Magerr v. City of Phila.

DAVID MAGERR v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-4264

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 11, 2016

MEMORANDUM

Padova, J.

Plaintiff brings this action against his employer, the City of Philadelphia, alleging that he was subject to discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his sex, disability, and age, in violation of Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the PHRA. The City moves to dismiss the Complaint, except for the disability discrimination claim in violation of the ADA asserted in Count II, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following reasons, we grant the Motion to Dismiss in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff David Magerr is a 56 year old man who has worked for the City of Philadelphia Department of Human Services since 1994. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer in 1997 and is currently in remission. (Id. ¶ 12.) He suffers from severe anxiety. (Id.) Plaintiff has experienced discrimination in the workplace based on his cancer diagnosis, his anxiety, his age, and his sex. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14, 20.) One of his colleagues made comments to him that were sexist and discriminatory relating to his disability. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff's superiors would not meet with him about this colleague and took no action against her. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)

When Plaintiff's department moved to a new office location in April 2013, Plaintiff was not provided with a computer, internet access, a telephone, or access to electronic files, which prevented him from completing his work. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) When he approached his supervisor, David Bruce, about the problem and requested a new or different assignment, Bruce responded that he "'would take [Plaintiff] to Personnel and lay him off.'" (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff believed Bruce meant that he wanted to replace Plaintiff with someone younger with no health issues. (Id. ¶ 20.) In addition, because Plaintiff did not have assignments, he felt that he was being pushed out of his position and was being denied the opportunity to seek promotions or higher-level jobs. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

In July 2013, Bruce told Plaintiff that "'he should transfer out and leave if he did not like it.'" (Id. ¶ 23.) Bruce also told Plaintiff that he "'pushed him under the bus'" by contacting the union for assistance. (Id.) Bruce also told a union representative that he was planning to lay off Plaintiff. (Id.) In September 2013, Plaintiff's union representative helped Plaintiff schedule a meeting with Bruce and another supervisor, Vanessa Williams, to discuss a new work assignment. (Id. ¶ 27.) At this meeting, Williams and Bruce claimed that Plaintiff's work was unsatisfactory. (Id.)

Count I of the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Count II asserts that Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his disability in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. Count III asserts that Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.Counts IV, V, and VI assert three state law claims of discrimination and a hostile work environment based on sex, age, and disability, respectively, in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). We take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)). Legal conclusions, however, receive no deference, as the court is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 n.5 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

A plaintiff's pleading obligation is to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which gives the defendant "'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must contain "'sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,' thus enabling 'the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.'" WarrenGen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In the end, we will grant a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint are not sufficient "'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendant contends that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to his claims. Before commencing an ADEA, ADA, or Title VII action in federal court, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a timely Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC after it investigates the charge.¹ 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (stating that a civil action asserting a violation of the ADEA cannot be fileduntil sixty days after the plaintiff filed a charge alleging discrimination with the EEOC); Itiowe v. NBC Universal, Inc., 556 F. App'x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that the ADA requires a plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies with the EEOC prior to filing suit (citing Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1999))); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (setting forth the procedure for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC asserting a violation of Title VII and the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust those administrative remedies prior to filing suit). "Similarly, before filing a PHRA claim in court, an employee must file a complaint with the PHRC."² Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., 452 F. App'x 122, 126 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Burgh v. Borough Council, 251 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2001)). "Pennsylvania plaintiffs may dual-file a charge with both agencies." Wilson v. Gerber, Civ. A. No. 11-6517, 2013 WL 3878686, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2013) (citing Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997)). The exhaustion requirement gives the EEOC a chance to settle the case and puts the employer "on notice of the claims likely to be filed against it." Barzanty v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 361 F. App'x 411, 414 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996); and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and (e)(1)).

The record of this Motion includes the amended complaint Plaintiff filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") and the right-to-sue letter issued by theEEOC in connection therewith.³ (Pl.'s Resp. Exs. A, C.) Based on Plaintiff's EEOC right-to-sue letter, dated May 1, 2015, we conclude that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his federal and PHRA claims. (Id. Ex. C.) Consequently, we deny Defendant's Motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of the Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

B. Sex, Disability, and Age Discrimination Claims

Defendant argues that the Complaint, insofar as it asserts claims of discrimination, should be dismissed because it fails to allege that Plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action, as required for claims asserting violations of Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the PHRA. Defendant also moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims with the exception of Count II because the Complaint does not allege causes of action for discrimination in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and the PHRA that otherwise satisfy the standards for such claims set forth in PriceWaterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), or McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title I of the ADA bars discrimination against qualified individuals "on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to...