Marie v. Metlife Auto & Home Ins. Agency

MARIE A ARNOLD, Plaintiff, v. METLIFE AUTO & HOME INSURANCE AGENCY, INC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-03920-VKD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION

November 12, 2019

ORDER GRANTING BRIGHTHOUSE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Defendant Brighthouse Life Insurance Company ("Brighthouse") moves to dismiss all claims asserted against it by plaintiff Marie A. Arnold. Dkt. No. 24. The Court held a hearing on the motion on November 12, 2019. Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers, as well as the oral arguments presented, the Court grants the motion to dismiss, and gives Ms. Arnold leave to file a second amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Arnold, proceeding pro se, originally filed this action against defendants MetLife Auto & Home Insurance Agency, Inc. and MetLife Group, Inc., asserting claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a claim under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for alleged invasion of privacy. Ms. Arnold says that, at defendants' suggestion and with their agreement, she subsequently amended her complaint to include an additional defendant, Brighthouse.¹ Dkt. No. 13.

Ms. Arnold's operative amended complaint (Dkt. No. 19) asserts claims for fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Fourth Amendment (invasion of privacy). Although the allegations of the amended complaint are not stated clearly, Ms. Arnold seems to allege that she obtained some sort of insurance coverage through her prior employment with Kaiser Permanente ("Kaiser"). Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 2. Ms. Arnold says that she voluntarily terminated her employment with Kaiser on May 13, 2012, and was experiencing emotional distress and financial hardship. Id. She further alleges that she was given "an option[] to continue Metlife life [i]nsurance" through an "arrangement with [an] Insurance Agent," and either Ms. Arnold or the insurance agent "insisted [o]n [a] 'Promise Whole Life' Plan." Id. Appended as Exhibit A to the amended complaint is a letter that appears to summarize a "Promise Whole Life" plan Policy Number 21216479 UT, issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 11. The identified insured is "Marie A. Dantes," which Ms. Arnold represents was her (former) married name. Id.; Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 3. That letter identifies a June 14, 2012 "Policy Issue Date of Original Policy" and a "Face Amount of Insurance" of $50,000. Id. The letter also states that "[f]urther details about the policy and benefits will be furnished upon request."² Id. Elsewhere in the amended complaint, Ms. Arnold alleges that "Brighthouse and Metlife are stated to be Plaintiff's individual plan with same policy number." Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 3. Appended to the amended complaint as Exhibit B is what appears to be a brochure providing an overview of a Kaiser benefits package. Id. at ECF 13-20.

Ms. Arnold says she "informed Metlife about her hardship," and seems to claim that, due to a chronic illness or disability, she was entitled to "withdraw" money under her policy. Id. at ECF 4, 5. According to the amended complaint, defendants failed to disclose, and made false representations about, Ms. Arnold's alleged entitlement to payment of a "whole life policy amount." Id. As a result, Ms. Arnold says that she suffered humiliation and mental anguish, and became homeless. Id. at ECF 3. She seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, plus $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. at ECF 9.

The amended complaint seems to acknowledge that Ms. Arnold's claims may be time-barred. Nonetheless, Ms. Arnold alleges that she is entitled to tolling, noting that "[t]he general rule [that] the statu[t]es of limitation begins to run when Plaintiff discovers that a fraud occurred or exercise of reasonable diligence." Id. at 3.

Defendant Brighthouse moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brighthouse acknowledges that some of Ms. Arnold's claims appear to relate to an individual whole life insurance policy (Policy No. 21216479UT) under which Ms. Arnold was the named insured, and which was issued by MetLife Investors Insurance Company, now known as Brighthouse. Dkt. No. 33 at ECF 7 n.1. Nevertheless, Brighthouse argues that Ms. Arnold's amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that there is a viable basis for any claim against Brighthouse. Additionally, Brighthouse contends that all of Ms. Arnold's claims are time-barred and that the amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts to invoke tolling under the discovery rule. Ms. Arnold opposes the motion.³

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In such a motion, all material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Id.

However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, "the court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult AwarenessNetwork, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This means that the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). However, only plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A claim is plausible if its factual content permits the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. A plaintiff does not have to provide detailed facts, but the pleading must include "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 678.

Documents appended to or incorporated into the complaint or which properly are the subject of judicial notice may be considered along with the complaint when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fraudulent Concealment and Misrepresentation

Ms. Arnold's first two claims for relief are both based on fraud.⁴ To state a claim for fraud under California law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or non-disclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. Lazar v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996). Additionally, a claim for fraud "must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). However, "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Id. "A pleading is sufficient under [R]ule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that a defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations. While statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud areinsufficient." Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). "To comply with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong." Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

With respect to Ms. Arnold's concealment claim, the amended complaint alleges that "Metlife and Brighthouse committed concealment and cover-up, falsifying to [sic] Plaintiff's entitlement to withdraw in her policy," and that a "[d]efendant employee was concealing information and material[] facts" and "made false statement of deny" regarding Ms. Arnold's insurance claim. Dkt. No. 19 at ECF 3-4. As for the misrepresentation claim, the amended complaint alleges that a "Defendant Agent" made misrepresentations and "concealed facts about whole life [i]nsurance protects employee in the events of early accident, chronic illness or disability and take loan before age[] 65 and provide cash value with penalties surrender charges." Id. at 5. Ms. Arnold further alleges that "Defendant and Brighthouse failed to pay pension benefits to tens of thousand[s] of employee[s] covered by its group annuit[y] contracts." Id.

Broadly construing the allegations of Ms. Arnold's amended complaint, and viewing those allegations in a light most favorable to Ms. Arnold, she seems to claim that she was wrongfully denied payment under a whole life insurance policy. Nevertheless, Ms. Arnold's allegations are vague and conclusory as to "the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged" required for fraud claims. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, the amended complaint groups all defendants together, and it is unclear what involvement, if any, Brighthouse had in the events underlying Ms. Arnold's claims. Accordingly, Brighthouse's motion to dismiss this claim is granted.

The Court will give Ms. Arnold leave to file a second amended...