Maldonado v. United States

JOSEPH MALDONADO, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

No. 1:16-cr-284-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

January 28, 2020

(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is pro se Petitioner Joseph Maldonado ("Petitioner")'s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 57.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner's § 2255 motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 28, 2016, Petitioner was charged by indictment with two (2) counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the Government. (Doc. No. 33.) The plea agreement called for Petitioner to plead guilty to Count I of the indictment. (Id. ¶ 1.) On June 6, 2017, Petitioner appeared before Magistrate Judge Carlson for a change of plea hearing. (Doc. No. 43.) Magistrate Judge Carlson concluded that Petitioner was fully competent to enter an informed plea and understood the consequences of his plea, that he was pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily, and that the plea was supported by an independent basis in fact. (Id.) On that date, Magistrate Judge Carlson recommended that this Court accept Petitioner's guilty plea (id.), and on June 21, 2017, the Court accepted Petitioner's guilty plea (Doc. No. 44). On October 17, 2017, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of one hundred eighty (180) months, to be followed by a term of supervised release of five (5) years. (Doc. No. 53.)¹

On October 26, 2018, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 57.) After Petitioner completed a notice of election form indicating that he wished to have the Court rule on his § 2255 petition as filed (Doc. No. 59), the Government filed a brief in opposition to the motion on January 31, 2019 (Doc. No. 62). Petitioner filed a traverse on April 9, 2019. (Doc. No. 65.) Accordingly, because Petitioner's § 2255 motion has been fully briefed, it is ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a federal prisoner may file a motion requesting that the sentencing court vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the basis "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the [C]ourt was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). However, § 2255 does not afford a remedy for all errors that may have been made at trial or during sentencing. See United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 977 n.25 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)). Rather, § 2255 is implicated only when the alleged error raises "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." See Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 185.

III. DISCUSSION

In his § 2255 motion, Petitioner requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him and file a supplemental brief, order an evidentiary hearing, vacate his sentence and order that he be resentenced, and grant him further relief as the Court deems fair and just, on the basis that Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. (Doc. No. 57 at 2- 9.) Petitioner asserts four bases in support of the proposition that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 2-9.) The Court will address each asserted basis for relief in turn.

A. Legal Standard Applicable to an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

In order to establish entitlement to relief, a collateral attack of a sentence based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must meet a two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). See George v. Sively, 254 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2001). The first Strickland prong requires Petitioner to "establish first that counsel's performance was deficient." See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). This prong requires Petitioner to show that counsel made errors "so serious" that counsel was not functioning as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. See id. To that end, Petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). However, "[t]here is a 'strong presumption' that counsel's performance was reasonable." See id.

Under the second Strickland prong, Petitioner "must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's errors." See id. This prong requires Petitioner to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Reasonable probability is definedas "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." See id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

B. Counsel's Failure to Object to Petitioner's Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) Enhancement on the Basis that the Statute of the Predicate Convictions Is Indivisible

Petitioner first asserts that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the enhancement of his sentence pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") based on three prior drug-related convictions in state court. (Doc. No. 57 at 3-5.) Petitioner contends that pursuant to Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), the statute of Petitioner's prior convictions is indivisible, and, accordingly, those convictions cannot be the bases of an ACCA sentence enhancement because the Court must apply the categorical approach and "presume that the conviction[s] rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized." (Id. at 4-5.) (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013)).

In response, the Government argues that Third Circuit precedent contradicts the legal principles underlying Petitioner's first asserted basis for relief—"that 35 [Pa. Cons. Stat.] § 780-113(a)(30) is an 'indivisible' statute" and "a conviction under that statute could never be an ACCA predicate." (Doc. No. 62 at 5-6.) The Government asserts that "[t]he Third Circuit unequivocally held that 35 Pa. C.S. § 780-113(a)(30) is a divisible statute" in United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2014), and reiterated in United States v. Bell, 728 F. App'x 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2018), that the modified categorical approach was the appropriate method to determine whether a conviction under 35 Pa. C.S. § 780-113(a)(30) is a predicate conviction for purposes of the ACCA. (Id. at 6.) The Government contends that because the law on the subjectwas clear, there was no basis for Petitioner's counsel to object to Petitioner's ACCA predicates, and Petitioner's counsel's performance, therefore, cannot be deemed deficient. (Id. at 7.)

The three predicate convictions that served as the basis for Petitioner's sentencing enhancement pursuant to the ACCA were convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30). (Doc. No. 49 ¶¶ 24, 32, 35, 36.) "[T]he Third Circuit has held . . . that 35 [Pa. Cons. Stat.] § 780-113(a)(30) is a divisible statute and that the use of the modified categorical approach is proper when determining whether a prior conviction thereunder is a predicate offense under the ACCA." United States v. Sunday, 315 F. Supp. 3d 855, 863 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Abbott, 748 F.3d at 156); see also Bell, 728 F. App'x at 159 (citing Abbott, 748 F.3d at 156) ("[W]e apply the 'modified categorical approach' when determining whether a conviction under [35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)] is a 'serious drug offense' that counts as a predicate conviction under the ACCA . . ."). Any argument by Petitioner's counsel otherwise would have been meritless, and "counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim." See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

C. Counsel's Failure to Obtain Petitioner's State Court Records in Order to Challenge Petitioner's Prior Convictions Under the Modified Categorical Approach

Petitioner next asserts that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because even if the Court concludes that the modified categorical approach applies to Petitioner's predicate convictions, his counsel failed to obtain the underlying state court records pertaining to those convictions in order to challenge the Court's reliance on those convictions as predicate convictions for purposes of the sentencing enhancement. (Doc. No. 57 at 6-7.) Petitioner argues that based on the charging papers and plea colloquy relating to his underlyingstate convictions, he did not "admit to anything more than delivery of a controlled substance or conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance." (Id. at 6.)

The Government argues, in response, that because the presentence report ("PSR") indicates that Petitioner's prior convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) involved cocaine (Petitioner's first conviction) and heroin (Petitioner's second and third convictions) and, therefore, carried maximum possible sentences of 15 years, those convictions qualify as ACCA predicate convictions. (Doc. No. 62 at 7-8.) The Government contends that, therefore, Petitioner must establish that the PSR was incorrect in order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Id. at 8.) The Government asserts that because the documents related to Petitioner's underlying convictions, including the bills of information, indicate that the PSR was correct as to the identity of the...