Marin-Torres v. United States

LEONEL MARIN-TORRES, Defendant-Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Respondent.

No. C20-942-RSL

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

May 10, 2022

ORDER DENYING MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE

ROBERT S. LASNIK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Leonel Marin-Torres' motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Dkt. # 1. The Court has considered the parties' memoranda, the exhibits, and the remainder of the record. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2009, a federal indictment charged petitioner with (1) possession of cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (Count 1); (2) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 2); and (3) felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 3). Case No. CR09-262-RSL (“CR”), Dkt. # 24 at 1-3 (First Superseding Indictment). As predicate convictions for the felon-in-possession charge, the indictment lists a 1996 conviction for delivery of cocaine, a 1997 conviction for escape in the first degree, and a 2008 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. Id. at 2-3. Petitioner was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment for the 1996 delivery of cocaine conviction, 9 months of imprisonment for the 1997 escape conviction, and, after an appeal, resentenced to 26 months of imprisonment for the 2008 unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. PSR at ¶¶ 28-31, 32-34, 38-39. At trial, the government elected to prove petitioner's status as a felon only with respect to the 1996 delivery of cocaine conviction. Dkt. # 10 at 18.

Following a trial where petitioner represented himself pro se with stand-by counsel, the jury convicted petitioner on all counts. CR Dkt. # 100. On May 28, 2011, the Court imposed a 192-month prison sentence, consisting of 132 months on Count 1, a concurrent 120-month sentence on Count 3, and a consecutive 60-month sentence on Count 2, followed by eight years of supervised release. CR Dkt. # 110 at 2-3. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions on September 27, 2011. CR Dkt. # 137.

In 2014, while in custody, petitioner was convicted in the District of Oregon of (1) assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3) and 7(3), and (2) possession of prison contraband, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2), (b)(3), (d)(1)(B), and 7(3). CR Dkt. # 150-1 at 4-9 (Exhibit A-1). He was sentenced to an additional 96 months of confinement and three years of supervised release, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed by this Court. Id. In 2016, while still in custody, petitioner was convicted in the District of Oregon of assault of an officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and (b). CR Dkt. # 150-6 at 4-9 (Exhibit B-1). He was sentenced to an additional 51 months in custody and three years of supervised release, to run consecutive to the 192-month and 96-month sentences. Id. Both convictions were affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Marin-Torres, 671 Fed.Appx. 468 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Marin-Torres, 702 Fed.Appx. 634 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, petitioner's total sentence now includes 339 months of imprisonment and 14 years of supervised release.

In 2016, petitioner sought a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which retroactively applied the 2014 amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines drug-quantity table. CR Dkt. # 146. The Court denied the reduction. CR Dkt. # 155. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial on appeal. United States v. Marin-Torres, 702 Fed.Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2017). In 2019, petitioner sought a reduction of his sentence pursuant to the First Step Act. CR Dkt. # 164. The Court again denied the reduction. CR Dkt. # 170. At this time, the appeal in that case remains pending under stay. CR Dkt. # 186.

On June 18, 2020, petitioner filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his felon-inpossession conviction in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019); Dkt. # 1-1. Rehaif requires the government to prove for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession convictions “both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Petitioner argues that the indictment, jury instructions, and jury verdict form used in his trial were each legally insufficient for their failure to include the knowledge-of-status element under Rehaif. Dkt. # 1-1 at 2-3, 15. Additionally, he argues that the government failed to present evidence at trial proving he knew of his status at the time he possessed the firearm. Id. at 3, 9.

Petitioner alleges he did not have knowledge of his felony status within the meaning of Rehaif for each of his three underlying convictions. Id. at 17. Specifically, he argues that he did not believe his 1996 conviction for delivery of cocaine was a felony because he had just immigrated from Cuba to the United States and therefore did not understand the offense was a felony or the contents of his guilty plea, which was written in English. Id. at 19. Additionally, petitioner maintains his defense counsel in that case deceived him by representing that the sentence imposed would be 120 days as opposed to 24 months. Id. at 18. Petitioner also challenges his knowledge of the 1997 escape conviction, arguing he believed he lawfully left custody because he thought the term of imprisonment would only last 120 days. Id. at 20; but see PSR ¶ 33 (petitioner told police he escaped because he believed he was being underpaid by the work camp, not because he was confused about the duration of his sentence). He also argues that, regardless, the escape conviction was not a felony because he was only sentenced to nine months of imprisonment. Id. at 20. Finally, he argues that because he was released immediately after being resentenced to 26 months of imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm in 2008, he believed the underlying sentence was unlawful and he was therefore not a felon. Id. at 17; PSR at ¶ 39 (explaining that petitioner was immediately released after resentencing because he had already served over five years of the original sentence imposed).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Issues

The Court first considers the following preliminary issues: (1) jurisdiction, (2) timeliness, and (3) the concurrent sentence doctrine.

1. Jurisdiction

Petitioner argues the indictment failed to charge a cognizable federal offense by neglecting to include the knowledge-of-status element or to cite the operative criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Dkt. # 1-1 at 10-11. Accordingly, petitioner argues, the Court lacked jurisdiction over the original offense. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (“If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction . . . the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”).

In United States v. Cotton, the Supreme Court held that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). In the Rehaif context, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “omission of the knowledge of status requirement” does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction. United States v. Espinoza, 816 Fed.Appx. 82 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2818 (2021). Therefore, any deficiency in the indictment was not a bar to this Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over the original offense.

2. Timeliness

A one-year statute of limitations applies to § 2255 motions. As applicable here, this period runs from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). The government agrees that Rehaif narrows the substantive scope of the relevant criminal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and thus applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Dkt. # 10 at 4 (citing Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016)). The Supreme Court issued Rehaif on June 21, 2019. Petitioner filed the instant motion on June 18, 2020. Dkt. # 1-1 at 1. Therefore, the motion was timely filed.^[1]

3. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine

The government argues the concurrent-sentence doctrine supports denying this motion. Dkt. # 10 at 2-3. Under this doctrine, the Court may exercise its discretion “not to reach the merits of a claim attacking fewer than all multiple concurrent sentences if success on the claim would not have any collateral consequences or change the term of imprisonment.” United States v. Beckham, 202 F.Supp.3d 1197, 1201 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). The government argues the doctrine is applicable here because even if the Court were to vacate petitioner's felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he would remain subject to the concurrent sentence imposed for his drug distribution offense pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).

The Court declines to apply the concurrent-sentence doctrine in this case. The Ninth Circuit has rejected the use of the concurrent-sentence doctrine as a discretionary means of avoiding review of criminal convictions on...