Maldonado v. De Barceloneta

MADELINE MALDONADO, et al., Plaintiffs

v.MUNICIPIO DE BARCELONETA, et al., Defendants

CIVIL NO. 07-1992(JAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Dated: July 30, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court stands plaintiffs' counsel, Attorney Kortright, Attorney Quetglas, and Attorney Vazquez ("Plaintiffs"), motion for attorney's fees. (Docket No. 374). Mr. Sol Luis Fontanes, the Municipality of Barceloneta, Leonides Gonzalez, Sylvia Riquelme, Esther Ruiz, Ahmid Molina Morales, and Edgardo Santiago ("Municipal Defendants") have opposed Plaintiffs' fee application. (Docket No. 399). For the reasons set forth below the Court hereby reduces Plaintiffs' fee application and hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the request for fees. Furthermore, the Court reprimands counsel for each party for engaging in unprofessional and unconscionable conduct causing the waste of time and resources by this Court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 11, 2011, after receiving the First Circuit's Mandate dismissing the interlocutory appeal filed by several employees of the Municipality of Barceloneta who, along with Mayor Sol L. Fontanes, are the Municipal Defendants, the Court scheduled the case for trial. (Docket No. 321, 325). On April 28, 2011, the Municipal Defendants filed a notice to the Court indicating they had delivered Plaintiffs an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 ("Rule 68"). (Docket No. 351).

Shortly thereafter, on May 3, 2011, a Pretrial and Settlement Conference was held before the undersigned. (Docket No. 363). During the conference, attorneys for Plaintiffs informed the Court that they were forced to request withdrawal from the legal representation of plaintiffs Antonia Morales and her two sons (the "Morales household").¹ After the attorneys explained their reasons, the Court found them to be compelling and agreed to grant the withdrawal, but ordered the attorneys to make the request on the record. The motion was eventually filed and granted by the Court. (Docket Nos. 361, 362).

During the conference, Plaintiffs informed the Court that they would accept the offer of judgment tendered by the Municipal Defendants. The Municipal Defendants agreed to depositthe total amount of the offer of judgment with the Court and to have an amount equal to what would proportionally be awarded to the Morales household earmarked for them.²

On May 5, 2011, two days after the conference before the undersigned, the Municipal Defendants filed an informative motion. (Docket No. 364). Municipal Defendants' motion states that they had delivered an offer of judgment to Plaintiffs on April 28, 2011 and that "[p]ursuant to the terms agreed to by the parties during the course of the Settlement Conference, the Defendants reaffirm the Offer of Judgment." (Docket No. 364). Several hours later, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 stating that they had notified the Municipal Defendants that their April 28th offer had been accepted. (Docket No. 366). Municipal Defendants requested entry of judgment and that the judgment exclude the Morales household.

In that same Order, the Court, after stating that Plaintiffs had accepted the offer of judgment, ordered that:

The totality of the funds comprised in the offer of judgment is to be deposited in Court pursuant to Local Rule 67. Plaintiffs may withdraw all funds except an amount equaling $20,000.00. Said amount is hereby earmarked for Antonia Morales, Kelvin Morales and Randy Morales.

On May 24, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorney's fees. (Docket No. 374). As a result of the request for attorney's fees, a spate of motion practice ensued and the Court, after having initially denied the Municipal Defendants' request, decided to hold a hearing in order to discuss the parties' respective positions on the matter.

The Court concluded that despite the objections voiced by Municipal Defendants, the parties agreed to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 offer of judgment. The Court further concluded that attorney's fees in this case must be considered costs and that the Court must award both true costs and attorney's fees as part of its judgment. (Docket No. 396). Municipal Defendants subsequently filed their opposition to the motion for attorney's fees on September 12, 2011. (Docket No. 399).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to the Federal Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ("§ 1988"). Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees depends on whether or not they are prevailing parties in a civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Courts should ordinarily award attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2001).

