Maia v. IEW Constr. Grp.

257 N.J. 330

313 A.3d 887

CHRISTOPHER MAIA AND SEAN HOWARTH, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. IEW CONSTRUCTION GROUP, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

A-3 September Term 2023

088010

Argued January 3, 2024—Decided May 15, 2024

West Codenotes

Limited on Constitutional Grounds

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a25.1

On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 475 N.J. Super. 44, 291 A.3d 280 (App. Div. 2023).

Michael J. Riccobono argued the cause for appellant (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, attorneys; Michael J. Riccobono, on the brief).

Amy C. Blanchfield argued the cause for respondents (Mashel Law, attorneys; Stephan T. Mashel, of counsel and on the briefs, and Amy C. Blanchfíeld, on the briefs).

Thomas F. Doherty argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Business & Industry Association (McCarter & English, attorneys; Thomas F. Doherty, David R. Kott, and Ilana Levin, of counsel and on the brief).

James E. Burden argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (McClure Burden, attorneys; James E. Burden, on the brief).

Ravi Sattiraju submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Sattiraju & Tharney, attorneys; Ravi Sattiraju, of counsel and on the brief, and Brendan P. McCarthy, on the brief).

Alex R. Daniel submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute, and White and Williams, attorneys; Anthony M. Anastasio, of counsel, and Alex R. Daniel and Ryan T. Warden, of counsel and on the brief).

John F. Tratnyek submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Academy of New Jersey Management Attorneys (Jackson Lewis, attorneys; John F. Tratnyek and James M. McDonnell, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE FASCIALE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint seeking compensation for pre- and post-shift labor under provisions of L. 2019, c. 212 (Chapter 212), which amended the Wage Payment Law (WPL), N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -4.15, and the Wage and Hour Law (WHL), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a41, by providing additional remedies and by extending the WHL’s statute of limitations from two to six years. See L. 2019, c. 212. Chapter 212 took effect on August 6, 2019. See id. § 14. Some of the conduct on which plaintiffs base their complaint preceded the effective date of Chapter 212; some followed that effective date.

In this appeal, we consider whether plaintiffs’ claims as to conduct that preceded Chapter 212’s effective date were properly dismissed by the trial judge, who found the amendments to be prospective, or whether the Appellate Division properly reversed that judgment. We hold that the Legislature intended Chapter 212 to be prospective, not retroactive. Thus, Chapter 212 applies to conduct occurring on or after its effective date of August 6, 2019, but not to conduct occurring before then.

We therefore reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment, reinstate the trial judge’s order partially dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

In this appeal challenging an order entered under Rule 4:6-2(e), we derive the pertinent facts from plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendant IEW Construction Group (IEW) is a New Jersey-based company that performs construction services for the New Jersey Department of Transportation (DOT). Plaintiffs Christopher Maia and Sean Howarth were employed as laborers for IEW. IEW required plaintiffs to perform "pre-shift" and "post-shift" work which included dropping off and picking up equipment at different worksites and yards operated by the DOT.

Maia joined IEW on or around April 7, 2019. From that date until early May 2019, Maia was paid for the "pre-shift" and "post-shift" duties he performed. Thereafter, Maia was not paid for his "pre-shift" and "post-shift" work. Maia complained but IEW failed to remedy the situation. Maia continued to perform unpaid "pre-shift" and "post-shift" duties until November 2021, when he was laid off.

Howarth began working for IEW on or around April 22, 2020. Howarth was never paid for "pre-shift" and "post-shift" responsibilities during his employment at IEW. Like Maia, Howarth performed unpaid "pre-shift" and "post-shift" duties until November 2021, when he was laid off.

In April 2022, Maia and Howarth filed a class action complaint alleging, among other allegations, that IEW violated the WHL and WPL. On those two counts, plaintiffs seek unpaid wages to compensate and reimburse them, as well as injunctive relief, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs sought class certification for a proposed class to consist of "all current and former laborers and other similarly non-exempt positions employed by IEW in New Jersey at any point in the six (6) years preceding the filing date of [the] Complaint who were not paid for pre-shift and post-shift duties performed." The question of class certification has not yet been addressed.

B.

