Marion Super. Ct. Prob. Dep't v. Trapuzzano

223 N.E.3d 282

MARION SUPERIOR COURT PROBATION DEPARTMENT, Appellant-Defendant,

v.Cheryl TRAPUZZANO and Jennifer Trapuzzano, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Nathan Trapuzzano, Deceased, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CT-61

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed November 14, 2023

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, The Honorable Bruce E. Petit, Special Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 49D12-1603-CT-9812

Attorneys for Appellant: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellees: Jacob M. O’Brien, Scott L. Starr, Starr Austen & Miller, LLP, Logansport, Indiana

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the Marion Superior Court Probation Department ("Probation Department") appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding claims brought by Cheryl Trapuzzano and Jennifer Trapuzzano, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Nathan Trapuzzano ("Trapuzzano") (collectively, "the Estate"). The Estate brought claims against the Probation Department after a probationer shot and killed Trapuzzano during an apparent robbery. On appeal, the Probation Department argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because: (1) the Probation Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) the Probation Department has common law immunity and immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") from liability for the Estate’s claims; and (3) the Probation Department was not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. We find one issue dispositive and hold that the Probation Department has quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] The Probation Department raises three issues. We find one issue dispositive, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by determining that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the Probation Department has quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims.

Facts

[3] S.A. had an extensive juvenile history, which included offenses involving handguns. In December 2013, the State alleged that S.A. committed acts that would be auto theft, carrying a handgun without a license, possession of marijuana, operating a vehicle without a license, fleeing law enforcement, resisting law enforcement, and dangerous possession of a firearm if committed by an adult. The juvenile court found the auto theft and resisting law enforcement allegations to be true and dismissed the other charges. On February 10, 2014, S.A. was given a suspended commitment to the Department of Correction; placed on probation; placed on home confinement with his uncle; ordered to attend school; submit to a substance abuse evaluation; and attend counseling and the Restoring Excellence Program.

[4] Between February 11, 2014, and March 9, 2014, S.A. was in non-compliance with the terms of his probation on at least fifteen occasions because he was not at home during checks, was suspended from school, attended neither the Restoring Excellence Program nor counseling, and failed to submit to a substance abuse evaluation. Probation Department policy required S.A.’s probation officer, Tracy McDonald, to file a notice with the juvenile court after the third violation, but McDonald did not do so. On March 5, 2014, McDonald’s supervisor, Christina Gibson, addressed the violations with McDonald in an email and asked why they "shouldn’t go ahead and do a [petition to modify] on [S.A.]." Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 218.

[5] On March 5, 2014, the Probation Department filed a petition for modification of the dispositional decree. The Probation Department alleged that S.A. received a five-day out of school suspension, failed to participate in the Restoring Excellence Program, and had unauthorized leaves from his residence on nine occasions. The Probation Department requested that the juvenile court schedule a hearing on the matter but did not request any emergency relief or request a change in S.A.’s placement. The juvenile court set the matter for a hearing on April 7, 2014. While waiting on the April 7 hearing, S.A. continued to violate the terms of his probation, burglarized a gun shop, shot a man outside of a restaurant, and on April 1, 2014, shot and killed Trapuzzano during an apparent robbery.

[6] In March 2016, the Estate filed a complaint against Marion County, the Probation Department, the Marion Superior Court Executive Committee, Christine Kerl, Tracy McDonald, and Marion County Community Corrections Agency.¹ The complaint was amended twice, and the second amended complaint alleged:

38. Defendants were negligent in many ways, including, without limitation, by:

a. Failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation and administration of the Marion County Superior Court Probation Department;

b. Failing to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the responsibilities of probation officers in the Marion County Superior Court Probation Department;

c. Failing to follow the policies and procedures of the Marion County Superior Court Probation Department; d. Failing to fulfill the mandatory duties of probation officers as prescribed by Indiana Code 11-13-1-3;

e. Failing to fulfill the duties of probation officers as required by the policies and procedures of the Marion County Superior Court Probation Department;

f. Failing to properly supervise Tracy McDonald and/or other probation officers;

g. Failing to properly hire, retain, train, oversee, and employ Tracy McDonald and/or other probation officers;

h. Failing to properly monitor and/or supervise [S.A.] per the terms of his probation; and

i. Failing to properly record, track, supervise, and notify authorities of violations of [S.A.’s] home detention.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 41-42.

[7] The trial court dismissed all of the defendants except the Probation Department, and the Probation Department filed a motion for summary judgment. The Pro- bation Department alleged that: (1) the Probation Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) the Probation Department had immunity from the Estate’s claims; and (3) the Probation Department was not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. The Estate filed a response, and the trial court conducted a hearing in July 2022.

[8] In November 2022, the trial court denied the Probation Department’s motion. The trial court concluded that: (1) the Probation Department owed a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate quasi-judicial immunity; (3) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate discretionary function immunity under the ITCA; (4) law enforcement immunity under the ITCA is inapplicable; and (5) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the Probation Department was the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. Regarding quasi-judicial immunity, the trial court found:

13. Courts are reluctant to apply quasi-judicial immunity too broadly and if the acts do not involve the judicial process so that a fear exists that freedom of judicial decision making may be stifled, then the person or act should not be shielded by immunity. Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). While it is true that the filing of a notice of probation violation should be considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune and entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, that may not be the case if the actor knowingly filed a false probation violation. Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In this cause, there is evidence that not only did [the Probation Department] omit information in the Petition filed with the Court which would be vital to the Court in determining appropriate action to take, but they also made recommendations contrary to their own belief and mandatory policies. I.C. 11-13-1-1(0 creates a mandatory duty to notify the Court when a violation of conditions or probation occurs and to keep accurate records of cases investigated by Probation Department and make these records available to the Court. Id. at 1144 ([e]mphasis added). If the facts alleged by the [the Estate] as set out in the depositions and emails from [Probation Department] employees are true, then the trier-of-fact could find that not only was the Petition filed by the [Probation Department] not in furtherance of a judicial determination, but an actual deterrence to that process. The [Estate] cites evidence that presiding Juvenile Judge Moores was extremely angry and upset to not have been provided with accurate information in the Violation of Probation Petition as filed. This could further support a finding that Probation’s actions were outside the protection of quasi-judicial immunity. Based upon depositions of Christina Gibson, the trier-of-fact could find that the probation officer intentionally withheld vital information in the Petition filed which would negate the granting of immunity. Parke City [County] v. Ropak, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).

14. The Court believes that there is also an issue of fact as to whether Probation was carrying out a Court Order. In order for judicial immunity to apply, the [defendant must be carrying out an order of the Court. Preparing reports for the Court’s review to assist the Court in making a judicial determination is closely tied to a judicial proceeding. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). However, to omit vital information as is alleged in the [Estate’s] cause of action may be found to be actions notenforcing the Court’s Order, but rather a direct violation of that Order. This is a question of fact for the trier and not appropriate for summary judgment.

15. The Court finds that there are sufficient questions of fact which may negate the protection afforded through quasi-judicial immunity and [the Probation Department’s] Motion

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