Makusha Gozo v. DHS

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Makusha Gozo, Plaintiff, v. DHS, City of Willmar, Kandiyohi County, State of Minnesota, and Secretary Mayorkas, Defendants.

No. 24-CV-1389 (KMM/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

May 31, 2024

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Makusha Gozo's (1) 34 USC 30301 Complaint (Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”)); (2) Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 2 (“IFP Application”)); (3) Motion to Amend Title 34 USC § 30301 Complaint (Dkt. 3 (“Motion to Amend”)); (4) “Motion to proceed in forma pauperis” (Dkt. 4 (“Second IFP Application”)); and (5) Amended Title 34 USC § 30301 Complaint (Dkt. 6 (“Second Amended Complaint”)). For the following reasons, the Court orders that the Second Amended Complaint is this action's operative pleading, recommends dismissing that pleading in its entirety, and recommends denying the IFP Application and Second IFP Application as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

This case commenced on April 17, 2024, when the Court received the Complaint and IFP Application. (See Docket.) When Gozo filed the Complaint, authorities with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) were detaining him in the Kandiyohi County Jail (“KCJ”) in Willmar, Minnesota. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1-2 at 1 (comprising envelope showing Gozo's then-current location and status).^[1])

The Complaint names five defendants: (1) “DHS,” which the Court construes as referring to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; (2) the City of Willmar, Minnesota; (3) Kandiyohi County; (4) the State of Minnesota; and (5) “Secretary Mayorkas,” which presumably refers to Alejandro Mayorkas, the current U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. (Compl. 1.) The Complaint's thrust concerns an altercation on April 14, 2024, between Gozo and a “Mr. Vanden Einde,” who appears to be a KCJ corrections officer. (Id. at 2.^[2])

On April 24, 2024, the Court received the Motion to Amend and the Second IFP Application. (See Docket.) The Motion to Amend seeks to amend the original Complaint-and while titled a “Motion to Amend,” the document seems to consist of the desired new complaint itself. (See generally Mot to Amend. 1-10.) Two days later, the Court received the Second Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. 6.) This document closely resembles the Motion to Amend, but has at least a couple of minor differences. (Compare Mot. to Amend 1, 6, with Second Am. Compl. 1, 6 (showing differences in document title and in Paragraph 11).) The Court therefore construes the Second Amended Complaint as a second motion to amend the Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint also adds two new defendants: Eric Tollefson, Kandiyohi County's sheriff; and Tim Walz, Minnesota's governor. (See Second Am. Compl. 1.^[3])

B. Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 6)

Gozo alleges that on April 14, 2024, he received certain “pharmacy products” at the KCJ's housing unit, then stopped at an officer's station to speak with a corrections officer about certain other litigation Gozo had filed. (See Second Am. Compl. 3.) Gozo states that during this discussion, Vanden Einde interrupted the discussion by “threatening [Gozo] to stop his litigation against the Defendants.”^[4] After Gozo ended his discussion with the other officer, Vanden Einde allegedly “violently grabbed [Gozo's] back and forcibly pushed him toward his room,” during which he “reached below [Gozo's] waist to make physical contact with [Gozo].” (Id.) Gozo alleges that he then yelled at Vanden Einde, at which point Vanden Einde “responded . . . by calling [Gozo] various racial epithets.” (Id. at 4.)

Gozo states that after this interaction, he opened his cell door “to ask for medical attention,” but Vanden Einde told him “to shut his door and denied [Gozo] all legal recourse.” (Id.) Gozo also contends that Vanden Einde had “had no lawful reason to get up from his desk and leave his assigned post in order to pursue [Gozo] as he did.” (Id.)

Gozo reports that because of a “malfunctioning phone system,” he was unable to call DHS's Office of the Inspector General, and that unspecified officials “denied” him “envelopes to mail his complaint to the OIG.” (Id.) As a result, he says, he could not exhaust his administrative remedies and report “Defendants' criminal torts.” (Id.)

The Second Amended Complaint's “Argument” section contains various “[p]oints.” “Point one” asserts that several of the Defendants are liable to Gozo based on “vicarious liability under the doctrine of [r]espondeat [s]uperior,” ostensibly because they “permitted the licensure, registration and operations of the remaining Defendants and provided the auspices of their criminal torts.” (Id. at 5.) Gozo also generically asserts that one could construe his case like “other vicarious liability cases [where] there is negligent hiring, followed by negligent retention and then followed by negligent supervision.” (Id.)

In “Point two,” Gozo discusses various legal standards involved in assessing excessive-force cases. (See id. at 6-7.) By and large, the gist of this discussion is to assert that Vanden Einde's treatment of Gozo violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment. (See id. at 6-8.)

As far as this Court can discern, Gozo purports to bring claims under (1) “Minn. Stat. § 541.073 et seq.” (he describes this as covering “personal injury based on sexual assault”); (2) 34 U.S.C. § 30301; (3) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86; (4) 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42; (5) the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and (6) 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. (See id. at 2-3, 5.) For relief, Gozo asks for $18 million, which includes $1 million in “[a]ttorney fees” and $4 million in punitive damages. (Id. at 10.^[5])

II. ANALYSIS

A. Operative Pleading

The Court will first isolate this action's operative complaint. Neither of Gozo's attempts to amend the original Complaint fully comply with this District's rules for litigants who seek to amend their complaints. See D. Minn. LR 15.1(b). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a district court should permit a first amendment “as a matter of course”; after that, it should generally “freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The Court therefore grants the implicit motion to amend reflected by the Second Amended Complaint; that pleading at Docket Entry 6 will be this action's operative pleading. Given this determination, the Court denies as moot the Motion to Amend itself-the Second Amended Complaint supersedes whatever amendment that filing proposed.^[6]

B. Standards of Review

The IFP applications submitted by Gozo suggest that as a financial matter, he qualifies for IFP status. But under the federal statute governing IFP proceedings, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious[,] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

To decide if a complaint states a claim for which a court may grant relief, a district court accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Varga v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 764 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2014)). While a complaint's factual allegations need not be detailed, they must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing authorities). A complaint must “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A district court's consideration of whether a pleading states a claim is “context-specific”; a court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679; see also, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (making same points (quoting Magee v. Trs. of Hamline Univ., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 2014)) (cleaned up)). Courts should construe pro se complaints like Gozo's “‘liberally,'” but such pleadings must still allege enough facts to support the claims advanced. Sandknop v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 932 F.3d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).

In addition to the standards imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction [over an action], the court must dismiss [it].” Cf. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023) (noting that “courts must enforce jurisdictional rules sua sponte” (citing Hamer v. Neighborhood Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017))).

C. Claims Against Federal Defendants

The Court will first address the Second Amended Complaint's claims against two federal defendants-i.e., DHS and Secretary Mayorkas. The Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “the United States may not be sued without its consent and . . . the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (citing authorities); see also, e.g., F.D.I.C v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (quoting Mitchell). To be sure, one defendant here is a federal agency-DHS-rather than the United States itself, but the Mitchell rule also applies to federal agencies. See, e.g., Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475; Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006) (citing Meyer). ...