Marazzo v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

JOSEPHINE MARAZZO, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

19-CV-0552 (KAM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 31, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Josephine Marazzo ("plaintiff") appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("defendant"), which found plaintiff not disabled and thus not entitled to disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). Before the court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is respectfully DENIED, and this action is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background leading to this action is set forth in the administrative record. (Administrative Transcript ("Tr."), ECF No. 21.) The court has reviewed the parties' respective motions for judgment on the pleadings and the administrative record. The parties entered into a joint stipulation of facts on January 8, 2020, detailing Ms. Marazzo's medical history and Ms. Marazzo's testimony at her administrative hearing, which the court hereby incorporates by reference. (See Joint Stipulation of Facts ("Stip."), ECF No. 20-1.)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on September 14, 2015, alleging disability beginning July 25, 2011 due to severe impairments of cervical and lumbar spine sprain/strain, status post arthroscopic surgery to the left shoulder, right knee sprain, anxiety disorder, and depression. (Tr. 17, 240-41.) Plaintiff's claim was denied on March 22, 2016. (Id. 88-99.) On March 28, 2016, Ms. Marazzo requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Id. 100.) On November 15, 2017, Marazzo appeared with counsel and testified via video conference before ALJ Hilton R. Miller ("ALJ Miller"). (Id. 39-70.) At the hearing, ALJ Miller heard testimony by plaintiff, Sharon Kahn, a medical expert, and Michael Smith, a vocational expert. (Id.)

On January 29, 2018, ALJ Miller issued a decision affirming the SSA's determination that Marazzo did not qualifyas disabled within the meaning of the Act and, as a result, was not entitled to benefits. (Id. 12-38.) On February 17, 2018, plaintiff appealed ALJ Miller's decision to the Appeals Council. (Id. 213-36.) On November 27, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Marazzo's request, making ALJ Miller's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. 1-6.) This action followed. (See generally Complaint ("Compl."), ECF No. 1.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits may bring an action in federal court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of their benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The reviewing court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo review and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even when it might have justifiably reached a different result. Cage v. Comm'r, 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). Rather, "'[a] district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by 'substantial evidence' or if the decision is based on legal error.'" Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)).

"Substantial evidence means 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quotingHalloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004)). If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's factual findings, those findings must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ."). Inquiry into legal error requires the court to ask whether "'the claimant has had a full hearing under the [Commissioner's] regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.'" Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)).

DISCUSSION

I. The Commissioner's Five-Step Analysis of Disability Claims

A claimant must be "disabled" within the meaning of the Act to receive disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A claimant qualifies as disabled when she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Id. § 423(d)(1)(A); Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131-32. The impairment must be of "such severity" that the claimant is unable to do her previous work or engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant meets the Act's definition of disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Commissioner's process is essentially as follows:

[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that [s]he has a 'severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in [her] prior type of work, the Commissioner must find [her] disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)); accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

"The claimant has the general burden of proving . . . his or her case at steps one through four of the sequential five-step framework established in the SSA regulations." Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "However, [b]ecause a hearing on disability benefits is a nonadversarial proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The burden falls upon the Commissioner at the fifth step of the disability evaluation process to prove that the claimant, if unable to perform her past relevant work [and considering her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience], is able toengage in gainful employment within the national economy." Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

"The Commissioner must consider the following in determining a claimant's entitlement to benefits: '(1) the objective medical facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience.'" Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (alterations in original)). If the Commissioner finds a combination of impairments, the Commissioner must also consider whether "the combined effect of all of [a claimant's] impairment[s]" establish the claimant's eligibility for Social Security benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523(c); see also id. § 416.945(a)(2).

II. The ALJ's Application of the Five-Step Analysis

Using the five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled as mandated by the SSA regulations, the ALJ made the following determinations.

At step one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of July 25, 2011 to the date she was last insured on December 31, 2017. (Tr. 17.)

At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the severe impairments of cervical spine sprain/strain, lumbar spine sprain/strain, left shoulder status post-arthroscopic surgery, right knee sprain, anxiety disorder, and depression. (Id.) The ALJ noted that plaintiff went to the emergency room in September 2017 for right wrist pain, where an x-ray revealed an acute avulsion fracture and adjacent soft tissue swelling; plaintiff was discharged with a splint, and did not require further treatment for the injury. (Id. 18.) The ALJ thus concluded that plaintiff's right wrist impairment was not severe since it did not meet the durational requirement of 20 C.F.R. 404.1509. (Id.)

At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App'x 1. (Id.) Specifically, ALJ Miller considered plaintiff's impairments under listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint), 1.04 (disorders of the spine), 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders), and 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders). (Id.) ALJ Miller determined that Ms. Marazzo did not meet listing 1.02 for major joint dysfunction because there was no medical evidence of gross anatomical deformity and chronic joint pain/stiffness with signs of limited or abnormal joint motion, or imaging thatrevealed joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis; further, there was no evidence that plaintiff was unable to ambulate or unable to perform fine and gross movements effectively. (Id. 20.) ALJ Miller determined that Ms. Marazzo did not meet listing 1.04 for spinal conditions because the medical evidence did not indicate nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or lumbar spinal stenosis, and because plaintiff could ambulate effectively. (Id.) ALJ Miller determined that Ms. Marazzo did not meet listings 12.04 or 12.06 for mental disorders because Ms. Marazzo had only...