Maples v. State

342 Mich.App. 370

994 N.W.2d 834

David A. MAPLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Michigan, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 343394

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 3, 2019, at Lansing.

Decided July 21, 2022, at 9:15 a.m.

Bendure & Thomas, PLC (by Mark R. Bendure ) and We Fight The Law, PLLC (by Racine M. Miller ) for plaintiff.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Kathryn M. Dalzell, Assistant Solicitor General, for the state of Michigan.

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Cavanagh and Cameron, JJ.

ON REMAND

Cameron, J.

This matter returns to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court. We once again affirm the Court of Claims’ decision to grant summary disposition in favor of defendant, the state of Michigan, under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact).

I. BACKGROUND

David A. Maples filed a claim for compensation under the Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA), MCL 691.1751 et seq. , after his plea-based conviction and sentence were vacated. The relevant facts were outlined in detail in this Court's previous opinion:

In August 1993, Maples, Lawrence Roberts, and James Murphy were arrested and charged with delivery of cocaine and conspiracy to deliver cocaine. The charges arose from a drug transaction that occurred when Maples and Roberts met Murphy at a bar. While at the bar, apparently unbeknownst to Maples and Roberts, Murphy sold cocaine to an undercover police officer. When Maples and Roberts left the bar together, they were pulled over and arrested. The charges against Roberts were eventually dismissed.

Shortly after his arrest, Murphy wrote a letter to the trial court, explaining that Maples and Roberts had nothing to do with the cocaine sale. Murphy reiterated Maples's innocence during a February 1994 hearing on Murphy's entrapment motion; Maples joined the motion. During the hearing, Murphy testified that Maples was neither involved in nor aware of the cocaine sale.

Maples was not scheduled for trial until September 1995. After being unsuccessful in his attempt to have his case dismissed for entrapment and later to have the case dismissed for a speedy-trial violation, Maples expressed his intent to call Murphy as a defense witness in Maples's trial. However, on the eve of trial, Maples learned that Murphy had accepted a plea offer from the prosecution that awarded him a reduced sentence in exchange for agreeing not to testify on Maples's behalf. Further, Maples's only other witness, Roberts, could not be located for trial. Maples then pleaded guilty to delivery of cocaine because he did not have any exculpatory witnesses available and his attorney assured him that he could still appeal the speedy-trial issue. After Maples was sentenced to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment, Murphy executed affidavits in 1997 and 2007 in which he attested that Maples was never involved in the crimes alleged. Murphy's affidavits were consistent with his testimony from the February 1994 entrapment hearing.

Thereafter, Maples appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation. A panel of this Court concluded that Maples had waived review of that claim and others when he pleaded guilty. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Maples , 459 Mich. 867 [584 N.W.2d 738] (1998).

Maples then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and the denial of his right to a speedy trial. The district court denied his petition, but it did not explicitly rule on Maples's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Maples v. Stegall (Maples I) , 340 F.3d 433, 436 (C.A.6, 2003) (discussing the federal district court's holding). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient because counsel's advice to Maples—that he could pursue a speedy-trial claim at the appellate level despite the unconditional guilty plea—was "patently erroneous." Id. at 439. However, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case back to the federal district court to analyze Maples's likelihood of success on his speedy-trial violation claim in order to determine if there was the requisite prejudice to substantiate an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. at 440-441.

On remand, the federal district court concluded that Maples's speedy-trial claim had no merit and, thus, that he could not succeed on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See Maples v. Stegall (Maples II) , 427 F.3d 1020, 1023 (C.A.6, 2005) (discussing the federal district court's holding). However, the Sixth Circuit concluded, inter alia , that although evidence that Roberts would have provided beneficial testimony was weak, evidence to the contrary was weaker, and that had Roberts been available for trial, he would have testified on Maples's behalf. Id. at 1032-1033. Thus, because Roberts could no longer be located by the time of trial, Maples was prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 1033. The Sixth Circuit also determined that Murphy's unavailability to testify because of his plea agreement prejudiced Maples. Id. at 1034. The Sixth Circuit noted that Murphy had given testimony that favored Maples at the entrapment hearing in February 1994. Id. Because both Roberts and Murphy would have testified favorably for Maples, but both were unavailable by the time of trial, the Maples II court concluded that Maples had suffered actual prejudice from the delay. Id. Given that conclusion, the Sixth Circuit held that Maples's speedy-trial violation claim had merit, which meant that he had suffered a violation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. Accordingly, the Maples II court reversed the federal district court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Id.

