Manga v. Carranza

MARIA MANGA, Plaintiff, v. JOVITA CARRANZA, in her official capacity as Administrator of the United StatesSmall Business Administration, et al.,¹ Defendants.

Case No. 1:18-cv-00437 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

March 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Small Business Administration terminated Maria Manga in November 2016 following a months-long dispute about her work requirements. After a winding path through a stop at the Merit Systems Protection Board, a hearing before an administrative law judge, and several civil complaints filed here and in the District of Maryland, her case arrived in this Court dressed as a pro se Freedom of Information Act claim. Now, with the benefit of counsel, Manga sought leave to amend her claims, producing the Second Amended Complaint. See Sec. Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 54; Minute Entry (09/18/2019).

In it, she sues the Small Business Administration and its Administrator (collectively, "the SBA") for wrongful termination, along with other counts all tied to that core claim: negligent supervision, violation of the federal and D.C. Family and Medical Leave Acts, and retaliation. SAC at 5-10. In response, the SBA has moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Defs.' Mot.Dismiss or Summ. J. ("Defs.' Mot."), ECF No. 61. Manga opposes the SBA's motion but limits her arguments to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") claims. See generally Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 63. But those FMLA claims are unavailable to Manga by statute. As a result, and because the Court lacks jurisdiction over the rest of Manga's claims, the Court will grant the SBA's motion and dismiss the case.²

I.

Manga began working for the SBA in 1998. SAC ¶ 8. A long-time Washington, D.C. resident, she worked for many years in the SBA's Washington office. Id. ¶ 1. That is, until, according to Manga, her supervisor Eugene Stewman "assaulted her in his office" in September 2013. SAC ¶ 30; see also Compl. at 1-2, Manga v. Stewman, 14-cv-00828-RMC (D.D.C. May 20, 2014), ECF No. 1 ("[H]e placed his right hand on my left shoulder and pushed me very firmly against the door causing me pain."). The following summer, the SBA transferred her from the Washington, D.C., office to the Baltimore office.³ SAC ¶ 11; Merit Systems Protection Board No. PH-0752-17-0096-I-1 ("ALJ Decision") (Dec. 7, 2017) 2, ECF No. 61-2.

And Manga continued in the Baltimore office until the events that brought about this lawsuit unfolded in October 2015, when Manga collapsed at work, lost consciousness, and was rushed by ambulance to a hospital. ALJ Decision at 2; SAC ¶ 15. As it turned out, Manga never returned to work. Gery Decl. Ex. 3, ECF No. 61-2.

Manga was comatose for at least "several days" in the hospital, though her treating physicians never diagnosed the cause. Id. at 3; cf. SAC ¶ 16 ("[Manga] was unresponsive andremained unconscious for two weeks."). Several of her co-workers visited her in the hospital, SAC ¶ 43, and the Deputy Director contacted her to document her absence with sick leave, ALJ Decision at 3. After her release from the hospital, Manga recovered through weeks of therapy, SAC ¶ 17, while "she had to relearn how to walk and perform other functions," Id. ¶ 44. The SBA approved Manga's requests to take sick leave from the date of her hospitalization, October 29, 2015, through December 31, 2015. ALJ Decision at 4-7.

But in the new year, the matter of Manga's continued absence got contentious. After two months convalescing, the SBA expected her to return to work in Baltimore. Id. at 7. Manga hoped for the "reasonable work accommodation" of a transfer back to Washington, D.C. Id. at 5; see also SAC at 4 (stating Manga's desire to be "Reinstate[d] . . . to her position in the Washington SBA office"). Her doctor sent a letter on her behalf at the beginning of the year saying that "her only limitation is her decreased mobility," and that "she could perform her job functions if she did not have an onerous commute." ALJ Decision at 5. Manga also submitted for more sick leave through the end of January 2016, and then again through the end of March. Id. at 7.

