Mahoney v. Hughes

212 N.Y.S.3d 145

227 A.D.3d 908

In the Matter of Ryan Patrick MAHONEY, respondent,

v.Lauren Rita HUGHES, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—April 22, 2024

May 15, 2024

Friedman & Friedman, PLLC, Garden City, NY (Crystal S. Pannell of counsel), for appellant.

Cheryl Mallis, Garden City, NY, attorney for the child.

ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P., WILLIAM G. FORD, JANICE A. TAYLOR, LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Sharon N. Clarke, Ct. Atty. Ref.), dated February 8, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, granted those branches of the father’s petition which were to modify a so-ordered stipulation of custody dated March 29, 2022, so as to award him final decision-making authority with respect to the parties’ child’s educational and medical needs.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the father’s petition which was to modify the so-ordered stipulation of custody so as to award him final decision-making authority with respect to the child’s educational needs, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the petition; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The parties, who were never married, have one child together, born in October 2018. Pursuant to a so-ordered stipulation of custody dated March 29, 2022, the parties agreed that the mother would have residential custody of the child and that the parents would have joint legal custody, with the mother having final decision-making authority. In April 2022, the father filed a petition to modify the so-ordered stipulation of custody so as to award him sole physical custody on an emergency basis. After a hearing, the Family Court granted those branches of the father’s petition which were to modify the so-ordered stipulation of custody so as to award him final decision-making authority with respect to the child’s educational and medical needs. The mother appeals.

[1] Initially, the court attorney referee did not exceed her jurisdiction by determining this matter, since, contrary to the mother’s contention, the record demonstrates that both parties stipulated to have this matter heard and determined by a court attorney referee (see Matter of Moran v. Lane, 218 A.D.3d 687, 688, 193 N.Y.S.3d 214).

[2–5] " Tn order to modify an existing custody or parental access arrangement, there must be a showing of a change in circumstances such that modification is required to protect the best interests of the child’ " (Matter of Martinez v. Gaddy, 223 A.D.3d 816, 817, 204 N.Y.S.3d 163, quoting Matter of LaPera v. Restivo, 202 A.D.3d 788, 789, 158 N.Y.S.3d 858). " ‘The paramount concern when making such a determination is the best interests of the child under the totality of the circumstances’ " (Matter of Martinez v. Gaddy, 223 A.D.3d at 817, 204 N.Y.S.3d 163, quoting Matter of Cabano v. Petrella, 169 A.D.3d 901, 902, 94 N.Y.S.3d 376; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171–172, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260). "The Family Court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Pierce v. Caputo, 214 A.D.3d 877, 879, 185 N.Y.S.3d 283; see Matter of Turcios v. Cordero, 173 A.D.3d 1048, 1049, 100 N.Y.S.3d 569). "When an antagonistic relationship exists between the parties, it may be appropriate, depending upon the particular circumstances of the case, to give each party decision-making authority in separate areas" (Matter of Steingart v. Fong, 156 A.D.3d 794, 796, 67 N.Y.S.3d 44; see Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 24 A.D.3d 589, 592, 808 N.Y.S.2d 352).

[6] Here, the Family Court’s determination that the father established that there had been a change in circumstances such that modification of the so-ordered stipulation of custody was necessary has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of McFarlane v. Sapeg, 225 A.D.3d 766, 767, 207 N.Y.S.3d 596; Matter of Argila v. Edelman, 174 A.D.3d 521, 524, 106 N.Y.S.3d 71). Additionally, the court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interests to award the father final decision-making authority with respect to the child’s medical needs has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Cohen v. Cohen, 177 A.D.3d 848, 852, 114 N.Y.S.3d 458; Matter of Steingart v. Fong, 156 A.D.3d at 796, 67 N.Y.S.3d 44). The record demonstrates that the father had a demonstrated ability and an expressed interest in the child’s medical needs (see Matter of E.D. v. D.T., 152 A.D.3d 583, 584, 58 N.Y.S.3d 527), and there is no evidence in the record that called into question the father’s ability to make appropriate medical decisions for the child (see Matter of Lopez v. Noreiga, 182 A.D.3d 551, 553, 122 N.Y.S.3d 653). In contrast, the mother refused to sign consent forms to enroll the child in therapy, and she testified that she did not believe the child needed therapy despite the child’s history of anxiety and...