Mark O. v. Kijakazi

MARK O, Claimant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Respondent.

No. 19 CV 2891

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

May 4, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Jeffrey T. Gilbert, United States Magistrate Judge

Claimant Mark O.^[1] (“Claimant”) seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Kilolo Kijakazi ^[2] Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying Claimant's application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 13]. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 19, 29] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons discussed below Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] is denied and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgement [ECF No. 29] is granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 21, 2016, Claimant filed a Title XVI application for SSI alleging disability beginning on January 1, 2013. (R. 161-69). His claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 87-91, 94-103). On January 3, 2018, Claimant appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Lana Johnson. (R. 15-38). ALJ Johnson also heard testimony on that date from impartial vocational expert (“VE”) Susan A. Entenberg. (R. 38-41). On April 18, 2018, ALJ Johnson denied Claimant's claim for SSI. (R. 72-82).

In finding Claimant not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step evaluation process required by Social Security regulations for individuals over the age of 18. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 21, 2016, his protected filing date, until April 18, 2018, the date of the ALJ's decision. (R. 74). Although Claimant alleged a disability onset date of January 1, 2013, the ALJ noted that he only filed an application under Title XVI, meaning the ALJ adjudicates Claimant's functionality and potential functional limitations as of January 21, 2016 until the date of her decision. (R. 72). At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant had a severe impairment or combination of impairments as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). (R. 74-75). Specifically, Claimant has a seizure disorder and cirrhosis of the liver. (R. 74-75). The ALJ also acknowledged a non-severe complaint of Wilson's disease but concluded that this impairment was well-managed by conservative outpatient treatment and that it caused no more than minimal vocationally relevant limitations. (R. 75).

At step three, the ALJ determined that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 75). In particular, the ALJ considered listings 5.05 and 11.02. (R. 75). Regarding listing 5.05, the ALJ concluded that Claimant did not meet or medically equal several requirements of that listing - he does not have varices with hemorrhaging, ascites or hydrothorax, spontaneous bacterial peritonitis, hepatorenal syndrome, hepatopulmonary syndrome, or hepatic encephalopathy, nor was there any evidence that he has end stage liver disease, hospitalizations for severe liver complications, rapid blood loss, or spontaneous liver infections, although the ALJ did acknowledge that diagnostic imaging shows Claimant has an abnormal liver. (R. 75). Claimant also did not, according to the ALJ, meet the requirements of listing 11.02 based on the record evidence surrounding his seizure disorder - indeed, when complaint with medication, the ALJ noted that he was essentially seizure free. (R. 75).

The ALJ then found Claimant had the RFC^[3] to perform:

“medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can frequently climb ramps and stairs. He can never be around unprotected heights, never operate dangerous heavy moving machinery, and never perform commercial driving.” (R. 75).

Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Claimant did not have any past relevant work, as the record was devoid of earnings data or objective information to corroborate the work history as an electrician to which Claimant testified. (R. 80). At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Claimant's age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, he is capable of performing other work within the national economy and that those jobs exist in significant numbers. (R. 80-81). Specifically, the VE's testimony, on which the ALJ relied, identified jobs at the medium exertional level including as a hand packer, dishwasher, and janitor. (R. 81). The VE additionally provided occupations at the light (cashier, sales attendant, hotel housekeeper) and sedentary (order clerk, sorter, assembler) exertional levels that were compatible with Claimant's RFC. (R. 81). The ALJ then found Claimant was not under a disability from January 21, 2016, the date Claimant's application was filed, through April 18, 2018, the date of her decision. (R. 82). The Appeals Council declined to review the matter on February 25, 2019, (R. 16) making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1765, 1775 (2019); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a claimant files an application for disability benefits, he or she bears the burden under the Social Security Act of bringing forth evidence that proves his or her impairments are so severe that they prevent the performance of any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A five-step inquiry controls whether an individual is eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, which the Seventh Circuit has summarized as follows:

The ALJ must consider whether: (1) the claimant is presently employed; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) the claimant's residual functional capacity leaves him unable to perform his past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.”

Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). Claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2021); Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022).

A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). Judicial review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his or her decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence “means - and means only - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fowlkes v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 5191346, at *2 (7th Cir. 2021).

“[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154. But even where there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not build a “logical bridge” from the evidence to the conclusion. Wilder, 22 F.4th 644 (citing Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021)). In other words, if the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court must “conduct a critical review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner's decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The reviewing court may not, however, “displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility determinations.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008); see also, Gribben v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 59404, at *2 (7th Cir. 2022) (“We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in it.”). “[O]nly if the record compels a contrary result” will the court reverse the ALJ's decision. Fowlkes, 2021 WL 5191346, at *2 (quoting Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2010)).

ANALYSIS

Claimant argues two points of error on appeal. First, he claims the ALJ failed to adequately account for his diagnosis of Wilson's disease at step two, step three, and in the RFC. Second, he takes issue with the ALJ's evaluation...