After the federal district court issued the writ of habeas corpus, the state criminal court dismissed Maples's criminal charges and vacated his conviction in 2006. Approximately 11 years later, Maples filed his WICA complaint in the Court of Claims.

Maples maintained that he met the WICA requirements for compensation. Specifically, he claimed that new evidence, in the form of Murphy's testimony, affidavits, and letter, as well as Roberts's proposed testimony, demonstrated Maples's innocence and had resulted in the reversal of his conviction and dismissal of the charges against him. The Court of Claims noted that the WICA defined "new evidence" to include evidence that was not presented at "the proceedings leading to plaintiff's conviction," MCL 691.1752(b), that Maples had joined in Murphy's entrapment motion, and that Murphy had testified at the entrapment hearing that Maples had no knowledge of the cocaine sale and did not participate in it. Concluding that the entrapment hearing was a pretrial hearing that led to Maples's conviction and that Murphy's testimony at the entrapment hearing was the same evidence that Maples was now attempting to use to support his WICA claim, the Court of Claims determined that by definition, it was not "new evidence" under the WICA. Further, the court concluded that counsel's constitutionally deficient performance and Maples's speedy-trial claim resulted in his release, not the evidence of Maples's innocence. [ Maples v. Michigan , 328 Mich.App. 209, 213-217, 936 N.W.2d 857 (2019) ( Maples III ), rev'd 507 Mich. 461, 968 N.W.2d 446 (2021) (citations omitted).]

Maples appealed the Court of Claims’ decision to grant summary disposition in favor of the state of Michigan. This Court affirmed, concluding that "[t]he exculpatory material made part of the entrapment hearing cannot now be considered ‘new evidence.’ "

Maples III , 328 Mich App at 220, 936 N.W.2d 857. This Court reasoned that "Maples's entrapment defense certainly was part of the criminal case that brought about his ultimate conviction, and therefore, the pretrial entrapment hearing was a ‘proceeding leading to plaintiff's conviction’ " for purposes of MCL 691.1752(b). Id. at 221, 936 N.W.2d 857. Because Maples sought "to admit the same testimony that was presented during a proceeding leading to his conviction," this Court concluded that Murphy's testimony, affidavits, and letter were not "new evidence" under the WICA. Id. Additionally, because Maples had failed to provide evidence regarding the substance of Roberts's "supposed testimony," this Court concluded "that Roberts's supposed testimony was not ‘new evidence.’ " Id. at 222, 936 N.W.2d 857.

After granting leave to appeal, a majority of our Supreme Court held that Maples had presented "new evidence under the WICA because [Murphy's evidence] was not presented to a trier of fact during a proceeding that determined guilt—a trial or a plea hearing." Maples v. Michigan , 507 Mich. 461, 465, 968 N.W.2d 446 (2021) ( Maples IV ). On that basis, the Supreme Court reversed this Court's opinion in Maples III and remanded "for further proceedings." Id. at 465, 478, 968 N.W.2d 446.

For purposes of this remand, this Court must decide whether the Court of Claims erred when it concluded that Maples failed to demonstrate that the "new evidence" provided by Murphy actually resulted in Maples's conviction and sentence being vacated and his charges being dismissed, as required by the WICA. Because Maples cannot demonstrate this, we affirm.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"We review the interpretation of the WICA de novo." Maples IV , 507 Mich. at 470, 968 N.W.2d 446.

The role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute. The focus of our analysis must be the statute's express language, which offers the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is limited to enforcement

...