Mandeville v. Steven Harry Nathanson & Se. Emergency Physicians, LLC

MEREDITH MANDEVILLE, Executrix of the Estate of Joel Dew, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN HARRY NATHANSONand SOUTHEASTERN EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, LLC, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-cv-25013

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA BECKLEY DIVISION

June 24, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Court has reviewed the Renewal of Defendant's Second Affirmative Defense and Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim (Document 80), filed by Defendant Steven Harry Nathanson, M.D. (Dr. Nathanson), the Memorandum of Law in Support (Document 82), Defendant Southeastern Emergency Physicians, LLC's Joinder in Defendant Steven Harry Nathanson, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim (Document 86), the Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim (Document 92), and Defendant Steven Harry Nathanson, M.D.'s Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Steven Harry Nathanson, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Punitive Damages Claim (Document 94). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the Defendant's motion should be denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are relevant for the present motion. On September 3, 2012, the decedent in this case, Joel Dew, developed symptoms of illness, including fever, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Mr. Dew, a personal trainer and musician by trade, continued to feel ill on September 5, 2012, and cancelled several training appointments. The next day, September 6, 2012, he was involved in a single vehicle car accident, resulting in deployment of the airbags in his vehicle and a cracked windshield. According to the records of the West Virginia State Police, Mr. Dew crossed into the opposing lane, struck a ditch, and caused significant damage to his front driver-side tire and quarter panel. However, Mr. Dew did not lose consciousness. EMS and law enforcement responding to the accident found that Mr. Dew had a fever of 101.4 degrees, tachycardia, and altered mental state. Specifically, EMS noted that Mr. Dew "appear[ed] very confused as if under the influence of some type of drug or medication," and was "unable to state where he was traveling to, or what roadway he was driving on." (State of West Virginia Uniform Traffic Crash Report Crash Data, at 2, att'd as Ex. E to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. on Plaintiff's Punitive Damages) (Document 81).

The parties dispute the cause of Mr. Dew's mental state. The Defendant notes that EMS believed Mr. Dew to be "under the influence of some substance." (Def.'s Response, at 2, citing Dep. of Bruce Price, at 6:4-7; State of West Virginia Uniform Traffic Crash Report, at 2., collectively att'd as Ex. E to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. on Plaintiff's Punitive Damages.) The Plaintiff, by contrast, presents expert testimony that Mr. Dew's mental state was the result of a massive underlying infection, specifically, sepsis. It is undisputed that Mr. Dew was thentransported to Raleigh General Hospital in Beckley, West Virginia, at 11:14 a.m. that morning, and placed into an examination room at 11:17 a.m. Raleigh General Hospital is designated a Level III trauma center by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources Bureau for Public Health. The triage nurse at Raleigh General Hospital classified Mr. Dew as a "Priority III" patient, and the Plaintiff acknowledges that "Category III care involves conditions that are classified as emergency condition[s]." (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 2.) During his intake, Mr. Dew disclosed to the triage nurse that he had suffered flu-like symptoms for several days, including fever, nausea, and vomiting.

The Defendant in this case, Dr. Steven Harry Nathanson, M.D., along with other health care providers, treated Mr. Dew at Raleigh General Hospital. Dr. Nathanson examined Mr. Dew, and ordered blood and urine studies, as well as intravenous fluids and the administration of an anti-inflammatory drug, Toradol. Dr. Nathanson noted that the context of the medical examination was "lost control 2° illness." (Raleigh General Hospital Emergency Provider Record, at 1, att'd as Ex. C to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. on Plaintiff's Punitive Damages). At 12:48 p.m., Dr. Nathanson ordered that Mr. Dew be discharged from Raleigh General Hospital. He was then discharged in "stable" condition at 1:22 p.m., and given a set of standard discharge instructions for patients involved in a motor vehicle collision. (Medical Records, att'd as Ex. 1 to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at 1.) The discharge instructions, entitled "Motor Vehicle Accident," recommended that Mr. Dew eat a bland diet, drink plenty of clear liquids, avoid dairy products, take Tylenol for any discomfort, and return to Raleigh General Hospital for any new or worsening medical problems. (Emergency Provider Record, at 3, att'd as Ex. C to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. on Plaintiff's Punitive Damages.) The medical records indicate that Raleigh General Hospitalpersonnel characterized Mr. Dew's condition as "improved" at the time he was discharged. (Id. at 2.)

At the time Dr. Nathanson discharged Mr. Dew, the results of the blood tests had not been received. Dr. Nathanson testified that he had reviewed the urine tests prior to discharge, but the parties dispute whether this was possible. The blood tests ultimately indicated that Mr. Dew had, inter alia, an elevated white cell count, elevated granulocytes, low platelets, low lymphocytes, low sodium, elevated creatinine, low calcium, and blood in urine. According to the Plaintiff, Mr. Dew's test results satisfy the criteria of the American College of Chest Physicians and the Society of Critical Care Medicine for Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome. (Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., at 2.)

After his discharge from the hospital, Mr. Dew's condition continued to worsen. On the night of September 7, presumably to alleviate pain caused by his symptoms, Mr. Dew took a prescription narcotic pain reliever prescribed to the Plaintiff, Ms. Mandeville. The next morning, Mr. Dew was transported by ambulance from his home to Raleigh General Hospital, and seen again by Dr. Nathanson. Dr. Nathanson noted that the Plaintiff had an altered mental state, intracranial hemorrhage, meningitis, and sepsis. Dr. Nathanson ordered that Mr. Dew be transported to Charleston Area Medical Center in Charleston, West Virginia. After arriving there, Mr. Dew suffered cardiopulmonary arrest and died. The Plaintiff claims that the cause of death was systemic Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus infection. It is undisputed that a subsequent autopsy of Mr. Dew revealed systemic sepsis in the brain, cerebellum, myocardium and coronary arteries, lungs, liver, spleen, pancreas, and kidneys.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The well-established standard in consideration of a motion for summary judgment is that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2014). A "material fact" is a fact that could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). A "genuine issue" concerning a material fact exists when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 180 (4th Cir. 2013); News & Observer, 597 F.3d at 576.

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must view all of the factual evidence, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 169. However, the non-moving party must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. "At the summary judgment stage, the non-moving party must come forward with more than 'mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another' to resist dismissal of the action." Perry v. Kappos, No.11-1476, 2012 WL 2130908, at*3 (4th Cir. June 13, 2012) (unpublished decision) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985)).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, nor will it make determinations of credibility. N. Am. Precast, Inc. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 2008 WL 906334, *3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2008) (Copenhaver, J.) (citing Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986). If disputes over a material fact exist that "can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. If, however, the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case," then summary judgment should be granted because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before the Court on this motion is whether summary judgment is appropriate on the Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. In seeking to carry his burden of showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists on this issue, the Defendant...