Manzano v. Southern Indian Health Council, Inc.

CAROLINA MANZANO, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN INDIAN HEALTH COUNCIL, INC.; DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 20-cv-02130-BAS-BGS

United States District Court, S.D. California

July 7, 2021

ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (ECF NO. 5); AND (2) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEAL OR STRIKE (ECF NO. 12)

Hon Cynthia Bashant United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Carolina Manzano (“Plaintiff”) brings this action alleging harassment and wrongful termination while she was employed by Defendant Southern Indian Health Council, Inc. (“Defendant” or “SIHC”). (See generally, Compl, ECF No. 1.)^[1] Defendant moves to dismiss the action on the bases that SIHC is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, divesting this Court of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff opposes, and Defendant replies. (ECF Nos. 7, 8 10.) The Court finds the Motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

SIHC was formed by seven tribes-the Barona Band of Mission Indians, the Campo Band of Mission Indians, the Ewiiaapaayp Band of Kumeyaay Indians, the Jamul Indian Village of California, the La Pasta Band of Mission Indians, the Manzanita Band of the Kumeyaay Nation, and the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians (“Member Tribes”)-to provide health care to American Indians and other residents of its service area. (Compact of Self-Governance (“Compact”) at 2, Ex. B to Decl. of Tiffany Salayer (“Salayer Decl.”), ECF No. 10-1.)^[3] Specifically, SIHC's duties are “to improve the physical, mental and spiritual health of American Indians of the member tribes of San Diego County through the active involvement of tribes as partners in enhancing the quality of life of their communities[, ]” including improving environmental health, sanitation, health education, support for social services, and cultural preservation. (Second Am. and Restated Bylaws of SIHC (“Bylaws”) §§ 3.1, 3.2(a)-(e), Ex. A to Decl. of Laura Caswell (“Caswell Decl.”), ECF No. 5-2.)

Initially, SIHC “began as a satellite operation of the Indian Health Council in Pauma Valley[, ]” during which it “operated out of trailers on the Sycuan reservation.” (March 2017 Pamphlet (“Pamphlet”) at 18, Ex. C to Caswell Decl., ECF No. 5-2.) It incorporated as a nonprofit corporation in 1982 and moved to the Barona Reservation. (Id.) In 1987, SIHC's Board of Directors acquired private land in Alpine, California, which was placed into a federal trust and serves as the entity's permanent location. (Id.) SIHC provided health services “for many years under self-determination contracts with the Indian Health Service [(“IHS”)], ” a federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, which recognized SIHC “as a tribally-operated service unit.” (Compact at 2.) In 2014, SIHC entered into a Compact^[4] with IHS, in which IHS transferred authority to SIHC pursuant to Title V of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”) “to decide how federal programs, services, functions and activities . . . shall be funded and carried out” and to “promote[] the autonomy of the Tribes in the field of health care.” (Compact § 1.2.1.) Under the Compact, SIHC is authorized “to plan, conduct, consolidate, administer, and receive full tribal shares of funding for all programs, services, functions and activities . . . that are carried out for the benefit of American Indians . . . .” (Id. at 2.) SIHC entered the Compact on behalf of the Member Tribes. (Id.; see also Requests for Participation, Ex. B to Caswell Decl., ECF No. 5-2.)

The Member Tribes must “meet the following requirements: (a) are federally recognized, (b) are located in San Diego County; and (c) are admitted to membership by a vote of the Board.” (Bylaws § 5.2.) The Member Tribes can apply for or withdraw from membership through a duly adopted tribal General Council resolution. (Id. §§ 5.3, 5.4(a).) The Board of Directors, which is the seat of SIHC's corporate power, is composed of one individual appointed from each Member Tribe to serve as director and an alternate. (Id. § 6.4.) All directors and alternates must be enrolled in the Member Tribe that appointed them. (Id. § 6.7.) The Board directly supervises the CEO, to whom all day-to-day operations are delegated, and each director is required to keep their Member Tribe apprised of the activities and services of SIHC. (Id. §§ 6.18, 6.2.) The Board itself has expansive powers to shape SIHC's services, control SIHC's finances and manage all funds received, and oversee how SIHC's conducts its operations. (Id. § 6.3(a)-(j).)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss a claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring a court to dismiss an action “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction”). Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns “the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). District courts are therefore required to decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the merits of the case. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95. “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

Although the Ninth Circuit has characterized tribal sovereign immunity as only “quasi-jurisdictional” in nature, it has also held that “Rule 12(b)(1) is still a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign immunity from suit.” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). When addressing a 12(b)(1) challenge based on sovereign immunity, a district court “may review any evidence . . . to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). When a plaintiff is asserting subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to bar suit. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Pistor, 791 F.3d at 1111. In these situations, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to [a] plaintiff's allegations.” Pistor, 791 F.3d at 1111.

III. ANALYSIS

The Court first addresses Plaintiff's objections to Defendant's exhibits in support of its Motion to Dismiss before turning to whether Plaintiff has established that SIHC cannot invoke tribal sovereign immunity to bar this suit.

A. Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff objects to numerous attestations made in the Caswell Declaration and to the Compact attached to Defendant's Reply. (ECF Nos. 7-1, 11.) Regarding the declaration, the Court finds no need to rely on all but one of the objected-to statements by Caswell because the same information is contained in other exhibits that Plaintiff either does not object to or has herself proffered into evidence.^[5] As to Plaintiff's objections to the Compact, because it concerns facts essential to the issue of sovereign immunity, the Court addresses these evidentiary challenges in more detail below.

1. Untimeliness

First, Plaintiff states the Compact is untimely because it was not filed with SIHC's moving papers, but with its Reply brief. She contends that the Compact is an entirely new exhibit and not, as Defendant represents, merely a complete version of an exhibit attached to its Motion, which included only the tribal resolutions stating each Member Tribes' intent to have SIHC enter into the Compact on their behalf. (See Requests for Participation.)

Generally, “[n]ew evidence submitted as part of a reply is improper because it does not allow the defendant an adequate opportunity to respond.” Townsend v. Monster Beverage Corp., 303 F.Supp.3d 1010, 1027 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (citations and quotations omitted). As such, if courts elect to consider materials submitted in a reply brief, they must afford the opposing party an opportunity to respond. See Mohsin v. California Dep't of Water Res., 52 F.Supp.3d 1006, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996)); Daghlian v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Williams v. Bowman, 157 F.Supp.2d 1103, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

Here Plaintiff responded to the later-filed Compact attached to SIHC's Reply by filing objections to its authentication and admissibility. (ECF No. 11.) Given that Plaintiff has had an opportunity to respond to this late filing, the Court finds consideration of the Compact would be proper. Furthermore, the Court finds no reason to doubt counsel's explanation, under oath, that the Compact's omission from the Motion was an administrative error on the part of counsel. (See Salayer Decl. ¶ 3 (“It was brought to my attention that I inadvertently attached an incomplete copy of the Compact . . . .”).) This representation of events comports with the other evidence provided in this case: The language of the Caswell Declaration expressly intends to authenticate the Compact as an attached exhibit (see Caswell Decl. ¶ 12 (“Attached to the Notice of Lodgment as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the compact entered into between SIHC and...