Mahon v. Of

KALONJI MAHON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK CITY POLICEDEPT., GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK STATE,DETECTIVE (former) LUIS RODRIGUEZ, Shield No.3110, North Bronx Narcotics Bureau, SERGEANTJOHN URENA, Narcotics Bureau Bronx (N.B.B.X.),and CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants.

15 Civ. 4120 (AJP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April 25, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

ANDREW J. PECK, United States Magistrate Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Kalonji Mahon brings this § 1983 action alleging violations of his rights under the Constitution and New York law. (See generally Dkt. No. 2: Compl.) Mahon seeks injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Compl. ¶ V.) Presently before the Court is defendants' summary judgment motion. (Dkt. No. 34: Notice of Mot.) The parties have consented to decision of this case by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. No. 29.) Mahon has not responded to defendants' motion, and the time to do so has passed. (See Notice of Mot. ("[P]ursuant to Court Order dated March 7, 2016, opposition papers, if any, shall be filed on or before April 15, 2016."); Dkt. No. 31: 3/7/16 Order)

For the reasons set forth below, defendants' summary judgment motion is GRANTED.

FACTS

On December 1, 2010, Kalonji Mahon sold two bags of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer in exchange for $30 of pre-recorded buy money ("PRBM"). (Dkt. No. 37: DeCastro Aff. Ex. D: O.C.C.B. Buy Report.)¹ Mahon was arrested later that day by Detective Luis Rodriguez, who recovered $207 from Mahon (Ex. G: Property Clerk Invoice), including the $30 of PRBM (Ex. F: Mahon Dep. at 78-79; O.C.C.B. Buy Report; Dkt. No. 2: Compl. ¶ II(D)). Sergeant John Urena supervised Mahon's arrest. (Compl. ¶ II(D).)

Detective Rodriguez created a post-arrest property voucher for $182, accounting for $177 recovered from Mahon and $5 of PRBM. (Property Clerk Invoice.) The remaining $25 of PRBM was returned to the N.Y.P.D. fund. (Property Clerk Invoice.) Mahon claims that his property was vouchered inaccurately, he was not given "adequate notice/receipt," and ultimately his property was not returned to him in its entirety. (Compl. ¶ II(D); id. ¶ III; Mahon Dep. at 78-79, 82-83.) Mahon alternately states that excluding the PRBM he had exactly $182 on his person at the time of his arrest (Mahon Dep. at 79), and that he had more than $182 (probably $200) on his person at the time of his arrest (Mahon Dep. at 83; Dkt. No. 32: 2/17/16 Conf. Tr. at 9).

On December 6, 2010, Mahon was indicted by a Bronx County grand jury. (Ex. E: Grand Jury Indictment No. 4569-10.) On May 21, 2012, Mahon was convicted in Supreme Court, Bronx County of third degree criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance. (Ex. H: Certificate of Disposition.) At Mahon's trial, the prosecution presented as evidence a photocopy of the PRBM the undercover officer used to purchase crack cocaine from Mahon on December 1, 2010. (Mahon Dep. at 92-93.) Sergeant Urena testified that the N.Y.P.D. preserves only the smallest bill from the PRBM. (Compl. ¶ II(D).)

Mahon alleges that the "municipal defendant New York City Police Department hascreated [a] widespread unofficial policy, custom or practice where PRBM/U.S. currency is missing from it's obligation/duty to provide adequate and true notice due." (Compl. ¶ II(D).) Mahon asserts that the City's policy of recycling PRBM for successive buy and bust operations allows arresting officers to "dummy up the receipts" (Mahon Dep. at 93), and creates a chain of custody issue that runs afoul of due process and interferes with adequate access to the Courts (Compl. ¶ V; see also Mahon Dep. at 82-83, 92; 2/17/16 Conf. Tr. at 14, 17).

Mahon additionally alleges that the N.Y.P.D. Commissioner is liable for failing to train his subordinates to account for arrestees' property after buy and bust operations, and that the Governor of New York is liable for creating an "environment where N.Y.P.D. members normal, usual, ongoing practice [is] to lose U.S. currency through issue of false receipt, and claim that PRBM is being recycled without due notice, chain of custody or record." (Compl. ¶ II(D).)

ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986); Humphreys v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 553 F. App'x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2014); Connolly v. Calvanese, 515 F. App'x 62, 62 (2d Cir. 2013); Lang v. Ret. Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir. 1991).

The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608 (1970); Alzawahra v. Albany Med. Ctr., 546 F. App'x 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2013); Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). The movant may discharge this burden by demonstrating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case on an issue on which the non-movant has the burden of proof. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53; Dolan v. Cassella, 543 F. App'x 90, 90 (2d Cir. 2013).

To defeat a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party "'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)). Instead, the non-moving party must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record" to show that "a fact . . . is genuinely disputed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356; Alzawahra v. Albany Med. Ctr., 2013 WL 6284286 at *1; Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (at summary judgment, "[t]he time has come . . . 'to put up or shut up'"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003).

In evaluating the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.² The Court draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party only after determining that such inferences are reasonable, considering all the evidence presented. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S. Ct. 489 (1987). "If, as tothe issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper." Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d at 37.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court is not to resolve contested issues of fact, but rather is to determine whether there exists any disputed issue of material fact. See, e.g., Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1987); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S. Ct. 1570 (1987). To evaluate a fact's materiality, the substantive law determines which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. While "disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment[,] [f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 11-12.

"The Court recognizes that it must extend extra consideration to pro se plaintiffs" and that "pro se parties are to be given special latitude on summary judgment motions." Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 999 F. Supp. 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Peck, M.J.) (citations & internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (a pro se party's pleadings should be read liberally and interpreted "'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest'").³ "Nevertheless, proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant from the usualrequirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's 'bald assertion,' unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Cole v. Artuz, 93 Civ. 5981, 1999 WL 983876 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1999) (citing cases).⁴

II. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MAHON'S § 1983 CLAIMS

The Court construes Mahon's complaint liberally, and reads three due process claims into his allegations. (Dkt. No. 2: Compl.) First, that on Mahon's December 1, 2010 arrest his personal property was taken from him without due process of law. (Compl. ¶ II(D).) Second, that the City's failure to present as evidence at Mahon's trial the physical PRBM recovered from Mahon's person created a "chain of custody" problem that violated due process. (Ex. F: Mahon Dep. at 92; see also Dkt. No. 22: 1/12/16 Conf. Tr. at 18; Dkt. No. 32: 2/17/16 Conf. Tr. at 16-17.) Third, although nebulously articulated, appears to be that the City's policy of "recycl[ing]" PRBM violates due process generally. (Compl. ¶¶ II, III.)

A. New York State Law Provides Mahon an Adequate Remedy for Property Deprivation

To the extent Mahon's claim is that Detective Rodriguez' allegedly inadequate voucher (see page 2 above) deprived...