But the Baltimore Deputy Director did not approve Manga's leave or her transfer. Id. at 8-9. As the SBA saw it, Manga's doctor note explained why she might prefer a move back to Washington, D.C., but it did not justify her continued absence from the Baltimore office. Id. at 9. Instead, the Deputy Director warned Manga and her then-attorney that she would "be placed on AWOL [Absence Without Leave] status" if she did not submit adequate medical documentation. Id. at 9. Then at the end of February 2016, the Deputy Director emailed Manga and her attorney again, noting that although the SBA had "provided specific information on the Family [and] Medical Leave Act (FMLA)," Manga had not responded with "specificity." Id. Heincluded another warning that he would place Manga on AWOL status starting from January 4, 2016, unless he received a response. Id. The next day, Manga and her attorney held a conference call with the Deputy Director. Id. They assured the Deputy Director that a more specific doctor's note would be forthcoming within days. Id. So the SBA did not hold Manga as AWOL—yet. Id.

When Manga's doctor sent the promised note, the Deputy Director was unmoved. Id. at 10. The SBA wanted a letter recommending excusal because Manga was "medically restricted from reporting to work." Id. But what it got was the doctor's opinion that Manga had "continued low back pain," and "could be working [at] the D.C. office" "with accommodations" including "an ergonomic chair with lumbar support" and "a standing optional desk." Id. As far as the SBA was concerned, that meant Manga could also be working at the Baltimore office with those same accommodations. Id. at 7, 11. So the SBA declared Manga AWOL. Id. at 10-11.

That was early March 2016, and the SBA continued to mark her AWOL until late April 2016, when the Deputy Director notified Manga of her proposed removal for being AWOL and failing to follow leave procedures. Id. at 11; SAC ¶ 23. Finally, a year after her hospitalization, the Director of the Baltimore office sustained the violations and approved her removal. SAC ¶ 18; Gery Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 61-2.

Manga appealed to the MSPB on various grounds, including violation of the FMLA. ALJ Decision at 1, 12-14, 19; see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) ("An employee . . . may submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is appealable to the Board under any law, rule or regulation."). An administrative law judge ("ALJ") reviewed filings from Manga and the SBA, then conducted a video hearing. ALJ Decision at 1, 13-14; see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1) ("[I]n any case involving a removal from the service, the case shall be heard by theBoard, an employee experienced in hearing appeals, or an administrative law judge."). After taking testimony from Manga, her character witnesses, and the Baltimore Deputy Director and Director, the ALJ denied Manga's appeal. Id. at 14; see generally id.

Manga later sued, and her Second Amended Complaint is now at issue. See generally SAC. There are four remaining counts after Manga voluntarily dismissed Counts I and II. See Minute Entry (09/18/2019). Count III alleges negligent supervision for the assault in September 2013. SAC ¶¶ 29-36. Count IV alleges wrongful termination. Id. ¶¶ 37-54. Count V alleges wrongful discharge in violation of the federal and D.C. Family and Medical Leave Acts. Id. ¶¶ 55-64. And Count VI alleges retaliation in violation of the same Family and Medical Leave Acts. Id. ¶¶ 65-69. The SBA has moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Defs.' Mot. at 7-13; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 56. Manga opposes the SBA's motion, Pl'.s Opp'n, ECF No. 63, and the SBA has replied, Defs.' Reply, ECF No. 64. The SBA's motion is now ripe for decision.

II.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Manga bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. See Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In conducting its review, the Court may consider "the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts."⁴ Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sci., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). It accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint. Id. It also gives the SBA "thebenefit of all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the alleged facts." Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A valid claim must consist of factual allegations that, if true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement" are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes Manga's allegations in the light most favorable to her and accepts as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded allegations. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994). The Court need not, however, accept legal conclusions or conclusory statements as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III.

A.

The SBA first takes up the negligent supervision claim in Count III, so the Court will start there too. Defs.' Mot. at 7; see SAC ¶¶ 29-36. The SBA argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this claim because it "is a time-barred tort action that Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust."...