Malam v. Adducci

452 F.Supp.3d 643

Janet MALAM, Petitioner,

v.Rebecca ADDUCCI, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 20-10829

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed April 5, 2020

Amended April 6, 2020

Rosana Santana Moura Garbacik, Andrew D. Stacer, Stacer, PLC, Plymouth, MI, for Petitioner

Jennifer L. Newby, U.S. Attorney Defensive Litigation, Detroit, MI, for Respondents.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITIONER'S EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [2]¹

JUDITH E. LEVY, United States District Judge

This is an emergency petition challenging Janet Malam's mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because of danger posed to her by the COVID-19 pandemic. Petitioner claims that her continued detention violates her Fifth Amendment rights by exposing her to substantial risk of illness and death. She requests a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring that Respondents release her on her own recognizance and refrain from re-detaining her for the pendency of her immigration proceedings.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART this emergency application for relief.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Janet Malam, born in the United Kingdom, is a lawful permanent resident. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) She was legally admitted to the United States in 1967 at the age of four and is now fifty-six years old. (Id. ) Petitioner has been detained since March 4, 2020, in the Calhoun County Correctional Facility² in conjunction with removal proceedings at the Detroit Immigration Court. (Id. ) She brings suit against the following Respondents: Rebecca Adducci, the Detroit District Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Matthew Albence, Deputy Director of ICE; Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; William Barr, Attorney General of the United States; ICE; and Heidi Washington, Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). (Id. )

Petitioner alleges that she suffers from a number of health conditions, including: multiple sclerosis ; bipolar disorder ; pain; anemia ; essential primary hypertension ; hypothyroidism ; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ; fibromyalgia ; mild cognitive impairment; carpal tunnel syndrome ; severe major depressive disorder ; opioid addiction; nicotine dependence; and polyneuropathy. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) According to Petitioner's extensive medical records, these diagnoses are current and accurate as of March 3, 2020. (ECF No. 1-4, PageID.31.)

Because Petitioner has committed two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, her detention is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).³ On March 30, 2020, Petitioner filed a petition requesting emergency relief in either one of two forms: a writ of habeas corpus or an injunction "ordering Defendants to immediately release [Petitioner], with appropriate precautionary public health measures, on the grounds that her continued detention violates the Due Process Clause [of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]." (Id. at PageID.17.) Petitioner simultaneously filed an Application for Temporary Restraining Order requesting that the Court order Petitioner's release during the pendency of her immigration proceedings due to the substantial risk to her health posed by COVID-19 as a result of Petitioner's continued detention in the enclosed group environment endemic to the Calhoun County Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 2.)

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order requiring her immediate release from detention for the duration of the COVID-19 State of Emergency in Michigan or until further Court order.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

"Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress." Hamama v. Adducci , 912 F.3d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. , 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) ). All courts have an "independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ). A court must determine whether it has jurisdiction before deciding a cause of action. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Article I, § 9, cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution (Suspension Clause); the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act); and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus)." (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moreover, even if Petitioner's claims could not be heard under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides an independent source of jurisdiction.

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Jurisdiction

28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides a district court with jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus where a petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). See INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (recognizing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a jurisdictional statute). For over 100 years, habeas corpus has been recognized as the vehicle through which noncitizens may challenge the fact of their detention. See Chin Yow v. U.S. ¸ 208 U.S. 8, 13, 28 S.Ct. 201, 52 L.Ed. 369 (1908) ("Habeas corpus is the usual remedy for unlawful imprisonment.") In 2001, the Supreme Court recognized the continued viability of the writ in cases involving the detention of noncitizens: " § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention." Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). In 2018, the Court ruled on the merits of a habeas petition challenging the validity of pre-removal detention. Jennings v. Rodriguez , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018).

Respondents claim, citing Luedtke v. Berkebile , that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant habeas relief because 28 U.S.C. § 2241 "is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement." Luedtke v. Berkebile , 704 F.3d 465, 466 (6th Cir. 2013). Though the Supreme Court has left as an open question "the reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement," Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 792, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2006), the Sixth Circuit, conversely, has held that "a § 2241 habeas petition is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging the conditions of...confinement." Velasco v. Lamanna , 16 F. App'x 311, 314 (6th Cir. 2001). In 2018, the Sixth Circuit reiterated this holding, affirming a district court that dismissed a § 2241 petition raising an Eighth Amendment challenge to subpar prison conditions because such a claim must be brought in a civil-rights action such as one under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Solano-Moreta v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , No. 17-1019, 2018 WL 6982510 (6th Cir. Sep. 24, 2018) ; but see Aamer v. Obama , 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("Habeas corpus tests not only the fact but also the form of detention.") (internal citation omitted); Roba v. U.S. , 604 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that § 2241 petition may be used to challenge conditions of confinement).

The Respondents argue that "there is no dispute that Petitioner brings a challenge to the conditions of her confinement." (ECF No. 11, PageID.175.) On its face, the application appears to concern Petitioner's conditions of confinement. Petitioner titles her claim for relief: "Freedom from Cruel Treatment and Conditions of Confinement." (ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) But Petitioner may nonetheless bring her claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because she seeks immediate release from confinement as a result of there being no conditions of confinement sufficient to prevent irreparable constitutional injury under the facts of her case.

Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent support the conclusion that where a petitioner claims no set of conditions would be sufficient to protect her constitutional rights, her claim should be construed as challenging the fact, not conditions, of her confinement and is therefore cognizable in habeas. In Nelson v. Campbell , the Supreme Court held that a death-row inmate's challenge to the method of his upcoming execution constituted a challenge to the conditions—not the fact or duration—of his execution, and therefore his claim fell outside the "core" of habeas corpus. 541 U.S. 637, 644-45, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004). However, the Court speculated that if the challenged method "were a statutorily mandated part of the lethal injection protocol, or if as a factual matter petitioner were unable or unwilling to concede acceptable alternatives," there would be a "stronger argument that success on the merits, coupled with injunctive relief, would call into question the death sentence itself," bringing the claim into the core of habeas corpus. Id. at 645, 124 S.Ct. 2117. In Adams v. Bradshaw , the Sixth Circuit relied on Nelson to uphold habeas jurisdiction over a claim where a petitioner challenged the method of his execution but did not concede that any acceptable alternative existed. 644 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Adams has not conceded the existence of an acceptable alternative procedure....Thus, Adams's lethal-injection claim, if successful, could render his...