Malone v. City of Chi.

Jamell Olmstead Malone, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago, Officer Foggey, and Officer Campbell, Defendants.

No. 13 C 3900

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 25, 2016

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jamell Olmstead Malone brought a pro se complaint alleging two Chicago Police Department ("CPD") officers, Foggey and Campbell, deprived him of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ The incident at issue occurred on March 18, 2013, when Malone was pulled over for driving with only one functioning headlight. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS²

At approximately 12:15 a.m. on March 18, 2013, Malone was driving his car alone on 71st Street heading westbound, when he was pulled over near the intersection of 71st Street and Stony Island Avenue by Officer Foggey, who was in a marked CPD squad car. R. 59 at 3-4 (¶¶ 12, 14). Also present was Officer Campbell, who was partnering with Officer Foggey at the time. R. 59 at 4 (¶ 13). Officer Foggey pulled Malone over for operating his car with only one functioning headlight. Id. (¶ 15). At the time he was pulled over, Malone had his car windows closed and his car doors locked. Id. (¶ 16).

Officer Foggey approached the driver's side of Malone's car. Malone partially lowered his window to allow the exchange of paperwork and verbal communication through the gap. Id. (¶ 17). Officer Foggey identified himself as a CPD Officer and explained that he pulled Malone over for failing to have two functioning headlights. Id. (¶ 18). Officer Foggey requested that Malone produce his driver's license.Malone stated that he did not have a driver's license, and that he was "riding on papers" given to him when his license was taken for a previous traffic citation he had received (also for the broken headlight). Id. (¶ 20). Officer Foggey responded by instructing Malone to get out of his car. Malone refused. Id. (¶ 21). Due to Malone's inability or refusal to produce a driver's license, and his refusal to get out of the car, Officer Foggey radioed for back-up. Id. at 5 (¶ 23). Approximately six police officers responded to his request. Id. (¶ 24). After the other officers arrived, Malone got out of his car. Officer Foggey immediately handcuffed him and patted him down. Malone was read his Miranda rights and put in the back of the patrol car. Id. (¶¶ 25-27). Officer Foggey then drove the patrol car with Malone in the back seat to the police station, while Officer Campbell drove Malone's car to the same location. Id. (¶¶ 29-30).

At the police station, Malone was placed in a room for approximately 45-60 minutes. Id. at 6 (¶ 31). He was not fingerprinted or formally processed. Id. (¶ 32). Instead, Officer Foggey wrote him two tickets, one for driving without a valid driver's license and the other for driving with a non-functional headlight. Id. (¶ 33). Officer Foggey presented the tickets to Malone and indicated that he was free to leave. Malone was given his car keys and left the police station. Id. (¶ 34).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and views all of the evidence and inferences therein in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ball v. Cotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce more than a "mere scintilla of evidence" and come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not return a judgment favoring the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

DISCUSSION

I. MALONE'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY OF CHICAGO

In Monell v. Department of Social Services of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court established both the fact that "municipalities and other local government units [were] included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies," id. at 690, and the limits of such actions. Most importantly, Monell held that "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691. Instead, municipal liability exists only "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Id. at 694. The Seventh Circuit has identified three different ways in which a municipality or other local governmental unit might violate § 1983: (1) through an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) through a "wide-spread practice" that although not authorized by written law and expresspolicy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of law; or (3) through an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with "final decision policymaking authority." McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995). Malone has presented no facts to establish a triable issue under any of the three ways in which to hold the City of Chicago liable for the alleged constitutional violations of the individual police officers. Therefore, the Court must enter summary judgment in favor of the City of Chicago.³

II. MALONE'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action to any citizen of the United States against any person who, under color of state law, deprives the citizen of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that he was subjected to this deprivation by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979). In addressing constitutional claimsbrought under § 1983, therefore, "analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Baker, 443 U.S. at 140 (the "first inquiry" is "to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged").

The complaint alleges that the police officers violated Malone's rights under the "1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Amendments." R. 25 at 3. The majority of Malone's sources of constitutional protections can be eliminated from the outset. The First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments have nothing to do with any issue that could plausibly be raised by the facts alleged by Malone. And while Malone does assert he was subjected to "excessive punishment," the Eighth Amendment can only be invoked by persons who have been convicted of crimes, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977), which, at the time of his arrest, Malone had not been. Malone's excessive punishment claim, therefore, must arise if at all under the due process clause. Id. Malone invokes his due process rights through the Fifth Amendment, but citizens of the States take their due process protections directly from the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Malone did not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment in his complaint, the Court will assume he meant to do so. Thus, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are all the Court need consider in this case.

A. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

To the extent that Malone is complaining that his due process rights were violated, the Court must dismiss that claim. The Supreme Court has held that "if aconstitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Malone alleges that (1) his vehicle was unlawfully stopped; (2) he was falsely detained; and (3) his vehicle was searched, seized and driven without his consent. R. 25 at 4; R. 6 at 3. The Fourth Amendment specifically covers unlawful searches and seizures. Hence, the police officers' § 1983 liability, if any, must turn on an application of the reasonableness standard governing searches and seizures, not the due process standard of liability for constitutionally arbitrary executive action. Cf. Graham, 390 U.S. at 395 ("all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach") (emphases in original).

B. FOURTH AMENDMENT

"The 'touchstone' of [the Supreme Court's] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the 'reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). "Reasonableness, of course, depends 'on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by lawofficers.'" Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (quoting U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). Malone testified that what happened to him in the early morning hours of March 18, 2013 was unreasonable....