Manus v. Webster Cnty.

THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH CONWAY MANUS, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. WEBSTER COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-00149-SA-DAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI ABERDEEN DIVISION

August 6, 2014

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE

This cause comes before the Court on Municipal Defendants' Motion to Exclude [283] and Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude [340]. Defendants move the Court to exclude the testimony of Erin A. Barnhart, M.D., the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Barnhart, and an affidavit signed by Dr. Barnhart. Plaintiffs move the Court to exclude the testimony of E. Thomas Cullom, III, M.D. Upon due consideration of the motions, responses, rules, and authorities, the Court finds as follows:

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Joseph Conway Manus ("Manus") originally brought this action, asserting constitutional claims brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state law claims. Manus alleged that on September 7, 2010 law enforcement officers from Webster County, Mississippi; Eupora, Mississippi; and Mathiston, Mississippi used excessive force against him in order to effectuate an unlawful arrest and denied him medical care during the seven days that he was in their custody. As a result, Manus claimed he suffered serious injuries, including quadriplegia.¹ Manus died on December 1, 2012 while this lawsuit was pending.

After his death, Manus' widow, Miranda Manus, acting on her own behalf as well as with Manus' mother, Lois Manus, on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries, and Manus' estatewere substituted as Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint adding a claim for wrongful death on June 6, 2013. All Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of qualified immunity and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The Court granted in part and denied in part these motions in its Order and Memorandum Opinion entered March 31, 2014.

Thereafter, Eupora Police Chief Greg Hunter, the estate of Eupora Police Officer Keith Crenshaw,² and the City of Eupora filed a Motion for Reconsideration [327] requesting the Court reconsider its finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment and qualified immunity in their favor with regard to Plaintiffs' claims against them for excessive force bystander liability and for the denial of medical care. The Court declined to reconsider [338] its prior opinion with regard to Plaintiffs' claims against these Defendants for excessive force bystander liability and Plaintiffs' claims against Chief Hunter and the City of Eupora for deliberate denial of medical care. However, the Court reversed its finding with regard to Plaintiffs' claim for deliberate denial of medical care against Officer Crenshaw and dismissed that claim with prejudice.

Subsequently, Plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with Webster County and the individual County Defendants, and the Court entered an Order [350] dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against these Defendants without prejudice on July 31, 2014.

In ruling on the summary judgment motions in this matter, the Court determined that the qualified immunity analysis at the summary judgment stage did not require the Court to rely upon the testimony of Dr. Barnhart or James Wells.³ However, the Court recognized that prior to trial, a hearing would be necessary to determine whether the proffered testimony, togetherwith certain related documents, is admissible and/or meets the requirements set forth by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Consequently, on July 25, 2014, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine [283, 285].⁴ After receiving testimony from Wells and Dr. Barnhart along with various exhibits, the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Exclude Death Certificate and Testimony of James S. Wells [285]⁵ and took Defendants' Motion to Exclude Dr. Barnhart, Dr. Barnhart's Affidavit, and Autopsy Report [283] under advisement.

STANDARD

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence,

If [a] witness is only testifying as a lay witness, the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 179-80 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing FED. R. EVID. 701.). In other words, "the distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field." Id at 180. "Moreover, any part of a witness's opinion that rests on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge must be determined by reference to Rule 702, not Rule 701." Id. at 180 (citing FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note).

With regard to the opinions of experts, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows testimony from "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" if such testimony will assist the trier of fact and "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702. Thus, the trial court must ensure that any and all testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). An expert, to state an opinion, must have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Id. at 592, 113 S. Ct. 2786. Under Rule 703, an expert must base his opinion upon facts and data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Id. at 595, 113 S. Ct. 2786.

The Court must determine that the reasoning and methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and that the reasoning and methodology can properly be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592-93, 113 S. Ct. 2786. The Supreme Court outlined a set of factors that may be used to make this determination, including:

(1) whether the expert's theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of a technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) the degree to which the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.

Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95, 113 S. Ct. 2786). These factors "form the starting point of the inquiry into the admissibility of expert testimony." Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2002).

In Kumho Tire, Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court expanded the Daubert "gatekeeping" obligation of the trial court to apply not only to testimony based on "scientific"knowledge, but also "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge. 526 U.S. 137, 141, 147-48, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). The Supreme Court explained that trial courts enjoy "broad latitude" when deciding how to determine reliability and that the Court's gatekeeping function must be tied to the particular facts of the case. Id. at 151-53, 149-51, 119 S. Ct. 1167.

While the Court should "make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field," id. at 152, 119 S. Ct. 1167, "the heart of Daubert is relevance and reliability." Rushing v. Kansas City So., 185 F.3d 496, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). "As long as some reasonable indication of qualifications is adduced, the court may admit the evidence without abdicating its gatekeeping function. After that qualifications become an issue for the trier of fact, rather than for the court in its gatekeeping capacity." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786). Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that "[m]ost of the safeguards provided for in Daubert are not as essential in a case such as this where a district judge sits as the trier of fact in place of a jury." Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Defendants' Motion to Exclude Dr. Barnhart, Dr. Barnhart's Affidavit, and Autopsy Report

Dr. Barnhart's Affidavit

At the hearing on Defendants' motions, Plaintiffs' counsel represented to the Court that Plaintiffs do not intend to introduce the affidavit at issue, signed by Dr. Barnhart on May 30, 2013, at trial. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Exclude [283] is MOOT insofar as it relates to Dr. Barnhart's affidavit. Defendants may, of course, renew their objections at the appropriate time should Plaintiffs later attempt to introduce this evidence at trial.

Testimony of Dr. Barnhart

Defendants do not contest Dr. Barnhart's qualifications as a forensic pathologist or her ability to testify as to her physical findings resulting from her autopsy examination of Manus. Rather, Defendants contend Dr. Barnhart is not qualified to testify with regard to the cause and manner of the injury that ultimately led to Manus' death. Specifically, Defendants seek to exclude any testimony by Dr. Barnhart that Manus suffered a cervical fracture during an altercation with law enforcement while being taken into custody on September 7, 2010.

At the evidentiary hearing on Defendants' motions, Dr. Barnhart testified that her opinions regarding the...