1
CURTIS E. MAIN, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division
September 29, 2021
OPINION AND ORDER
JON E. DEGUILIO CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
A. Factual Background
In September 2017, Mr. Main applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, claiming that, by May 2017, he had become unable to work due to his health conditions. (R. 181.) He primarily alleged that he was disabled due to degenerative disk disease, atrial fibrillation, tendinitis of the shoulders, and a pancreatic cyst. (R. 202.)
On September 4, 2019, after reviewing Mr. Main's medical records and listening to his testimony, the ALJ found that he was not disabled. (R. 26.) The ALJ determined that Mr. Main suffers from two severe impairments: cervical degenerative disc disease and an umbilical hernia. (R. 18.) However, the ALJ found that Mr. Main's alleged degenerative shoulder joint disease, lumbar degenerative disc disease, atrial fibrillation, and mental impairments were all non-severe. (R. 19-21.) The ALJ then found that none of these impairments or combination of impairments was equal in severity to the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 22.) After reviewing the record and listening to Mr. Main at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that he had the residual functional capacity for medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R § 404.1567(c),
2
except for the following limitations: “[H]e can occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequent but not constant bilateral reaching, which includes overhead, forward and to the side.” (R. 22.) Determining that Mr. Main could perform past relevant work as a component assembler and general laborer, the ALJ found that Mr. Main was not disabled. (R. 25-26.) Mr. Main requested a review by the Appeals Council, which was denied on June 12, 2020 (R. 1), thereby making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
B. Standard of Review
Because the Appeals Council denied review, the Court evaluates the ALJ's decision as the final word of the Commissioner of Social Security. Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2013). This Court will affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact and denial of benefits if they are supported by substantial evidence. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). This evidence must be “more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). Even if “reasonable minds could differ” about the disability status of the claimant, the Court must affirm the Commissioner's decision as long as it is adequately supported. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ has the duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make independent findings of fact, and dispose of the case accordingly. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399-400. In evaluating the ALJ's decision, the Court considers the entire administrative record but does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute the Court's own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539
3
(7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the Court conducts a “critical review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner's decision. Id. An ALJ must evaluate both the evidence favoring the claimant as well as the evidence favoring the claim's rejection and may not ignore an entire line of evidence that is contrary to his or her findings. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). The ALJ also must provide a “logical bridge” between the evidence and the conclusions. Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009).
C. Standard for Disability
Disability benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish disability under the terms of the Social Security Act. Estok v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1998). Specifically, the claimant must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations create a five-step process to determine whether the claimant qualifies as disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). The steps are to be used in the following order:
1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity
2. Whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment
3. Whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one listed in the regulations
4. Whether the claimant can still perform past relevant work and
5. Whether the claimant can perform other work in the community.
See Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001).
At step two, an impairment is severe if it significantly limits a claimant's ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(a), 416.922(a). At step three, a claimant is deemed
4
disabled if the ALJ determines that the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If not, the ALJ must then assess the claimant's residual functional capacity, which is defined as the most a person can do despite any physical and mental limitations that may affect what can be done in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. The ALJ uses the residual functional capacity to determine whether the claimant can perform his or her past work under step four and whether the claimant can perform other work in society at step five. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(e), 416.920(e). A claimant qualifies as disabled if he or she cannot perform such work. The claimant has the initial burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).
D. Discussion
Mr. Main argues that the ALJ's decision should be remanded for several reasons. First, he argues that the ALJ's credibility analysis was flawed because the ALJ cherry-picked evidence. (DE 16 at 2.) Second, he argues that the ALJ erred at Step 3 by not considering medical equivalency. (Id. at 9.) Third, he argues that the RFC was not supported because it lacked an accurate and logical bridge. (Id. at 13.) Fourth, he argues that the ultimate decision was unsupported. (Id. at 24.) The Court believes Mr. Main's most convincing argument is that the ALJ erred in conducting its credibility analysis. Since this argument is the most persuasive, the Court will not address the remaining arguments, which will either be moot or can be addressed on remand.
5
Because the ALJ is “in the best position to determine a witness's truthfulness and forthrightness . . . [the] court will not overturn an ALJ's credibility determination unless it is ‘patently wrong.'” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310-11 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504-05 (7th Cir. 2004)). But when the credibility determination rests on “objective factors or fundamental implausibilities rather than subjective considerations [such as a claimant's demeanor], appellate courts have greater freedom to review the ALJ's decision.” Cliffordv. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). When making their credibility determination, “an ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013); SSR 163p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016) (superseding SSR 96-7p).[1] Additionally, while an ALJ is not required to provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence, an ALJ cannot simply state that an individual's allegations have been considered or that the individual's allegations are not credible. Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004). An ALJ's failure to give specific reasons for a credibility finding, supported by substantial evidence, is grounds for remand. Id.; Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009).
The process for evaluating a claimant's symptoms is organized around two major steps. First, the claimant must provide objective medical evidence of a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that reasonably could be expected to produce the alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)-(b). Second, after the claimant satisfies the first step,
6
the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual's symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the individual's ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). In evaluating allegations of pain, adjudicators are directed to consider whether the symptoms are “consistent with the objective medical [evidence] and other evidence in the individual's record.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *2 (Mar. 16, 2016); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (explaining that the agency considers both “objective medical evidence and other evidence” in evaluating whether an impairment affects activities of daily living and the ability to work). Objective medical evidence is merely one factor to be considered, and an ALJ is not free to “disregard an individual's statements about the intensity,...