Mamatkulov v. City Univ. of N.Y.

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LAZIZJON MAMATKULOV, Plaintiff v. CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

No. 22 Civ. 4131 (JPC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 1, 2022

ORDER

JOHN P. CRONAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff Lazizjon Mamatkulov, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court's federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges that he was a student at Hunter College and was expelled from Defendant City University of New York (“CUNY”) after his answer on an assignment was similar to that of a classmate. According to Plaintiff, other students had committed plagiarism on examinations, yet were not expelled. Plaintiff further maintains that he was not given an opportunity by the school to defend himself or otherwise be heard. He alleges that this unfair treatment occurred because he is disabled and Muslim. By Order dated May 20, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this Order.

I. Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on May 2022, filing a Complaint that alleges the following facts:

I as a student was allowed to work together with classmate in group to complete an assignment however because my answer was similar to classmate answer CUNY wrongfully expelled me without completing my due process right. 6 other students who I have fact of also plagerised on exams and on all assignments during Covid- 19 and they were not expelled. However, in my case I was treated wrongfully expelled.

Dkt. 2 (“Complaint”) at 6.^[1] Plaintiff also states, without further elaboration, that he was “wrongfully expelled because [he] is muslim and [is a] disabled person,” and that he was “not given a chance to be heard and did not get fair treatment.” Id. Plaintiff brings this suit against CUNY, seeking reinstatement at Hunter College. Id. at 7.

II. Standard of Review

The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pled. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them “to raise the strongest claims that [they] suggest[],” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, has its limits: to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006).

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. at 556-57. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. at 678. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible- not merely possible-that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 678-79.

III. Discussion

A. Disability Discrimination

Plaintiff's allegations that he was expelled because he is disabled could be construed as asserting claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Title II of the ADA prohibits a “public entity” from discriminating against a “‘qualified individual with a disability' on account of that individual's disability.” Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege “that (1) he or she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to the ADA; and (3) that plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants' services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by reason of plaintiff's disabilities.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which also prohibits disability discrimination, imposes requirements nearly identical to those in Title II of the ADA. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003). To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that he “(1) is a ‘handicapped person' as defined by the [Rehabilitation Act]; (2) is ‘otherwise qualified' to participate in the offered activity or benefit; (3) was excluded from such participation solely by reason of h[is] handicap; and (4) was denied participation in a program that receives federal funds.” Biondo v. Kaledia Health, 935 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 275 (2d Cir. 2009)); see also Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] showing of discriminatory animus or ill will based on disability is necessary to recover damages under Title II in a private action against a state.”).

Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully expelled because he is a “disabled person.” Complaint at 6. For purposes of the ADA, the term “disability” must be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage.^[2] See Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the ‘definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals'” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (alterations omitted)). Plaintiff's allegation that he “is a disabled person” under the ADA is insufficient, however, because it is a legal conclusion rather than a factual allegation about what physical or mental impairment limits his life activities.

Moreover, Plaintiff's allegation that he was “wrongfully expelled” for plagiarism because he “is disabled” is also insufficient. Complaint at 6. He does not plead any facts that could give rise to an inference that his expulsion was motivated by his unidentified disability rather than by the school's determination that he committed plagiarism on an assignment. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

If Plaintiff amends the Complaint to replead his claims for disability discrimination, he must plead facts showing that he has a disability and facts giving rise to an inference that his expulsion was because of that disability.

B. Equal Protection Claims

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under the color of state law (a “state actor”) violated “a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Plaintiff asserts that he was expelled from CUNY for plagiarism because he is Muslim and disabled. These allegations can be construed as a claim under section 1983 that CUNY, a state actor, violated his constitutional right to equal protection.

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.'” Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). A claim under the Equal Protection Clause will succeed when “a plaintiff proves that: (1) the [plaintiff], compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad-faith intent to injure a person.” Id.; see also Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 446 (holding that government decisions that draw distinctions based on disability “must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose”). A bare allegation of discriminatory animus is not enough to render an equal protection claim plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff has not pleaded facts supporting a section 1983 claim for religious or disability discrimination against the university. Even if he had pleaded such facts, however, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against CUNY under section 1983 in federal court. CUNY's central administration and its senior colleges qualify as arms of the State of New York. Clissuras v. City Univ. of N.Y., 359 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2004).

“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Gollomp v Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. “New York has not waived its Eleventh...