Marquez v. Riveredge Hosp.

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ISELA V. MARQUEZ and FERNANDO MARQUEZ, as plenary co-guardians of CHLOE MARQUEZ, a disabled person, Plaintiff, v. RIVEREDGE HOSPITAL, INC., an Illinois Corporation, doing business as RIVEREDGE HOSPITAL, Defendant.

No. 21-CV-3369

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Isela and Fernando Marquez bring this action against Defendant Riveredge Hospital, Inc. (“Riveredge”) as plenary co-guardians of their daughter, Plaintiff Chloe Marquez. (Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. No. 1) at 1.)^[1] Chloe, through her parents, alleges that Riveredge violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) by failing to accommodate Chloe's disabilities. (See generally Compl.) Riveredge has moved to dismiss Chloe's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Motion”) (Dkt. No. 11) at 1-2; Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss (“Memo”) (Dkt. No. 12) at 3, 8-12.) Riveredge has also moved to dismiss all of Chloe's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Motion at 1-2; Memo at 12-14.) For the reasons set forth below, we grant Riveredge's Motion in part and deny it in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts come from the Complaint, which we deem to be true for the purposes of this Motion. See Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

Chloe Marquez is 22 years old and resides in Orland Park, Illinois with her parents Isela and Fernando Marquez. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Chloe has cerebral palsy and difficulty swallowing. (Id.) As a result of these conditions, she eats a puree diet, uses a gastronomy tube, moves around with a wheelchair, and communicates with others via a text-to-speech function on her iPad. (Id. ¶ 9.) She has a history of depression that stems from her conditions, and she will likely require treatment for her depression from time-to-time. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 8.)

Riveredge is a free-standing psychiatric hospital in Forest Park Illinois, offering “specialized inpatient and outpatient behavioral care to children, adolescents, young adults, and adults.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Riveredge represents “that it has the only specialized inpatient behavioral health program for adults with an intellectual or developmental disability.” (Id.) It receives both Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement from the federal government. (Id. ¶ 7.) Riveredge is approximately 24 miles from Chloe's home and accepts Chloe's insurance. (Id. ¶ 8.)

On June 22, 2019, Isela noticed that Chloe had a linear abrasion on her neck. (Id. ¶ 10.) When Isela asked Chloe about the abrasion, Chloe admitted that she had attempted to commit suicide. (Id.) Isela immediately called Chloe's psychiatrist for guidance but was unable to reach the psychiatrist until the following day. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) The psychiatrist told Isela that she should take Chloe to Northwestern Memorial Hospital's (“NMH”) emergency department. (Id. ¶ 11.) There, doctors recommended that Chloe receive inpatient care at a mental and behavioral hospital that could address her needs. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.)

On June 25, 2019, an NMH crisis intervention team social worker called Riveredge to see if Riveredge could treat Chloe. (Id. ¶ 13.) A Riveredge employee told the social worker that Riveredge could not accept Chloe due to her cerebral palsy. (Id.) Almost two years later, on May 25, 2021, Isela called Riveredge to ask whether it would accept Chloe if she needed to be admitted. (Id. ¶ 14.) “After learning that Chloe utilizes a power wheelchair, the [Riveredge] employee emphatically told [Isela] that they would definitely not accept [Chloe] as an inpatient but may be [sic] as an outpatient.” (Id.) According to the Complaint, Chloe intends to seek treatment from Riveredge once Riveredge complies with its federal nondiscrimination mandates. (Id. ¶ 8.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A court may only address the merits of a case if it has subject-matter jurisdiction to do so. See McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Ensuring the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is the court's first duty in every lawsuit.”) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction. See Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015).

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is meant to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in her favor.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081. Courts may grant motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only if a complaint lacks sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Although a facially plausible complaint need not provide “detailed factual allegations, ” it must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. These requirements ensure that a defendant receives “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

Riveredge challenges Chloe's standing to pursue both declaratory and injunctive relief under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and ACA. (See Memo at 3.) Below, we consider whether Chloe has standing to seek each of those forms of relief.

A. Injunctive Relief

Chloe seeks injunctive relief in connection with each of the counts in her complaint. See (Compl. at 8 (violation of the ADA and its implementing regulations applicable to public accommodations); 11 (violation of the Rehabilitation Act); 14 (violation of the ACA).) As a remedy for her ADA count, Count I, Chloe seeks “[a]n order enjoining [Riveredge] from discriminating against [her], requiring [Riveredge] to (i) adopt and implement an inpatient admissions policy that does not screen out patients with physical disabilities; (ii) make available qualified staff to assist [Chloe] with her activities of daily living, as needed; (iii) provide its appropriate employees training on the foregoing admissions policy; (iv) provide its appropriate employees with disability cultural competency training; and [(v)] remove existing architectural barriers where readily achievable.” (Id. at 8.) Her requests for injunctive relief are substantially similar for Counts II (violation of the Rehabilitation Act) and III (violation of the ACA). (See Id. at 11 (Rehabilitation Act), 14 (ACA).)

Courts considering whether a plaintiff has standing to pursue injunctive relief under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and ACA for claims like Chloe's apply the standard applicable to ADA claims. See Marquez v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., Case No. 21-cv-3357, 2022 WL 326967, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2022); Marquez v. BHC Streamwood Hosp., Inc., Case No. 20-cv-4267, 2021 WL 4282948, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2021). To seek prospective injunctive relief under the ADA, “a plaintiff must allege past injury under the ADA; show that it is reasonable to infer from her complaint that this discriminatory treatment will continue; and show that it is also reasonable to infer, based on the past frequency of her visits and the proximity of the public accommodation to her home, that she intends to return to the public accommodation in the future.” Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1074 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Riveredge argues that Chloe does not have standing to pursue injunctive relief because she has not alleged facts to show that she intends to seek treatment from Riveredge in the future. (Memo at 8-12.) In response, Chloe maintains that she has satisfied the applicable pleading requirements and contends that Riveredge is improperly asking us to question her credibility when she says that she intends to return to Riveredge. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Opp'n”) (Dkt. No. 16) at 7-14.)

In two substantially similar cases filed by Chloe's parents in this District against other healthcare facilities, courts have concluded that Chloe does not have standing to seek injunctive relief against the defendant healthcare facilities. See Bd. of Trs., 2022 WL 326967, at *3-4; BHC Streamwood, 2021 WL 4282948, at *3-4. Both courts reasoned that the operative...