Magic Circle Films Int'l, LLC v. Entm't One U.S. LP

199 A.D.3d 1444

154 N.Y.S.3d 599 (Mem)

MAGIC CIRCLE FILMS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.ENTERTAINMENT ONE U.S. LP, Defendant-Respondent. (Appeal No. 1.)

809

CA 20-01066

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: November 19, 2021

CAMARDO LAW FIRM, P.C., AUBURN (JOSEPH A. CAMARDO, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

DANIEL J. AARON, P.C., NEW YORK CITY (DANIEL J. AARON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, TROUTMAN, BANNISTER, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that it was the owner of certain musical compositions and sound recordings, and that it sustained damages because defendant unlawfully sold or distributed those works. In appeal No. 1, plaintiff appeals from an order that, inter alia, denied that part of its cross motion seeking leave to amend the amended complaint. In appeal No. 2, plaintiff appeals from an order that, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint. We affirm in each appeal.

With respect to appeal No. 1, it is well settled that "[l]eave to amend a pleading should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice to the nonmoving party where the amendment is not patently lacking in merit" ( Forcucci v. Board of Educ. of Hamburg Cent. Sch. Dist. , 151 A.D.3d 1660, 1661, 56 N.Y.S.3d 718 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3025 [b] ). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, we conclude that the amendments sought by plaintiff are patently lacking in merit and, therefore, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying that part of the cross motion seeking leave to amend the amended complaint (see generally Broyles v. Town of Evans , 147 A.D.3d 1496, 1497, 47 N.Y.S.3d 605 [4th Dept. 2017] ). Plaintiff sought to add a cause of action for breach of contract, but there is no contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant (see Arroyo v. Central Islip UFSD , 173 A.D.3d 814, 816, 103 N.Y.S.3d 512 [2d Dept. 2019] ; see generally Alloy Advisory, LLC v. 503 W. 33rd St. Assoc., Inc. , 195 A.D.3d 436, 436, 144 N.Y.S.3d 854 [1st Dept. 2021] ). Plaintiff also sought to add a cause of action for money had and received, which "sounds in quasi contract and arises when, in the absence of an agreement, one party possesses money [that belongs to another and] that in equity and good conscience it ought not retain" ( Sweetman v. Suhr , 159 A.D.3d 1614, 1615, 72 N.Y.S.3d 756 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 913, 2018 WL 3152819 [2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lebovits v. Bassman , 120 A.D.3d 1198, 1199, 992 N.Y.S.2d 316 [2d Dept. 2014] ). Here, however, plaintiff's claim was not "materially different from a claim for copyright infringement" ( Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Tel. Network, Inc. , 683 F.3d 424, 432 [2d Cir. 2012] ), and the Federal Copyright Act ( 17 USC § 101 et seq. ) "confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the [f]ederal courts for the resolution of copyright disputes" ( Jordan v. Aarismaa , 245 A.D.2d 616, 617, 665 N.Y.S.2d 973 [3d Dept. 1997] ; see 17 USC § 301 [a]). We therefore conclude that plaintiff's proposed cause of action for money had and received is patently lacking in merit inasmuch as it is preempted by the Copyright Act (see Saint-Amour v. Richmond Org., Inc. , 388 F. Supp. 3d 277, 291-292 [S.D. N.Y. 2019] ; We Shall Overcome Found. v. Richmond Org., Inc. , 221 F. Supp. 3d 396, 411-412 [S.D. N.Y. 2016] ).

With respect to appeal No. 2, plaintiff contends that the court erred in granting defendant's motion, claiming that the causes of action asserted in the amended complaint are not preempted by federal copyright law. In the amended complaint, plaintiff asserted causes of action for unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and injunctive relief. We conclude that, despite plaintiff's characterizations of its causes of action, there is "no doubt that the rights plaintiff[ ] ha[s] asserted are the equivalent of rights concerning use and reproduction of property protected by the [f]ederal copyright laws" ( Editorial Photocolor Archives v. Granger Collection , 61 N.Y.2d 517, 520, 474 N.Y.S.2d 964, 463 N.E.2d 365 [1984] ; see generally Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc. , 373 F.3d 296, 305-306 [2d...