Mamedov v. Garland

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ZAUR MAMEDOV A076891573 and BAKHRIYA AGAYEVA, Plaintiffs, v. MERRICK GARLAND, Attorney General; UR M. JADDOU, Director, United States Citizenship & Immigration Services; and UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES Defendants.

No. 20-CV-1063 (ARR) (RML)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

September 1, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

ALLYNE R. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this case concerning the denial of a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative (“I-130 petition” or “petition”), defendants Merrick Garland, Ur M Jaddou, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“defendants” or “the government”) move to dismiss the second amended complaint (“SAC” or “complaint”) for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In their complaint, plaintiffs Zaur Mamedov and Bakhriya Agayeva principally allege that the procedure used to deny an I-130 petition filed by Ms. Agayeva on Mr. Mamedov's behalf violated their due process rights and the consent decree in Stokes v. INS, No 74-CV-1022 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1976). The government argues that the SAC must be dismissed because plaintiffs do not have a protected interest in the grant of the petition and the petition was denied consistent with due process and the Stokes decree. For the following reasons, I assume that plaintiffs have a protected interest in the grant of the I-130 petition and hold that they have failed to allege a violation of any protected due process right. I therefore grant the government's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Legal Background

When a United States citizen marries a noncitizen, the citizen may petition for lawful permanent residency for her noncitizen spouse. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1154. The process begins with the filing of an I-130 petition. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). The I-130 petition is a request that U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) classify the beneficiary as an “immediate relative” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1). Though approval of an I-130 petition “does not automatically cause the agency to issue a visa or grant permanent lawful resident status to the beneficiary,” Li v Renaud, 654 F.3d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 2011), immediate relative status is valuable. An “immediate relative” spouse of a U.S. citizen can apply for lawful permanent residence and is “not subject to the worldwide levels or numerical limitations” for immigrant visas or permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b).

The INA mandates the following procedures for consideration and approval of an I-130 petition: “After an investigation of the facts in each case, . . . the Attorney General shall, if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an immediate relative[,] . . . approve the petition ....” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b).^[1]The next subsection precludes approval of a petition upon a finding of past marriage fraud:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) no petition shall be approved if (1) the alien has previously been accorded, or has sought to be accorded, an immediate relative or preference status as the spouse of a citizen of the United States or the spouse of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, or (2) the Attorney General has determined that the alien has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.

8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).

The New York District Office of USCIS adjudicates I-130 spouse visa petitions pursuant to the procedures established by the consent decree entered as a final judgment in Stokes v. INS, No. 74-CV-1022 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1976). See SAC, Ex. A (“Stokes Decree”), ECF No.37. The Stokes decree stipulates that the petitioners have certain rights and privileges during an I-130 adjudicatory proceeding, including, inter alia, the right to representation by an attorney or representative; the right to present evidence including live witnesses; the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and rebut adverse evidence; and the right to obtain subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses. Stokes Decree 3-4.

Factual Background

I have detailed the facts underlying this case in two prior opinions, familiarity with which is assumed. See Mamedov v. Barr, No. 20-CV-1063 (ARR), 2021 WL 781743, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Mamedov I”); Mamedov v. Garland, No. 20-CV-1063 (ARR), 2022 WL 426155, at *1-3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022) (“Mamedov II”). The following facts, which are particularly relevant to the present motion and presumed to be true, see Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013), are drawn from the SAC and the certified administrative record, which is incorporated by reference in the complaint, SAC ¶ 8.

Zaur Mamedov is a native and citizen of Azerbaijan. Certified Record of Proceedings (“R”) 282, ECF Nos. 18-23.^[2] On April 25, 2003, he married Karen Joyce, a U.S. citizen. SAC ¶ 8. Mr. Mamedov and Ms. Joyce filed joint tax returns and jointly applied for a limousine business license. Id. On June 21, 2006, Joyce filed an I-130 petition on her husband's behalf, requesting that he be classified as her immediate relative. SAC ¶ 9. At an interview with USCIS officers, Joyce signed a statement claiming, among other things, that their marriage “was not real and that she had been paid $5000 for the marriage.” SAC ¶ 10. USCIS denied the I-130 petition the same day and the couple divorced about a month later, on January 24, 2007. Id.

