Maiorano v. Astrue

930 F.Supp.2d 1240

Teresa MAIORANO, Plaintiff,

v.Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 12–cv–0367–WJM.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

March 13, 2013.

Joseph Anthony Whitcomb, Rocky Mountain Disability Law Group, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Alexess D. Rea, Social Security Administration, William George Pharo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION

WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, District Judge.

This social security benefits appeal is before the Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff Teresa Maiorano (“Plaintiff”) challenges the final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying her application for disability insurance benefits. The denial was affirmed by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who ruled Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (“Act”). This appeal followed.

For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ's decision denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Teresa L. Maiorano (“Plaintiff”) was born on May 8, 1957 and was 51 years old on the alleged disability onset date. (Admin. Record (“R.”) (ECF No. 10) at 27.) Plaintiff has completed her GED and has past relevant work experience as a customer service clerk and sales attendant. (R. at 20, 27.)

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on January 8, 2010, alleging that she had been disabled since February 17, 2009 due to several impairments, including plantar fasciitis in both feet, depression, osteoarthritis, ulnar tunnel disorder, and a hypothyroid condition. (R. at 154, 158.) Plaintiff's application was initially denied on April 23, 2010. (R. at 10.)

After requesting a hearing, Plaintiff's claims were heard by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) William Musseman on March 17, 2011. (R. at 10.) Plaintiff and vocational expert Martin Rauer testified at the administrative hearing. ( Id.) Medical evidence and opinions were provided by treating physicians Dr. Jeffrey G. Snyder, M.D., a general practitioner, and Dr. Kerry Berg, D.P.M., a podiatrist; and examining physicians Dr. Michael G. Messner, D.O., an orthopedic specialist; Dr. Kenneth P. Finn, M.D., a pain medicine and musculoskeletal specialist; and Dr. Mark Meyer, M.D., a pain management specialist. (R. at 14–17.)

On May 9, 2011, the ALJ issued a written decision in accordance with the Commissioner's five-step sequential evaluation process.¹ At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 17, 2009. (R. at 12.) At step two, he found that Plaintiff suffered from bilateral plantar fasciitis, a severe impairment. ( Id.) The ALJ did not find Plaintiff's thyroid disorder, depression, or any other impairment to be a severe impairment. ( Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's plantar fasciitis, while a severe impairment, did not meet any of the impairments or combination of impairments listed in the social security regulations. ( Id.) The ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), finding that she had the RFC to perform “sedentary” work as defined by the regulations, including very minimal standing and walking, and no operation of foot or leg controls. (R. at 13.) Given this RFC, at step four the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a bank customer service clerk and an order clerk, because such work would not require her to perform activities that were restricted by her RFC. (R. at 20.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act and therefore was not entitled to benefits. ( Id.)

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on December 9, 2011. (R. at 6.) Thus, the ALJ's May 9, 2011 decision is the final administrative action for purposes of review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir.2009). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir.2007). Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record. Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261–62 (10th Cir.2005). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir.2006). “On the other hand, if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.1993).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Plaintiff raises four issues: (1) the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinions of treating physicians Dr. Snyder and Dr. Berg; (2) the ALJ erred at step two in finding Plaintiff's depression, hypothyroidism, ulnar tunnel syndrome, and osteoarthritis not to be severe impairments; (3) the ALJ improperly disregarded Plaintiff's testimony regarding all her impairments other than her plantar fasciitis; and (4) the ALJ's RFC assessment failed to consider the impact of Plaintiff's depression and osteoarthritis on her functional ability, and in reliance on the erroneous RFC, the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff could return to her past relevant work. (ECF No. 14 at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that each of these errors was caused by the ALJ's application of the wrong legal standard, and that each determination was not based on substantial evidence. ( Id.) The Court will address each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn.

A. Treating Doctors' Medical Opinions

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of Dr. Snyder and Dr. Berg, both of whom were Plaintiff's treating physicians. (ECF No. 14 at 17–21.)

The opinion of a treating physician is generally “entitled to great weight because it reflects expert judgment based on continuing observation of a patient's condition over a prolonged period of time.” Williams v. Chater, 923 F.Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.Kan.1996). However, an ALJ may disregard that opinion if it is contradicted by other medical evidence, or otherwise inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record. See Marshall v. Astrue, 315 Fed.Appx. 757, 759–60 (10th Cir.2009); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The analysis of how much weight to accord a treating source opinion is sequential:

An ALJ must first consider whether the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. If the answer to this question is “no,” then the inquiry at this stage is complete. If the ALJ finds that the opinion is well-supported, he must then confirm that the opinion is consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. In other words, if the opinion is deficient in either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.

Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir.2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927).

If a treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must determine what weight, if any, the opinion deserves, considering the following factors:

(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician's opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ's attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion.

Id. at 1301 (internal quotations omitted). The ALJ need not explicitly discuss each individual factor. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir.2007). Nevertheless, the ALJ must consider every factor in determining the weight to be assigned to a medical opinion, and “if the ALJ rejects the opinion completely, he must then give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.” Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301;see20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Soc. Sec. Ruling (SSR) 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4.

1. Dr. Snyder

With regard to Dr. Snyder, Plaintiff argues that as her treating doctor, his opinion merited not only significant weight, but controlling weight, and the ALJ improperly disregarded it entirely. ( Id. at 17–20.)

The ALJ reviewed Dr. Snyder's opinions regarding the pain Plaintiff suffers as a result of her plantar fasciitis; his diagnoses of hypothyroidism, osteoarthritis, and depression; and his opinions regarding Plaintiff's work limitations resulting from her impairments. (R. at 15–19.) The ALJ noted that Dr. Snyder had been treating Plaintiff as her primary care physician for eight years as of the date of the hearing. (R. at 14.) Dr. Snyder, a general practitioner, was not a specialist in any of Plaintiff's impairments. ( Id.)

Regarding Plaintiff's osteoarthritis, the ALJ found that “no medically determinable impairment has been established, with signs and findings that would prevent the claimant's full and unencumbered use of her upper extremities” (R. at 17), and that although Dr. Snyder's records noted that Plaintiff had osteoarthritis in her hands, “this diagnosis has not been confirmed by appropriate imaging studies.” (R. at 18.) Therefore, the ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Snyder's opinion regarding Plaintiff's upper body limitations. (R. at 17.)

Regarding Plaintiff's depression, the ALJ found that despite Dr....