Marquez v. BHC Streamwood Hosp.

ISELA V. MARQUEZ and FERNANDO MARQUEZ, as plenary co-guardians of CHLOE MARQUEZ; JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, legal guardians of JANE DOE 2, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. BHC STREAMWOOD HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a Streamwood Behavioral Healthcare System, a Tennessee corporation, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-4267

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

September 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Robert M. Dow, Jr. United States District Judge

Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant BHC Streamwood Hospital Inc. for alleged violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). Current before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim [19]. For the reasons stated below Defendant's motion [19] is granted in part (as to Counts 1 and 4) and denied in part (as to Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6). Plaintiffs are given leave to replead Counts 1 and 4 by October 14, 2021 if they believe that they can do so consistent with this opinion and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The parties are directed to proceed with initial disclosures and written discovery if they have not already done so, but should not schedule any depositions until after the Court resolves the issues relating to coordinating discovery discussed at the September 16, 2021 status hearing [see 27].

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Defendant Streamwood Hospital is a Tennessee corporation that has provided mental health services in Illinois since 1991. [16 at ¶ 6.] Streamwood was the first free-standing child, adolescent, and young adult behavioral healthcare facility in Illinois, and its primary focus remains on providing emotional and behavioral healthcare services to teens and young adults. [Id. at ¶¶ 1, 6.] Plaintiffs are two individuals who allege that they were denied treatment at Streamwood because of their physical disabilities. Plaintiffs allege the following facts.^[1]

1. Plaintiff Chloe Marquez

Plaintiff Chloe Marquez is a 21-year-old woman who lives in Orland Park, Illinois. [Id. at ¶ 4.] She suffers from athetoid/spastic cerebral palsy with dysphasia and dysphagia [id.] which limit her mobility in a number of ways. [Id. at ¶ 9.] Because of her cerebral palsy, Chloe requires a power wheelchair in most instances, though she can ambulate short distances of up to 100 feet with a walker. [Id.] Because of her dysphasia, she communicates with others by using the text-to-speech function of an iPad. [Id.] She follows a puree diet and consumes supplemental nutrition through a gastronomy tube due to her dysphagia. [Id.]

On June 22, 2019, Chloe's mother, Isela, noticed a linear abrasion on Chloe's neck. [Id. at ¶ 10.] When Isela asked Chloe about the abrasion, Chloe admitted that she had attempted suicide. [Id.] Isela contacted Chloe's psychiatrist seeking guidance, but she was unable to reach the doctor until the following day, June 23, 2019, when the psychiatrist instructed Isela to take Chloe to the emergency room at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. [Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.] Chloe was evaluated by Northwestern's psychiatric acute crisis intervention team who learned that Chloe had been having suicidal ideations since June 10, 2019. [Id. at ¶ 11.] The crisis intervention team recommended that Chloe be admitted for inpatient psychiatric care. [Id. at ¶ 12.] Members of Northwestern's crisis intervention team then began searching for a mental and behavioral hospital where Chloe could receive inpatient psychiatric care.^[2] [Id.]

On June 26, 2019, a social worker with Northwestern's crisis intervention team contacted Streamwood seeking inpatient placement for Chloe. [Id. at ¶ 13.] A Streamwood employee told the social worker that Streamwood would not accept Chloe because of her cerebral palsy and her need for a wheelchair and gastronomy tube. [Id.]

2. Plaintiff Jane Doe 2

Plaintiff Jane Doe 2, a minor, lives with her parents in Northbrook, Illinois. [Id. at ¶ 5.] She suffers from cerebral palsy and has a history of anxiety and depression. [Id. at ¶¶ 5, 16.] Jane Doe 2 also requires a wheelchair because of her cerebral palsy. [Id. at ¶ 17.]

Jane Doe 2 was attending a summer camp for children with disabilities in Grand Rapids, Michigan in July 2019 when she began having episodes of significant anxiety, confusion and delusion, and expressing suicidal thoughts. [Id. at ¶ 18.] She was rushed by ambulance to a hospital in Grand Rapids where she remained as an inpatient for five nights. [Id.] Hospital employees searched for a mental and behavioral health hospital in the Grand Rapids area where Jane Doe 2 could receive treatment, but they were unsuccessful. [Id.] An outpatient psychiatrist at the hospital discharged Jane Doe 2 to her mother on July 30, 2019 and recommended that Jane Doe 2 go to the emergency department of Highland Park Hospital to expedite the search for inpatient psychiatric care at a local facility in Illinois. [Id.] Highland Park Hospital's crisis intervention team diagnosed Jane Doe 2 as having depression with psychosis and concluded that she required immediate hospitalization. [Id. at ¶ 19.] The hospital could not admit Jane Doe 2 to its own mental and behavioral health unit, however, so it searched for another inpatient facility on Jane Doe 2's behalf. [Id. at ¶ 20.]

On July 31, 2019, a member of Highland Park Hospital's crisis intervention team contacted Streamwood seeking treatment for Jane Doe 2. [Id.] The crisis intervention team member faxed a referral packet to Streamwood and followed up with the hospital a few hours later. [Id.] A Streamwood employee initially denied receiving the referral packet, but after having it faxed to Streamwood for a second time, informed the Highland Park Hospital employee that it could not accommodate Jane Doe 2 because of her physical needs. [Id.]

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 22, 2020 alleging that Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq (Counts 1 and 4), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq (Counts 2 and 5), and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (Counts 3 and 6). [3, 16.] Plaintiffs seek declarative and injunctive relief on all counts to enjoin further violations of these acts, while Marquez seeks compensatory damages on Counts 2 and 3, and Jane Doe 2 on Counts 4 and 5. Defendant moves to dismiss all counts on grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims and have failed to state a claim for relief. [19.]

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “provides for dismissal of a claim based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including lack of standing.” Stubenfield v. Chicago Housing Authority, 6 F.Supp.3d 779, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996)). Typically, “[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, the district court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor.” Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Retired Chicago Police Ass'n, 76 F.3d at 862); see also Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 908 F.3d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 2018); Browner v. American Eagle Bank, 355 F.Supp.3d 731, 732-33 (N.D. Ill. 2019). However, when “standing is challenged as a factual matter, the plaintiff must come forward with ‘competent proof'-that is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence-that standing exists.” Lee, 330 F.3d at 468; see also Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 2009) (once evidence calling the plaintiff's standing into question is proffered, the presumption of correctness accorded to a complaint's allegations falls away, and the plaintiff bears the burden of coming forward with competent proof that standing exists).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint first must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (alteration in original). Second, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise the possibility of relief above the “speculative level.” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper “when the allegations in a complaint, however true could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded facts of the complaint must allow the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Langworthy v. Honeywell Life & Acc. Ins. Plan, 2009 WL 3464131, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2009) (citing McCauley v. City of...