Manning v. State

1

WILLIE JEROME MANNING A/K/A FLY Petitioner v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent

No. 2023-DR-01076-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi, En Banc

September 16, 2024

Serial 252832

ORDER

MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE

¶ 1. Willie Jerome Manning was convicted and sentenced to death in 1994 for murdering two Mississippi State University students, Tiffany Miller and Jon Steckler, in 1992. Before the Court, en banc, is petitioner's Motion for Leave to File Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief-his third petition in this Court for post-conviction relief. The State of Mississippi has filed a Response, and petitioner has filed a Reply. Also before the Court is another successive Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Light of Intervening Decisions of this Court: Howell v State, 358 So.3d 613 (Miss. 2023), and Ronk v State, No. 2021-DR-00269-SCT, 2024 WL 131639 (Miss. 2024). The State has responded, and petitioner has replied.

¶2. The State of Mississippi established post-conviction relief proceedings as a statutory mechanism "to provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues, or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(2) (Rev. 2020). Following the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), Mississippi Code Sections 99-39-1 to -29 (Rev. 2020), this Court will grant leave on a successive petition to proceed only if petitioner's application, exhibits, and the prior record show that his claims are not procedurally barred and that they "present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right[.]" Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5) (Rev. 2020).

Procedural Bars

Successive Writ Bar

¶3. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-39-27(9), "[t]he dismissal or denial of an application under this section is a final judgment and shall be a bar to a second or successive application under this article." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2020). Absent a meritorious claim meeting an exception set forth in Mississippi Code Section 99-39-27(9), "successive writs are barred." Ronk, 2023 WL 131639, at *2 (citing § 99-39-27(9)).

Res Judicata Bar

¶4. "Res judicata also extends to those claims that could have been raised in prior proceedings but were not." Brown v. State, 306 So.3d 719, 730 (Miss. 2020) (citing Ronk v. State, 267 So.3d 1239, 1288 (Miss. 2019)). Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3921(3), "the doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial and on direct appeal." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Rev. 2020). "The burden is upon the prisoner to allege in his motion such facts as are necessary to demonstrate that his claims are not procedurally barred under this section." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(6) (Rev. 2020). To overcome these procedural bars, petitioner must meet an exception set forth in Mississippi Code Sections 99-39-5(2) and -27(9).

Time Bar

¶5. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(2)(b) "filings for post-conviction relief in capital cases .. . shall be made within one (1) year after conviction." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(b) (Rev. 2020). This Court has held that "absent an applicable exception, an untimely filed motion for post-conviction relief is procedurally time-barred." Havard v. State, 86 So.3d 896, 899 (Miss. 2012). Accordingly, absent an exception, petitioner's instant application is time barred.

Whether any present claim meets an exception.

¶6. Notwithstanding the procedural bars, which preclude relief, petitioner's claims of Brady ^[1]violations and claims of newly discovered evidence are examined. Such claims might qualify as an exception from the procedural bars. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i), -27(9) (Rev. 2020). Because the aforementioned claims lack merit, however, they do not qualify as an exception.

I. Petitioner's Claim under ^[2]

¶7. We first examine petitioner's Brady claims: failure to disclose exculpatory evidence regarding his cousin Earl Jordan, his former cellmate Henry Richardson, and his girlfriend at the time of the crime, Paula Hathorn.

¶8. Petitioner's arguments related to Paula Hathorn have twice been rejected by this Court in petitioner's previous applications for post-conviction relief. In petitioner's first application for post-conviction relief, he argued "a violation of Brady for the State's failure to disclose information associated with Hathorn's testimony." Manning v. State, 929 So.2d 885, 892 (Miss. 2006). This Court found "all exculpatory issues raised by [petitioner] regarding . . . Paula Hathorn to be without merit." Id. Moreover, in petitioner's second, successive application for post-conviction relief in 2013, petitioner pleaded Hathorn's "Undisclosed Deal with the State" and "Role as an Informant." This Court denied all claims except petitioner's request to proceed in the trial court for DNA testing and fingerprint comparison. Order, Manning v. State, No. 2013-DR-00491-SCT (Miss. July 23, 2013). Federal courts have also refused Brady relief regarding Paula Hathorn. See Manning v. Epps, 695 F.Supp.2d 323, 359-61 (N.D. Miss. 2009), rev'd by Manning v. Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2012) ("AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations bars his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We cannot consider Manning's application for post-conviction relief"). The United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for writ of certiorari. Manning v. Epps, 568 U.S. 1251, 133 S.Ct. 1633, 185 L.Ed.2d 620 (2013) (mem.). Federal courts found that petitioner's application for collateral relief was untimely, thus, procedurally barred.

