Mann v. Lima

290 F.Supp.2d 190

Roberta MANN, Plaintiff, v. Mary Jo LIMA, Sovereign Bankcorp, and Sovereign Bank, Defendants.

C.A. No. 02-088S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

October 10, 2003.

Eva Marie Mancuso, Bridget E. Chisholm, Hamel, Waxler, Allen & Collins, Providence, RI, for plaintiffs.

Michael A. Gamboli, Michael J. Murray, Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP, Providence, RI, for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

SMITH, District Judge.

This case requires the Court to apply the law of hostile work environment sex discrimination to allegations of sexual harassment by a female plaintiff against a female supervisor. Defendants Mary Jo Lima, Sovereign Bankcorp, and Sovereign Bank believe that Mann has struck out on her claims, and move for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, this Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate and Defendants' motion is granted.

I. Facts

Roberta Mann is a former customer service representative for Sovereign Bank who comes to the plate with allegations that her erstwhile supervisor, Mary Jo Lima, sexually harassed her during the period of June through December 2000.

The allegations of harassment, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff's case, are as follows. In May of 2000, "[Lima] told me that my necklace was pretty and felt the next time I go shopping I should buy one for myself and one for her." Mann Dep., at 16. Sometime between June and August of 2000, Lima "whispered into my ear over my left shoulder," stating, "I see you have that necklace on, what do I need to do, slide in beside you and take it off?" Id. at 23-24. Also between June and August of 2000, Lima again commented to Plaintiff that she should buy two pieces of jewelry the next time Plaintiff went shopping, one for herself and one for Lima. Id. at 28. During that time frame, Lima also stated that she should take the necklace off, wrap it up, and give it to Lima for her birthday. Id. at 31.

In September of 2000, Plaintiff changed the length and color of her hair. After this change, Plaintiff claims that Lima walked up behind her and ran her fingers through Plaintiff's hair. Lima also made comments about "how pretty it looked and how different it was," all the while rubbing Plaintiff's head "in a massaging motion." Id. at 35.

On October 16, 2000, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Lima at Lima's request. The meeting occurred in a closed conference room, and no one else attended. Id. at 41. During that meeting, Lima said:

`I feel that you need a hug.' I said, `MJ [Lima], what are you talking about.' She said, `I feel you need a hug.' I said `MJ, I don't want you hugging me.'.... She repeated it again. She said, `I really think you need a hug.' I said, `I do not want you hugging me.' [Lima] got up from the table and walked around ... and I held my hand out ... and told her, `I do not want you hugging me.' When I looked over, [Lima] was kneeling in front of me and holding my ankle. ... [Lima] looked at me and she said, `I see you have that necklace on. I want it, give it to me.'.... I just sat there, I was a wreck. Then [Lima] said, `well, let's just forget this ever happened.'

Id. at 45-47.

On October 19, 2000, Plaintiff reported the events of the October 16 meeting to Sovereign Bank's human resources department. Id. at 52. This was the first time that Plaintiff complained to Sovereign Bank about Lima's conduct toward her.

The next and final incident occurred on December 26, 2000, when "[Lima] sat on my desk and told me how pretty it [Mann's top] was and how she liked the colors on me and how nice it looked on me." Id. at 74. The following week, Plaintiff did not come in to work because she could not face Lima. On January 2, 2001, she spoke with Karen Mendonca and Brenda Diko of Sovereign Bank, both of whom had human resources responsibilities, and informed them that she would not be returning to her job. Id. at 79-80.

There is also testimony that Lima once stated at a family gathering that she was a lesbian "so her mother would stop trying to fix her up with people," and that Lima recounted this event to Plaintiff. Id. at 27. This is the only evidence with respect to Lima's sexual orientation, other than the fact that Lima is presently married to a man.¹

Defendants pitch extensive evidence that Sovereign Bank investigated Plaintiff's charges, as reported on October 19, 2000; but Plaintiff suggests that this pitch is off the mark because Lima merely received an oral reprimand and no other discipline.

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq. (Title VII) and R.I. Gen. Laws 28-5-1, et seq. (Rhode Island's Fair Employment Practices Act).² Defendants maintain that Mann strikes out on the following pitches: strike one—Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory harassment was based on sex; strike two—Plaintiff's failure to offer sufficiently "objectively severe or pervasive" evidence of discriminatory harassment that would change the conditions of her working environment; and strike three—that even if harassment occurred, Defendants absolved themselves of liability by their prompt investigations.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The rules of this game are well-known and oft repeated. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that a party shall be entitled to summary judgment

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When determining a motion for summary judgment, this Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002); Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 820 (1st Cir. 1991); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).

To oppose the motion successfully, the non-moving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Moreover, the evidence presented by the non-moving party "`cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.'" Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822 (citing Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)). Indeed, "[e]ven in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990). Therefore, in order to round the bases and defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a trial-worthy issue by presenting "enough competent evidence to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party." Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

III. Analysis

A plaintiff alleging hostile work environment sex discrimination relies, in the first instance, on Congress' pronouncement that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This proscription has been construed to mean that "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)).

Thus, a "hostile work environment" sexual harassment claim, like the infield fly rule, is composed of specific elements all of which must be present: (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) that the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of a plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that the sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the plaintiff in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir.2001). Defendants focus the majority of their attack on whether the conduct in this case was "based on sex" and "severe or pervasive."

A. "Based on Sex"

In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the protections of Title VII in the context of a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim encompass situations in which the harasser and victim are of the same sex. 523 U.S. 75, 79-80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia described three avenues by which a plaintiff in a same-sex hostile work environment case can establish that the alleged discrimination is "because of" or "based on" sex:

Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of...