Marinello v. United States

138 S.Ct. 1101

200 L.Ed.2d 356

Carlo J. MARINELLO, II, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 16–1144.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Dec. 6, 2017.

Decided March 21, 2018.

Matthew S. Hellman, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Robert A. Parker, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Joseph M. LaTona, Buffalo, NY, David A. Strauss, Sarah M. Konsky, Jenner & Block, Supreme Court and Appellate Clinic at The University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL, Matthew S. Hellman, David Bitkower, Michael E. Stewart, Corinne M. Smith, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, Geoffrey M. Davis, Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner.

Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, David A. Hubbert, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Robert A. Parker, Assistant to the Solicitor, General, S. Robert Lyons, Stanley J. Okula, Jr., Gregory Victor Davis, Gregory S. Knapp, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

A clause in § 7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code makes it a felony "corruptly or by force" to "endeavo[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title." 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The question here concerns the breadth of that statutory phrase. Does it cover virtually all governmental efforts to collect taxes? Or does it have a narrower scope? In our view, "due administration of [the Tax Code]" does not cover routine administrative procedures that are near-universally applied to all taxpayers, such as the ordinary processing of income tax returns. Rather, the clause as a whole refers to specific interference with targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit.

I

The Internal Revenue Code provision at issue, § 7212(a), has two substantive clauses. The first clause, which we shall call the "Officer Clause," forbids

"corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavor[ing] to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under [the Internal Revenue Code]." Ibid. (emphasis added).

The second clause, which we shall call the "Omnibus Clause," forbids

"corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code]." Ibid. (emphasis added).

As we said at the outset, we here consider the scope of the Omnibus Clause. (We have placed the full text of § 7212 in the Appendix, infra .)

Between 2004 and 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) opened, then closed, then reopened an investigation into the tax activities of Carlo Marinello, the petitioner here. In 2012 the Government indicted Marinello, charging him with violations of several criminal tax statutes including the Omnibus Clause. In respect to the Omnibus Clause the Government claimed that Marinello had engaged in at least one of eight different specified activities, including "failing to maintain corporate books and records," "failing to provide" his tax accountant "with complete and accurate" tax "information," "destroying ... business records," "hiding income," and "paying employees ... with cash." 839 F.3d 209, 213 (C.A.2 2016).

Before the jury retired to consider the charges, the judge instructed it that, to convict Marinello of violating the Omnibus Clause, it must find unanimously that he engaged in at least one of the eight practices just mentioned, that the jurors need not agree on which one, and that he did so "corruptly," meaning "with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage or benefit, either for [himself] or for another." App. in No. 15–2224(CA2), p. 432. The judge, however, did not instruct the jury that it must find that Marinello knew he was under investigation and intended corruptly to interfere with that investigation. The jury subsequently convicted Marinello on all counts.

Marinello appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He argued, among other things, that a violation of the Omnibus Clause requires the Government to show that the defendant had tried to interfere with a "pending IRS proceeding," such as a particular investigation. Brief for Appellant in No. 15–2224, pp. 23–25. The appeals court disagreed. It held that a defendant need not possess " ‘an awareness of a particular [IRS] action or investigation.’ " 839 F.3d, at 221 (quoting United States v. Wood, 384 Fed.Appx. 698, 704 (C.A.2 2010) ; alteration in original). The full Court of Appeals rejected Marinello's petition for rehearing, two judges dissenting. 855 F.3d 455 (C.A.2 2017).

Marinello then petitioned for certiorari, asking us to decide whether the Omnibus Clause requires the Government to prove the defendant was aware of "a pending IRS action or proceeding, such as an investigation or audit," when he "engaged in the purportedly obstructive conduct." Pet. for Cert. i. In light of a division of opinion among the Circuits on this point, we granted the petition. Compare United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952 (C.A.6 1998) (requiring showing of a pending proceeding), with 839 F.3d, at 221 (disagreeing with Kassouf ).

II

In United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), we interpreted a similarly worded criminal statute. That statute made it a felony "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, [to] influenc[e], obstruc[t], or imped[e], or endeavo[r] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The statute concerned not (as here) "the due administration of" the Internal Revenue Code but rather "the due administration of justice ." (We have placed the full text of § 1503 in the Appendix, infra .)

In interpreting that statute we pointed to earlier cases in which courts had held that the Government must prove "an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings." Aguilar, supra, at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (citing United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (C.A.9 1982) ). We noted that some courts had imposed a " ‘nexus' requirement": that the defendant's "act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings." Aguilar, supra, at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (citing United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (C.A.10 1993), and United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (C.A.3 1975) ). And we adopted the same requirement.

We set forth two important reasons for doing so. We wrote that we "have traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.’ " Aguilar, supra, at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) ; citation omitted). Both reasons apply here with similar strength.

As to Congress' intent, the literal language of the statute is neutral. The statutory words "obstruct or impede" are broad. They can refer to anything that "block[s]," "make[s] difficult," or "hinder[s]." Black's Law Dictionary 1246 (10th ed. 2014) (obstruct); Webster's New International Dictionary (Webster's) 1248 (2d ed. 1954) (impede); id., at 1682 (obstruct); accord, 5 Oxford English Dictionary 80 (1933) (impede); 7 id., at 36 (obstruct). But the verbs "obstruct" and "impede" suggest an object—the taxpayer must hinder a particular person or thing. Here, the object is the "due administration of this title." The word "administration" can be read literally to refer to every "[a]ct or process of administering" including every act of "managing" or "conduct[ing]" any "office," or "performing the executive duties of" any "institution, business, or the like." Webster's 34. But the whole phrase—the due administration of the Tax Code—is best viewed, like the due administration of justice, as referring to only some of those acts or to some separable parts of an institution or business. Cf. Aguilar, supra, at 600–601, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (concluding false statements made to an investigating agent, rather than a grand jury, do not support a conviction for obstruction of justice).

Here statutory context confirms that the text refers to specific, targeted acts of administration. The Omnibus Clause appears in the middle of a statutory sentence that refers specifically to efforts to "intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity." 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (emphasis added). The first part of the sentence also refers to "force or threats of force," which the statute elsewhere defines as "threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family ." Ibid. (emphasis added). The following subsection refers to the "forcibl[e] rescu[e]" of "any property after it shall have been seized under" the Internal Revenue Code. § 7212(b) (emphasis added). Subsections (a) and (b) thus refer to corrupt or forceful actions taken against individual identifiable persons or property. And, in that context the Omnibus Clause logically serves as a "catchall" in respect to the obstructive conduct the subsection sets forth, not as a "catchall" for every violation that interferes with what the Government describes as the "continuous, ubiquitous, and universally known" administration of the Internal Revenue Code. Brief in Opposition 9.

Those who find legislative history helpful can find confirmation of the more limited scope of the Omnibus Clause in the House and Senate Reports written when Congress first enacted the Omnibus Clause. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). According to the House Report, § 7212"provides for the punishment of threats...