¶9. Nor has petitioner established a Brady violation concerning an affidavit of Henry Richardson, a.k.a. Miami. Petitioner was aware of Richardson at trial through Frank Parker's testimony. See King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168, 1174 (Miss. 1995) ("To establish a Brady violation a defendant must prove ... he [could not] obtain [the evidence] himself with any reasonable diligence[.]") Richardson was in the same jail cell as a detainee with Parker and petitioner. Parker testified that he overheard petitioner tell Richardson how he disposed of the murder weapon. Richardson's affidavit relates that he was not contacted until 2023, although petitioner knew of him at trial almost thirty years ago. Petitioner's arguments fail to meet the requirements for establishing a claim under Brady.

¶10. Finally, petitioner's Brady claim that the prosecution suppressed evidence of an alleged deal with Earl Jordan is barred by res judicata. Petitioner has raised the same argument in his direct appeal and a prior application for post-conviction relief, and it was denied. Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152, 1178 (Miss. 1998) ("there was . . . evidence before the jury that Jordan was hoping for some sort of deal to be made in exchange for his testimony. He admitted as much."); Order, Manning v. State, No. 2013-DR-00491-SCT (Miss. Apr. 25, 2013) (denying claim based on affidavit of paralegal/investigator for the Office of the State Public Defender, Capital Defense Division, that Jordan cooperated with the prosecution in exchange for favorable treatment). "Reframing an issue that previously has been considered and rejected is not allowed." Order, Underwood v. State, No. 2015-DR-01378-SCT, at *3-4 (Miss. Dec. 16,2021) (citing Carrv. State, 873 So.2d 991,1002 (Miss. 2004)). Notwithstanding the procedural bars, we find that each claim of a Brady violation lacks merit.

II. Intervening Decisions: Howell v. State and Ronk v. State

¶ 11. One exception to the procedural bars of the UPCCRA is "[t]hat there has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence . . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(i) (Rev. 2020). Without leave of this Court, on May 3, 2024, petitioner pleaded an amended successive application for postconviction relief referencing Howell and Ronk.

¶ 12. In June 1998, petitioner's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Manning, 726 So.2d at 1152. An assignment of error raised by petitioner was that the trial judge permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence that Jordan had volunteered to take a polygraph examination, i.e., a lie-detector test. Id. at 1179. Citing this Court's decision in Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1257 (Miss. 1993), overruled by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So.2d 158, 162 (Miss. 1999), the Court found that

In the case before us, the prosecutor made no attempt to disclose to the jury whether a test was actually taken or what the results of the test were. He only elicited that Jordan had volunteered to take one. This was proper redirect after Jordan's credibility had been attacked on cross-examination by the defense.

Id. Petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied in October 1998.

¶13. In January 1999, this Court handed down Weatherspoon, holding that

[W]e find that testimony pertaining to a witness's offer to take a polygraph, whether it be a witness for the State or the defense, is not admissible at trial. To the extent that this holding affects [two other cases] and Manning v. State, cited supra, those cases are overruled. 732 So.2d at 162.

¶14. Petitioner filed his first application for post-conviction relief/?ro se in February 2001. Over the ensuing years, petitioner filed numerous motions and supplements, and the State filed multiple responses, resulting in a total of forty orders between this Court and the trial court-the majority of which were for time extensions and leave to obtain post-conviction...