IEW filed a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss the part of plaintiffs’ complaint seeking damages for conduct that occurred prior to Chapter 212’s effective date, arguing that Chapter 212 should be applied prospectively, not retroactively. Plaintiffs countered that they were not seeking retroactive application of Chapter 212 but that, even if they were, the Legislature intended Chapter 212 to be "curative" and therefore applied to conduct occurring prior to its effective date.

The trial judge agreed with IEW that Chapter 212 is not to be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the judge granted IEW’s motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims "for conduct that arose prior to August 6th, 2019," but allowed those claims that arose after that date to "survive." (emphasis added).¹

Plaintiffs moved for leave to appeal the order partially dismissing their complaint. The Appellate Division granted that motion, reversed the order, and remanded for further proceedings. Maia v. IEW Const. Grp., 475 N.J. Super. 44, 48, 58, 291 A.3d 280 (App. Div. 2023). The Appellate Division concluded that "[t]he Legislature … did not tether Chapter 212’s remedies to the accrual date of an employee’s claim. It only prohibited an employee from recovering damages for wages due more than six years prior to the ‘commencement’ of the action." Id. at 56, 291 A.3d 280. Relying on W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 287 A.3d 421 (2023), the appellate court held that plaintiffs were entitled to the remedies available under the WHL and WPL as of the date of their complaint because "[a]pplying the law in effect at the time a complaint is filed … is not applying a statute retroactively; it is applying a statute prospectively to cases filed after its effective date." Id. at 54-56, 291 A.3d 280 (quoting Hildreth, 252 N.J. at 522, 287 A.3d 421).

Lastly, although it recognized that, unlike the WHL, the WPL never expressly contained any "look-back" period, the Appellate Division determined that "the Legislature intended to provide ‘the same opportunity’ for aggrieved workers to recover for violations of the WPL as it did for violations under the WHL," including having the same six-year period to recover damages for those violations. Id. at 53-54, 291 A.3d 280.

We granted IEW’s motion for leave to appeal. 255 N.J. 282, 300 A.3d (2023). We also granted motions by the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ), New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (NJCJI), New Jersey Business & Industry Association (NJBIA), and Academy of New Jersey Management Attorneys (ANJMA) to appear as amici curiae; the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (NELA), which appeared as amicus curiae before the Appellate Division, continued to participate.

II.

IEW asks us to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and grant its motion to partially dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. IEW distinguishes Hildreth and argues that the appellate court’s decision impermissibly "had the effect" of applying Chapter 212 retroactively. As a result, IEW contends that the appellate court erred by failing to consider the "factors" governing retroactive application which, according to IEW, cannot be satisfied. Specifically, IEW argues that Chapter 212 is not "curative," and that the phrase utilized in Chapter 212 -- "[t]his act shall take effect immediately" -- evidences an intent of prospective application.

Plaintiffs argue that the Appellate Division correctly relied on Hildreth and therefore the court’s decision should be affirmed. Plaintiffs reiterate that they are not seeking retroactive application of Chapter 212 but instead ask us to apply Chapter 212 as plainly written. Relying on legislative history, plaintiffs assert that the Legislature intended that those individuals who file a complaint on or after Chapter 212’s effective date be allowed to recover Chapter 212’s remedies and utilize the WHL’s six-year "look-back" period. As an alternative to their prospectivity argument, plaintiffs contended at oral argument that the amendments are "curative" and therefore apply retroactively.

NJBIA, ANJMA, and NJCJI support IEW’s position, echoing many of IEW's arguments, specifically that plaintiffs are impermissibly seeking retroactive application of Chapter 212. NJBIA adds that the WHL’s "look-back" period is a statute of repose and applying a statute of repose retroactively impermissibly creates or revives a cause of action. ANJMA argues that retroactivity is contrary to the Legislature’s intent and would result in manifest injustice and constitutional violations. NJCJI emphasizes that adopting plaintiffs’ arguments would undermine our precedent "protecting" against "unfair retroactive applications of new law[s]."

NJAJ and NELA support plaintiffs’ position that they are not seeking retroactive application of Chapter 212. Specifically, NJAJ argues that allowing plaintiffs to seek Chapter 212’s remedies for conduct occurring prior to its...