Manila v. Cnmi Dep't of Corr.

REYNALDO ATRERO MANILA, Plaintiff, v. CNMI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ROBERT GUERRERO,JOSE K. PANGELINAN, and GEORGIA M. CABRERA, Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-00003

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

January 24, 2019

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING CNMI'S MOTION TO CORRECT MISJOINDER AND MOTION TO DISMISS; AND

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT CABRERA'S MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' Motion to Correct Misjoinder Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), ("MTD," ECF No. 15), and Defendant Georgia M. Cabrera's Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 13). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Correct Misjoinder and Motion for a More Definite Statement are granted. The Motion to Dismiss is also granted, although not on grounds of sovereign immunity, as the Commonwealth urges, but because the Commonwealth is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In his Amended Complaint (Apr. 2, 2018, ECF No. 5), pro se plaintiff Reynaldo Manila, an inmate in the CNMI Department of Corrections ("DOC"), alleges that DOC officers unreasonably delayed in sending him off-island for eye surgery - first for retinal detachment of his left eye, then for cataracts in his right eye. (Am. Compl. at 3-4.) In September 2016 Manila was told that Acting Commissioner Georgia Cabrera was aware of his condition but refused to approve the surgery because his condition was not life-threatening. (Id. at 4-5.) He alleges that while on work assignments Cabrera harassed him and wrongly disciplined him. (Id. at 6.) Even after a Saipan eye doctor for a third time urged cataract surgery in July 2017, Cabrera refused. (Id. at 6-7.) When Commissioner Vince Attao approved the surgery in August 2017, Cabrera disagreed. (Id. at 7.) In October 2017, Cabrera refused to issue Manila extra toilet paper, which he needed to wipe his eye. (Id. at 8.) In November 2017, he grieved mistreatment by Cabrera to Commissioner Attao. (Id.) In January 2018, Manila had eye surgery in Guam, performed by a doctor at Pacific Retinal. (Id. at 9.) Subsequent medical reports indicated that the overall prognosis for his vision was only slight improvement. (Id. at 10.) Manila complains that the delays in treatment caused by Cabrera and other DOC officials may result in his permanent blindness and have caused him prolonged pain and suffering. (Id. at 10-11.) He prays for "general, consequential and compensatory damages" in an unspecified amount. (Id. at 11.)

III. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Soon after the Commonwealth and Defendant Cabrera filed their motions on April 27, 2018, Manila requested that the Court appoint counsel to represent him (May 15, 2018, ECF No. 19), and the Court granted his request (Order, June 4, 2018, ECF No. 20). An appointment was made, and after several extensions of time stipulated to by counsel for all parties, appointed counsel moved to withdraw (Oct. 5, 2018, ECF No. 30). After a hearing, the Court granted the motion from the bench, denied Manila's oral request to appoint another attorney, and ordered that once Manila filed a written response the pending motions would be taken under advisement without oral argument, pursuant toLocal Rule 7.1(a)(2) (Minute Entry, Oct. 11, 2018, ECF No. 31).

On November 13, 2018, the Court received Manila's Response to all the motions. (Response at 1, ECF No. 32.) Neither the CNMI nor Defendant Cabrera filed a reply.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(1) motions are either facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack does not challenge the veracity of the plaintiff's allegations, but instead asserts that they "are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. "The district court resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction." Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)). Conversely, a defendant bringing a factual attack disputes the truthfulness of allegations that would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In factual attacks, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint, and need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations. Id. (citations omitted). Here, Defendants raise a facial attack. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, "MTD Memo.," at 8, ECF No. 15-1.)

Before filing a responsive pleading, a party "may move for a more definite statement of a pleading . . . which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). A motion for a more definite statement "attacks the unintelligibility of thecomplaint, not simply the mere lack of detail, and is only proper when a party is unable to determine how to frame a response to the issues raised by the claimant." Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Such motions "are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules." Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Those requirements are: "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Correct Misjoinder

The CNMI asserts that its Department of Corrections lacks the capacity to sue and be sued, and that DOC therefore is not a proper party to this action. (MTD Memo. at 9-12) Invoking Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it asks the Court to drop DOC from the lawsuit and to add the CNMI as a proper party defendant. (Id. at 12.)

"Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Capacity to sue or be sued is determined "by the law of the state where the court is located[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). The Commonwealth maintains that only those government entities whose enabling legislation has expressly granted them the right to sue and be sued enjoy that capacity. (MTD Memo. at 10.) The Court agrees, having recently analyzed this issue in a different case involving a Commonwealth department, Norita v. CNMI Department of Public Safety:

A waiver of sovereign immunity is no small act. It is fair to infer that the CNMI legislature considered whether agencies should retain immunity when creating them. Moreover, such a waiver must be unequivocal, either in express language or "by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Ramsey v. Muna, 849 F.3d 858, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). The Commonwealth Supreme Court also acknowledged a distinction between "sue and be sued" agencies and those that are not "sue and be sued." Marine Revitalization Corporation v. Department of Land and Natural Resources (Marine Revitalization II), 2011 MP 2 ¶ 17. Neither party has pointed to, nor has this Court found, any instance in the Commonwealth Code in which an agency is expressly denied the capacity to sue or be sued. If there are two distinct groups of agencies, those with capacity and those without, it follows that legislative silence was intended to mean an agency lacks the capacity to sue and be sued.

Decision and Order Substituting CNMI, No. 1:18-cv-00022, at 16 (Jan. 10, 2019, ECF No. 15).

Because CNMI law has not given DOC the capacity to sue and be sued, Manila cannot prosecute an action against that department. The Court agrees with the CNMI that the proper party is the Commonwealth, and so it will be added as a defendant and the caption will be amended accordingly. (MTD Memo. at 9.)

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Commonwealth, now substituted for the Department of Corrections, asserts that it and the official capacity defendants enjoy "sovereign immunity against suits for damages in federal court" and must, therefore, be dismissed from this action. (Memo. at 14.) We first examine the extent of the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity generally, and then consider other factors bearing on whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

1. The Commonwealth's Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is the immunity of a sovereign government or entity from being sued without its consent. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1014 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981). It applies aswell when government officers are sued because of conduct that occurred while they were acting in their official capacity, as such lawsuits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Official capacity defendants may assert sovereign immunity, because in essence the government is being sued. Lewis v. Clarke, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017) ("In...