"Like many others before it, the key to this case is whether the plaintiff achieved "prevailing party" status. Typically, a plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed if he can show that he "succeeded on an important issue in the case, thereby gaining at least some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit." Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2002)(citing Gay Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 293). Plaintiffs do not need to prevail on every claim, but rather Plaintiffs must receive some relief on the merits of their claim before the Court can find that they have prevailed. Richardson, 279 F.3d at 2 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)).

Furthermore, a fee award must be reasonable in light of the degree of success attained. System Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 154 F.Supp.2d 195, (D.Mass. 2001)(citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992)). The Supreme Court has not adopted a rule that measures a fee award by a proportion of the damages awarded. Id. (citing City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986)).

Generally, courts employ the lodestar method when calculating fees pursuant to § 1988. A court should begin with the attorney's contemporaneous billing records and subtract hours that are duplicative, unproductive, or excessive and multiply the reasonable hours billed by the prevailing attorneyrate in the community. Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417 (1st Cir. 2007)(citing Gay Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 295). The resulting amount derived from this calculation is the lodestar. After calculating the lodestar, a court may adjust the award further for several reasons including the quantum of success achieved in the litigation. Id.

In deciding a fee award, the trial judge should weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities. Loiselle, 154 F.Supp.2d at 202.

Municipal Defendants do not object to the rates requested by Plaintiffs' counsel. These rates are: $150.00 per hour for Maria S. Kortright, $250.00 per hour for Jose F. Quetglas, and $225.00 per hour³ for Pedro R. Vazquez. The Court notes that Attorney Kortright possessed 29 years of experience at the time the case was filed. Attorney Quetglas affirms in his motion that he has 25 years of experience but does not provide any further information. Furthermore, Attorney Vazquez enjoyed 14 years of experience at the time the case was filed.

Attorney Quetglas seeks compensation at a rate of $250.00 per hour. The Court finds that Attorney Quetglas has failed to distinguish between work performed in court and work performedoutside of court. See Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras, 603 F.Supp.2d 301 (D.P.R. 2009). Moreover, Attorney Quetglas has not provided his resume or credentials to the Court and only informs the Court that he has practiced for 25 years. Thus, the Court reduces Attorney Quetglas' rate to $200.00 for work performed out of court and $250.00 for work performed in court. This adjustment is done in light of Attorney Quetglas' educational background and experience.

Attorney Vazquez seeks compensation at the rate of $225.00 per hour. The Court understands that the rate advanced by Attorney Vazquez is rather high. Moreover, the Court notes that Attorney Vazquez does not distinguish between work performed in court and work performed out of court. In his motion, Attorney Vazquez indicates that his rates vary between $175.00 and $250.00 depending on the complexity of the case and the time the case will require. (Docket No. 374-4). The Court has substantial difficulty in approving a rate of $225.00 for Attorney Vazquez when he has substantially less experience than his co-counsel.⁴ Additionally, the Court does not understand that his academic credentials merit a further increase. As a result, the Court believes that an hourly rate of $190.00 for out of court work in this case would be appropriate for Attorney Vazquez. Moreover,the Court understands that a rate of $210.00 for in court work to be appropriate.

Municipal Defendants object to the number of hours included in Plaintiffs' timesheets. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs seek payment for work that should not be remunerated. More specifically, Municipal Defendants aver that Plaintiffs seek payment for work performed pursuing third parties, work performed relating to non-prevailing claims, work performed for dismissed Plaintiffs, and work that impermissibly combines time spent representing dismissed parties with work performed in representation of surviving Plaintiffs. Municipal Defendants further object to a number of time entries on the ground that they are excessively vague. The First Circuit has previously held that time entries that are "so nebulous that they fail to allow the paying party to dispute the accuracy of the records as well as the reasonableness of the time spent" may be discounted. Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1992)(citing Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 801 F.2d 558, 560 (1st Cir. 1986)).

"[W]ork on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result...