Mann v. City of Chula Vista

CARLOS EUGENE MANN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHULA VISTA; CHULA VISTA POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER FREDERICO DOMINGUEZ;OFFICER Y. MARTINEZ; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-2525-WQH-MDD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 28, 2020

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative to Strike Portions Thereof filed by Defendants City of Chula Vista, Chula Vista Police Department, Officer Federico Dominguez, and Officer Yamil Martinez. (ECF No. 46).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2018, Plaintiff Carlos Eugene Mann, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Defendants City of Chula Vista (the "City"), Chula Vista Police Department ("CVPD"), CVPD Officer Federico Dominguez, CVPD Officer Yamil Martinez, and Does 1 through 10. (ECF No. 1). On July 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, alleging claims against Defendants for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law. (ECF No. 27).

On November 7, 2019, the Court issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 34). The Court determined that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendants under § 1983 or California law. The Court dismissed the Amended Complaint without prejudice and with leave to file a motion for leave to amend.

On April 6, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 44). In the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for 1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et. seq.; 2) false imprisonment; 3) negligence, and negligent training, directing, supervising, and controlling under sections 11116.6 and 11117 of the California Penal Code; 4) false imprisonment; 5) assault and battery; 6) negligence, negligent training and supervising, and negligent infliction of emotional distress; 7) negligent training, retaining, supervising, managing, directing, and controlling; 8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 9) negligent infliction of emotional distress; 10) defamation/slander/libel; 11) intentional discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1000e-2(a); 12) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of section 12940(k) of the California Government Code; and 13) selective and vindictive criminal processing. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, special damages in the amount of $2,000,000, punitive damages, equitable relief, declaratory relief, costs, and "other further relief as this Court may deem just and proper." (ECF No. 39-1 at 66). Plaintiff also requests that the Court "purg[e] all criminal information and DNA possession of CVPD regarding this case[.]" (Id.).

On April 20, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's SAC, or in the Alternative to Strike Portions Thereof. (ECF No. 46). On May 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 47). On May 19, 2020, Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 48). On May 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Reply. (ECF No. 49). On May 21, 2020, Defendants filed a Response to the Objection. (ECF No. 50).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

On June 26, 2018, Plaintiff's former girlfriend, Maribel Contreras, "reviewed [Plaintiff's] social media emails through his cell phone." (ECF No. 39-1 ¶ 63). When Contreras saw the emails, she "bec[a]me extremely violent" and "physically attacked [Plaintiff] . . . ." (Id. ¶ 62). Contreras "snatch[ed]" Plaintiff's $800 cell phone, ran into the bathroom, and threw the phone into the toilet. (Id. ¶ 63). Contreras pushed Plaintiff against the bathroom wall, causing Plaintiff severe pain in his back, neck, and shoulders. Contreras slapped Plaintiff's face, causing Plaintiff "a moment of blindness." (Id. ¶ 65). Plaintiff attempted to call 911 on the home phone, but Contreras grabbed the phone out of Plaintiff's hands. Plaintiff "defend[ed] himself [ ] out of fear [of] death" by putting Contreras in an "Arm Bar." (Id. ¶ 66). Plaintiff "was on his knees while being attacked when he contacted 911 from his home phone . . . ." (Id. ¶ 38).

CVPD Officers Dominguez and Martinez arrived at Plaintiff's residence and took separate statements from Plaintiff and Contreras. The Officers asked Plaintiff, "[W]hat happened that night?" (Id. ¶ 114). Officer Dominguez's "tone and posture" "led Plaintiff to believe that [Officer Dominguez] was friendly and was going to escort Contreras out of Plaintiff[']s residence." (Id. ¶ 117). Plaintiff made a "statement that he put Contreras in an Arm Bar . . . ." (Id. ¶ 165). Contreras alleged that Plaintiff strangled her. The Officers determined that Plaintiff committed a crime and that Plaintiff was the dominant aggressor.

Plaintiff was arrested for domestic violence assault with injury and assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of sections 273.5 and 245(a)(4) of the California Penal Code. The Officers told Plaintiff "to turn around and placehis hands behind his back . . . ." (Id. ¶ 169). Officer Dominguez handcuffed Plaintiff, double locking the handcuffs and checking for tightness. Plaintiff "complained to Officer Dominguez [ ] about the handcuffs being too tight . . . ." (Id. ¶ 105). Officer Dominguez "ignor[ed] the complaints and demand to loosen the handcuffs." (Id.). Plaintiff suffered "bruises on both of his wrists [that] lasted for several weeks." (Id. ¶ 106). Contreras was given domestic violence resources and was not arrested.

After Plaintiff was "frisked, handcuffed, and detained," Plaintiff "informed Officer Dominguez [ ] that he was a disabled person under prescribed medication, and needed water for his medical condition . . . ." (Id. ¶ 21). Officer Dominguez "refused[,] aggravating [Plaintiff's] disabilities." (Id.). Plaintiff was transported to a detention facility and was read his Miranda¹ rights after his intake paperwork was complete. No charges against Plaintiff were filed. The Officers' actions caused aggravation of Plaintiff's PTSD and hypertension, requiring him to attend doctor's appointments, take "additional medication," and attend "neurology brain balancing and Cognitive Processing Therapy." (Id. ¶ 72).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to state a claim for relief, a pleading "must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) "is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))."A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). However, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A court is not "required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of section 501 of the City's Charter and chapter 2.09 of the City's Municipal Code, attached as exhibits to the Motion to Dismiss. "As a general rule, 'a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.'" Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)). "There are, however, two exceptions to the requirement that consideration of extrinsic evidence converts a 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion." Id. "First, a court may consider 'material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint' on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id. (quoting Branch, 14 F.3d at 453). "Second, under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of 'matters of public record.'" Id. at 688-89 (quoting Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). The City's Charter and its Municipal Code are public records and proper subjects of judicial notice. Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted.

V. CLAIMS AGAINST CVPD

Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss or strike CVPD as a Defendant because CVPD is a department of the City and a duplicative Defendant. Plaintiff contends that he sufficiently states claims against all Defendants.

A city police department is an entity separate from the city and subject to suit. See Shaw v....