Manners v. Cannella, Case No. 15-cv-62071-BLOOM/Valle

LIVINGSTON MANNERS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER RONALD CANNELLA, OFFICER KARRIE SABILLON,OFFICER PAUL SCHEEL, and CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-62071-BLOOM/Valle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

October 25, 2016

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Officers Ronald Cannella ("Cannella") and Karrie Sabillon ("Sabillon") (collectively, "Officer Defendants"), ECF No. [58], and Defendant City of Fort Lauderdale ("City"), ECF No. [60] (collectively, the "Motions").¹ The Court has carefully reviewed the Motions, the record, all supporting and opposing filings, the exhibits attached thereto, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, the Motions for Summary Judgment are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Livingston Manners' ("Plaintiff") claims against Defendants stem from events that occurred on the night of June 24, 2014. That night, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Plaintiff was parked in a swale in front of the residence of Sylvester Petes ("Petes"), waiting to pick Petes upfor work. See ECF Nos. [60] ¶¶ 1-23 ("City's Facts") ¶ 1; [81] ("Plaintiff's Additional Facts") ¶ 1 (collectively, "Undisputed Facts")²; see also ECF Nos. [57] ("Officers' Facts") ¶ 1; [70] ("Plaintiff's Facts") ¶ 1 (collectively, "Officers' and Plaintiff's Facts"). Cannella was patrolling the area due to recent thefts in the neighborhood. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 3. Plaintiff's vehicle was the only vehicle on the street. See id. ¶ 2. After spotting Plaintiff's vehicle, Cannella continued driving straight through an intersection. Id. ¶ 4. Cannella states that he then observed Plaintiff turn left onto 26^th Avenue without fully stopping at a stop sign. Cannella turned around and positioned himself behind Plaintiff's vehicle to conduct a traffic stop. See id. ¶¶ 6-7; Officers' Facts ¶ 12. Plaintiff saw Cannella and began to drive slowly down 26^th Avenue because he knew Cannella "was going to come." Undisputed Facts ¶ 8. Cannella activated his lights and sirens to execute a traffic stop, but Plaintiff did not immediately pull over. See id. ¶¶ 9, 12. Instead, Plaintiff "traveled for two or three minutes," and "drove right through" the intersection at Pembroke Road and 26^th Avenue as the light turned green, pulling into a gas station and stopping at the second pump. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14; see Officers' and Plaintiff's Facts ¶ 15. Once stopped, Cannella approached Plaintiff's driver side window and, upon request, Plaintiff handed Cannella his license. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 15. Plaintiff then exited his vehicle. See id. ¶ 16. The parties dispute whether Cannella informed Plaintiff that he was under arrest, but do not dispute that when Cannella attempted to restrain Plaintiff, Plaintiff pulled away from Cannella and leaned back into his vehicle. See id. ¶¶ 18, 19. Cannella then pulled Plaintiff out of his vehicle. See Officers' and Plaintiff's Facts ¶ 32. A physical altercation ensued; Cannella claims that he attempted to handcuff Plaintiff, while Plaintiff states that he surrendered toCannella. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 20. Plaintiff is 6'2" and 240 pounds, while Cannella is 5'10" and 215 pounds. See id. ¶ 21. At the beginning of the altercation, Cannella brought Plaintiff to the ground, with Plaintiff landing on his back and Cannella landing on top of him. See Officers' and Plaintiff's Facts ¶ 35. Throughout the struggle, Cannella punched Plaintiff at least six or seven times and, at one point, Plaintiff held Cannella's wrists. See id. ¶ 37; Undisputed Facts ¶ 22. Plaintiff's arrest was only effectuated after Sabillon and other officers arrived on the scene, and Sabillon and Cannella deployed their Tasers. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 23; Officers' and Plaintiff's Facts ¶¶ 45-47. Plaintiff was initially charged with attempted homicide, resisting arrest with violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 23.

Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges brought against him in state court. See ECF No. [35] ("Second Amended Complaint") ¶ 62. He now brings claims against Cannella under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force and malicious prosecution (Counts I and IV), against Sabillon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force (Count II), and against City for false arrest (Count V). See Second Amended Complaint. Officer Defendants and City filed their respective Motions on September 6 and 16, 2016. See ECF Nos. [58] and [60]. Plaintiff's Responses, and Defendants' Replies, timely followed. See ECF Nos. [71], [78], [80], [87].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citation to the record, including, inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F. 3d 1235, 1243(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986)).

The moving party shoulders the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). If a movant satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App'x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, "the non-moving party 'must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence on the record supports the uncontrovertedmaterial facts that the movant has proposed. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268-69, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 S.W. 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

Officer Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. City moves for summary judgment, asserting probable cause as a complete defense. The Court addresses Defendants' arguments in turn.

A. Qualified Immunity

"Qualified immunity . . . offers complete protection for individual government officials performing discretionary functions 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "This formulation of the qualified immunity inquiry is intended to protect government officials 'from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.'" Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806); see also Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2015) ("The purpose for qualified immunity is to permit officials to act without fear of harassing litigation as long as they can reasonably anticipate before they act whether their conduct will expose them to liability."). "Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense from liability," McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007), and "[e]ntitlement to immunity is the rule, rather than the exception." Samarco v. Neumann, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) ("That qualifiedimmunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against them in their individual capacities.")). "'For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel . . . the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.'" McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir.), opinion amended on reh'g, 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150).

1. Discretionary Authority

To enjoy qualified immunity, Officer Defendants must first establish that they acted within their discretionary authority during the incident in question. See Oliver v....