Maldonado-Cátala v. Municipality Naranjito

255 F.Supp.3d 300

Maribel MALDONADO–CÁTALA, Plaintiff,

v.MUNICIPALITY OF NARANJITO, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 13-1561 (BJM).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Oct. 26, 2015.

Eileen Landron–Guardiola, Luis A. Rodriguez–Munoz, Eduardo A. Vera–Ramirez, Landron & Vera LLC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Rafael E. Rivera–Sanchez, Ricardo Burgos–Vargas, Vivian Ivette Gonzalez–Mendez, Carolina, PR, Joseph G. Feldstein–Del Valle, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BRUCE J. McGIVERIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Maribel Maldonado–Cátala ("Maldonado") brings this suit against the Municipality of Naranjito, Orlando Ortiz–Chevres, Marialis Figueroa–Negrón, José Figueroa–Nieves, Hiram Bristol–Colon, José Tomás Rodríguez–Veléz, and Insurance Company ABC (collectively "the Municipality"), alleging hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Docket No. 1. Maldonado also alleges violations of various Puerto Rico laws.¹ The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Docket No. 51. The Municipality moved for summary judgment, Docket Nos. 58, 118, and Maldonado opposed, Docket Nos. 104–05.

For the reasons set forth below, the Municipality's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" only if it "is one that could be resolved in favor of either party." Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions" of the record materials "which it believes demonstrate the absence" of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

When the moving party lacks the burden of proof at trial, it may discharge this threshold responsibility in two ways: by producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir.2000), or showing "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Once that bar is cleared, "the burden shifts to the summary judgment target to demonstrate that a trialworthy issue exists," Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 368 (1st Cir.2002), by "affirmatively point[ing] to specific facts" in the record revealing the presence of a meaningful dispute, McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995).

The court does not act as trier of fact when reviewing the parties' submissions and so cannot "superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how reasonable those ideas may be) upon" conflicting evidence. Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987). Rather, it must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs–Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). The court may not grant summary judgment "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. But the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and may not rest upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation," Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

BACKGROUND

Except where otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 56 submissions.² I note that both sides raise frivolous objections, and attempt to insert irrelevant facts and legal argumentation into their statements. This summary omits these glosses on the record, but any genuine disputes of material fact are addressed in this opinion's discussion section.³

The Parties

Maldonado held a career position with the Municipality, and began working for its Emergency Management Office ("EMO") in August 2008 as an emergency medical technician ("EMT"), where she provided medical services to injured persons and transported them to the hospital. DSUF ¶¶ 1, 2, 12. To perform her essential duties, she needed a license to drive an ambulance, a driver's license, and an EMT license that itself required a CPR license and sign-language certification. DSUF ¶¶ 3, 4.

Ortiz–Chevres became the Municipality's mayor in January 2009. DSUF ¶ 8. He appointed Figueroa–Negrón ("Figueroa") that same month to the Municipality's director of human resources position, where she remained until July 2012. DSUF ¶ 9. The mayor also appointed several EMO directors while Maldonado worked for the EMO: José Padilla, who served throughout 2009; Hiram Bristol–Colon ("Bristol"), who served from January to October 2010; Rámon Vázquez Baez, who served from November 2010 to January 2011; and Tomás Rodríguez–Vélez ("Rodríguez–Vélez"), who served from 2011 onward. DSUF ¶ 11. With the assistance of the EMO subdirector, the EMO director is responsible for supervising employees, handling personnel matters, and assigning work schedules. DSUF ¶¶ 12– 15. All other EMO employees are not supervisors. DSUF ¶ 13.

Alleged Harassment and Retaliation

In July 2010, Maldonado suffered a work-related accident. DSUF ¶ 34. As a result, the State Insurance Fund ordered her to stop working. DSUF ¶ 34. She remained on unpaid leave, which the mayor approved, from July 8, 2010 to April 3, 2012. DSUF ¶¶ 35, 36. On September 30, 2010, she accompanied a coworker to complain to Figueroa about harassment by Bristol. DSUF ¶¶ 37, 61. While there, Maldonado told Figueroa about comments made by Bristol and Jose Figueroa–Nieves ("Figueroa–Nieves"). Maldonado Dep. 20:23–25, 24:21–24. She alleges that around 2009 and 2010, Figueroa–Nieves and another coworker, Maria Elena Serrano ("Serrano"), called her "machito" (translated in the record as "manly") on a daily basis. Maldonado Dep. 11:19–20. Figueroa–Nieves also allegedly told her that she liked "butterflies in her mouth and perhaps that was because [she] ha[dn't] had a men [sic] to really put the wood to [her] and changed [sic][her] opinion." Maldonado Dep. 13:13–19.

Maldonado claims this "joke" "referring to [her] sexual orientation" was made "all the time" and "two or three times" in front of Bristol.⁴ Maldonado Dep. 13:18–25. Maldonado also said Bristol once told her that he would flirt with her if he did not know she was lesbian. DSUF ¶ 92. Figueroa assured Maldonado and her coworker that the complaint would be investigated, and relayed it to the mayor. DSUF ¶ 37.

By October 2010, the Municipality hired an attorney to investigate the complaint. DSUF ¶ 62. The attorney interviewed several employees and informed them that they should report any retaliation against them if it occurred. DSUF ¶¶ 71–72, 76. Maldonado was one of the employees interviewed, and told the investigating attorney that sexual harassment was occurring in the workplace against other females. DSUF ¶¶ 74, 98. But in doing so, she did not mention any harassment by Bristol or Figueroa–Nieves against her in particular. DSUF ¶ 79. In his investigation, which included asking other employees about harassment against Maldonado, the attorney did not uncover any incidents of harassment against her. DSUF ¶¶ 86, 96. On October 28, the attorney drafted a report finding that Bristol engaged in misconduct and sexual harassment against female employees. DSUF ¶ 94. The attorney recommended that the mayor remove Bristol from his position. DSUF ¶ 104. The mayor requested Bristol's resignation the next day, Bristol tendered it, and the mayor immediately accepted it. DSUF ¶¶ 105–06.

Following that investigation, and while on unpaid leave, Maldonado received several messages on Facebook. DSUF ¶ 119. The message she received on November 1, 2010, at 9:46 p.m., called her a "nasty lesbian," "whore," "snake," and "dike." It also said "I will see you fall you dirty lesbian and every one of you one by one what you did to that man the one from emergency management ... remember that you have children that by the way the boy is gay and the girl is a lesbo." Docket No. 115–3 at 13. Maldonado interpreted this message as a threat and filed a police report, which the police began investigating. The Municipality does not dispute that this message insulted and threatened Maldonado and her family. DSUF ¶ 119. The police traced this Facebook message to a computer in an office in the EMO.

OSMF ¶ 31. That office is kept locked, and the office is generally restricted to the EMO Director and his secretary, both of whom have the keys to that office. OSMF ¶ 67.

A second message said, "I was not the one who got my wings plucked it was done to you little lesbian your back doesn't hurt no more so come back from the fund." Docket No. 115–3 at 115. A third message narrated a story in which Maldonado alleges she was referred to as the "paramedic wolf." Docket No. 115–3 at 16–17. And a fourth message called her a "lesbian" and "worthless shit." Docket No. 115–3 at 11. Because whoever sent these messages used pseudonyms, Maldonado does not know the identity of the sender or senders. DSUF ¶¶ 133–34. Maldonado speculates the sender of the November 1 message was Figueroa–Nieves. DSUF ¶¶ 128–32. She believes so because she saw his work-assigned vehicle in the EMO's...