Mahrle v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Wash. Cnty., 327

CRAIG MAHRLE v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.

No. 327

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2020

February 11, 2021

Circuit Court for Washington County

Case No. C-21-CV-20-000183

UNREPORTED

Graeff, Wells, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Eyler, James R., J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Craig Mahrle, appellant, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, later amended, in the Circuit Court for Washington County against appellees, the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Maryland ("Board") and John Krumpotich. Appellant alleged that a contract between appellees for the conveyance of County-owned land violated County and State laws. Upon motions filed by appellees, the court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Appellant noted an appeal from the order of dismissal, presenting numerous questions, which we have distilled into one: Did the circuit court err in dismissing the amended complaint?¹ Finding no error, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 2016, Washington County acquired over 500 acres of land that was part of the former Fort Ritchie Military Installation ("the property"). In July 2018, the Board published a notice in the Herald Mail newspaper, advising of its intent to convey the property, which the County had determined to be "not needed for public use." The notice, which ran for three successive weeks, invited anyone with an interest in the conveyance to submit written comments to the County before August 21, 2018, after which time the property would be sold. The notice did not identify a potential buyer or buyers and did not contain any sale-specific information.

In November 2019, the Board entered into an agreement with Mr. Krumpotich for the sale of the property for the price of $1,712,500.00. The agreement was amended on January 16, 2020. The first amendment provided that the Board would consider continued ownership and obligations with respect to the roadways, water bodies, and public waterand sewer utilities on the property and agreed to extend the feasibility study period. Mr. Krumpotich agreed to increase the price to $1,750,000.00. On March 3, after a public meeting at which the Board considered and approved a second amendment, the parties executed the second amendment. At that meeting, appellant submitted an "as-is" offer of $1,525,000.00

The second amendment provided for an increase in price to $1,850,000.00, and the Board agreed to continued ownership of the roads, water bodies, and utilities. The closing was scheduled for Monday, April 6, 2020. The closing did not and has not occurred because of the pendency of this lawsuit.

In his complaint, appellant alleged that the Board failed to comply with the public notice requirements set forth in the Washington County Code (the County Code) § 1-301(a). It provides, in pertinent part:

(1) The County Commissioners may lease, sell, at either public or private sale, and convey or otherwise dispose of and convey any interest in real estate held by the County Commissioners and no longer needed for public use.

(2) The County Commissioners' intent to sell, dispose of, or convey, except in the case of a conveyance made between the county and any federal, state, or local government, shall be advertised in a newspaper of general distribution in the county, once a week for 3 successive weeks.

Appellant alleged that the second amendment to the agreement for the sale of the property "modified the boundaries" of the property being conveyed, and, therefore, the Board had a "legal obligation" to advertise the "new proposed transaction." Appellant requested a declaration "construing Washington County law and its application to" theagreement for the sale of the property. In addition, appellant sought to enjoin transfer of the property to Mr. Krumpotich "so as to allow [appellant] an opportunity to close on the purchase of the land after the County complies with its legal obligations [under County Code § 1-301(a)(2)]."

The Board filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which the requested relief could be granted. The motion to dismiss was supported by the affidavit of Jeffrey Cline, president of the Board, and accompanying exhibits, demonstrating that the following notice of intent to convey the property was advertised in the Herald Mail newspaper for three successive weeks: on July 31, August 7 and August 14, 2018:

NOTICE is hereby given that the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Maryland, (the "County") in accordance with Section 1-301, Code of Public Local Laws of Washington County, Maryland, intends to convey a total of 528 acres of land, more or less, located within the Cascade Development District and being the remainder of the former Fort Ritchie Military Reservation, which is part of the property acquired by the County on September 20, 2016 (the "Property").

It has been determined by the County that the above-described parcel of land is not needed for public use.

All persons who may have an interest in this conveyance may submit comments in writing to Todd Moser, Real Property Administrator, 80 W. Baltimore Street, Hagerstown, Maryland, before August 21, 2018, the date on or after which said conveyance will be made.

Mr. Krumpotich also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, adopting the arguments made by the Board. As additional grounds for dismissal, Mr. Krumpotich asserted that the complaint (1) failed to set forth a factual basis establishing that appellanthad standing to seek declaratory relief and (2) failed to allege "immediate, substantial, and irreparable injury" that would entitle him to injunctive relief.

Before the motions to dismiss were ruled on, appellant filed an amended complaint. Appellant alleged that, in addition to violating the notice requirements of County Code § 1-301(a), the Board failed to comply with Md. Code (2013 Repl. Vol.), Local Government Article ("LG"), § 12-401. In pertinent part, that section provides that the governing body of a county may "sell surplus property at public sale, after advertising the sale for at least 20 days[.]" LG § 12-401(b)(3). Appellees filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, renewing the arguments made in their initial motions.

Circuit court opinion

The circuit court held a telephonic hearing on the motions to dismiss on May 4, 2020.² Appellant argued that he was entitled to a declaratory judgment holding that the Board was required to give public notice of the proposed sale to Mr. Krumpotich after the second amendment and that it failed to do so. He argued that he was deprived of a right to purchase the property. Thus, he suffered irreparable injury and was entitled to an injunction prohibiting the conveyance of the property to Mr. Krumpotich.

Appellees argued that LG § 12-401 and County Code § 1-301(a) did not require notice other than the notice given in July and August 2018. They also argued that appellant lacked standing to seek declaratory relief and failed to allege an actual controversy withinthe meaning of the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), § 3-401, et seq.

Although documents were attached to the amended complaint, the circuit court treated the motion as a motion to dismiss, not as a summary judgment motion.³ The court issued a written opinion and order dismissing the amended complaint upon a finding that appellant failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for either declaratory or injunctive relief.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

All parties agree that the circuit court granted motions to dismiss and did not convert the motions to summary judgment motions. Appellant's primary contention is that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the legislative provisions. He also contends that he (1) is entitled to a declaratory judgment because the Board's intended sale is an ultra vires act and (2) alleged irreparable injury sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. Appellees disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court of Appeals has explained a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss as follows:

Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that mayreasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Consideration of the universe of "facts" pertinent to the court's analysis of the motion are limited generally to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.

State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship, 438 Md. 451, 496-97 (2014) (quoting RRC Ne., LLC v. BAA Maryland, Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643-44 (2010)).

"When reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, the appropriate standard of review 'is whether the trial court was legally correct.'" D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health System, Inc., 465 Md. 339, 350 (2019) (citations omitted). "Therefore, we review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. We will affirm the circuit court's judgment on any ground adequately shown by the record, even one upon which the circuit court has not relied or one that the parties have not raised." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

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