On February 9, 2007, Mamedov married Bakhriya Agayeva, a naturalized U.S. citizen. Id. ¶¶ 2, 11. The couple knew each other from their native Azerbaijan, where they attended the same school. Id. ¶ 11. On April 10, 2007, Ms. Agayeva filed an I-130 petition on Mr. Mamedov's behalf. Id. USCIS denied the petition pursuant to § 1154(c); Ms. Agayeva appealed the denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and then withdrew the appeal. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. On January 12, 2011, Ms. Agayeva filed a second I-130 petition for Mr. Mamedov. Id. ¶ 13. The second petition, which is the subject of the present case, included as supporting evidence an affidavit executed by Karen Joyce recanting her earlier statement about her marriage with Mr. Mamedov. Id. Ms. Joyce's affidavit states that her marriage to Mamedov was “real, not arranged” and not in exchange for payment. Aff. of Karen Joyce ¶ 1, SAC, Ex. B (“Joyce Aff.”). The affidavit explains that Joyce and Mamedov had grown apart and were no longer living together at the time of the I-130 interview, and that she suspected he was with another woman. Id. ¶ 3. Joyce states she was angry and “wanted to hurt” Mamedov, so “that is why I said the things that I said to the officers.” Id.

Addressing the signed statement, Joyce explains that “[t]he immigration officer scared me, saying that I would be prosecuted if I went any further with the interview, so I signed whatever they gave me to sign.” Id. Plaintiffs also submitted Mamedov and Joyce's joint tax filings, joint bank statements, a joint application for a business license, and several affidavits from friends to support the bona fides of Mamedov and Joyce's marriage. SAC ¶ 13.

On August 12, 2012, USCIS interviewed Ms. Agayeva and Mr. Mamedov regarding the second I-130 petition. At the hearing, plaintiffs' attorney brought up the Joyce marriage and urged the officer to read the Joyce affidavit. Id. ¶ 14. Counsel later followed up with the USCIS officer, sending a copy of the Joyce affidavit and other evidence supporting the bona fides of the marriage. Id. After USCIS issued a notice of intent to deny the petition-again pursuant to § 1154(c)- plaintiffs' attorney sent two letters to the USCIS New York Field Office Director requesting that the Field Office Director allow Joyce to testify before her by telephone or video. Id. On October 3, 2012, USCIS denied the second I-130 petition, having determined that “the submitted evidence does not overcome the sworn statement provided by Ms. Joyce on December 18, 2006.” R. 124. Plaintiffs appealed, and the BIA affirmed. SAC ¶ 16.

Procedural History

On February 26, 2020, plaintiffs filed the present suit. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Their first complaint alleged violations of the APA, the Fifth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. I dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment due process claim without prejudice and denied defendants' motion to dismiss the APA claim, and plaintiffs withdrew their Eighth Amendment claim. Mamedov I, 2021 WL 781743, at *5 & n.5. After both parties moved for summary judgment, I granted summary judgment in defendants' favor. Mamedov II, 2022 WL 426155, at *1. I also granted plaintiffs' request to file an amended complaint reasserting their due process claims. Id. at *5.

On March 18, 2022, plaintiffs reasserted their Fifth Amendment due process claims by filing the second amended complaint. The SAC alleges defendants violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights in three ways: (1) by denying the I-130 petition on the basis of a statement “illegally coerced from Karen Joyce” and not disclosing to plaintiffs “the circumstances under which the statement had been coerced” thus “denying them a meaningful opportunity to rebut the statement,” SAC ¶ 19; (2) by not affording plaintiffs “a trial type hearing before a neutral adjudicator at which Karen Joyce could testify and have her credibility adjudged,” id. ¶ 20; and (3) by failing to address in the BIA's opinion plaintiffs' arguments that “a hearing should have been held at which Karen Joyce could testify” and “the...