Marquez v. Teufel Holly Farms, Inc.

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RAMIRO ALONSO MARQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. TEUFEL HOLLY FARMS, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-00060-SB

United States District Court, D. Oregon

December 29, 2022

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

HON STACIE F. BECKERMAN United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Alonso Marquez (“Marquez”), an agricultural worker, filed this action against his former employer defendant Teufel Holly Farms, Inc. (“Teufel”), on January 11, 2022, alleging claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 659A.030(1)(b), (1)(f). Before the Court is Teufel's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C §§ 1-16. Teufel also asks the Court to dismiss this case, or, alternatively, stay proceedings pending completion of arbitration. For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that the district judge deny Teufel's motion to compel arbitration.

BACKGROUND^[1]

In 2000, Marquez began working as a seasonal farmworker at Teufel's nurseries in Portland and Cornelius, Oregon. (Decl. Ramiro Alonso Marquez Supp. Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Compel Arbitration (“Alonso Decl.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 16; Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, ECF No. 1.) In or around 2010, some of Teufel's other employees, including two supervisors, Alicia Tellez (“Tellez”) and Concepcion Kio (“Kio”), began “making unwelcome and inappropriate sexual comments towards [Marquez], touching [Marquez] inappropriately and without his consent, and making sexual gestures around [Marquez] in the workplace.” (Compl. ¶¶ 13-16; Alonso Decl. ¶ 3.)

For example, Tellez, a supervisor in Marquez's work area “touched [Marquez] on his buttocks at work and complimented his body” on several occasions. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17.) Other co-workers also touched Marquez on “his chest and made sexual comments about his nipples.” (Id. ¶ 18.)

In June 2020, consistent with Teufel's supervisors' yearly practice during Marquez's employment, Tellez called Marquez into Teufel's office building to sign employment paperwork before the season began. (Alonso Decl. ¶ 3.) When Marquez arrived, Nick Crunt (“Crunt”), one of Teufel's human resources (“HR”) representatives, handed Marquez a roughly twenty-five-page stack of documents, which requested “many signatures or initials,” to fill out. (Id. ¶ 4.)

Marquez, who has received only an eighth-grade education in Mexico, had “trouble understanding the documents.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Crunt could not assist Marquez because Crunt does not speak Spanish, but Kio was aware of Marquez's past difficulties completing paperwork and therefore attempted to assist him. (Id.) After Marquez asked Kio “what the documents meant,” Kio stated: “They are just papers for the company. You just sign them. You have to sign them.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Kio proceeded to “quickly flip[] through and point[] to each place where [Marquez] was supposed to place [his] initials or sign [his] name.” (Id.) When Marquez again asked “what the[] [documents] said,” Kio stated: “You just sign it and you're done.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Feeling that he had no other option, Marquez followed Kio's instructions and signed the documents in “a matter of minutes.” (Id.)

Marquez does not recall “signing any document with the word ‘arbitration' in it or any kind of document that limited [his] rights to complain about problems at work.” (Id. ¶ 8.) In fact, Marquez had not “heard of arbitration and did not know what it mean[t]” before Teufel filed its motion. (Id.) Although he does not recall doing so, the documents Marquez signed included a Spanish version of a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims (the “Arbitration Agreement”). (See Decl. Craig Larimer Supp. Def.'s Mot. Compel Arbitration (“Larimer Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 14; id. Ex. 1 at 1-3; see also id. Ex. 2 at 1-3, attaching an English version of Teufel's Arbitration Agreement).

The Arbitration Agreement provides that the employee “recognize[s] that differences may arise between [Teufel] and [the employee] during or following [their] employment,” such “differences may or may not be related to [the employee's] employment,” and the employee “understand[s] and agree[s] that by entering into this Agreement . . ., [the employee] anticipate[s] gaining the benefits of a speedy, impartial dispute-resolution procedure.” (Id. at 1.)

The Arbitration Agreement also provides that the company's and employee's promises to arbitrate their differences “provide consideration for each other,” but do not create “any contract of employment, express or implied, . . . [or] alter the ‘at-will' status of [the employee's] employment.” (Id. at 2.)

In terms of its scope, the Arbitration Agreement provides that it does not cover the employee's claims for workers' compensation or unemployment compensation benefits, nor does it cover “claims by the Company for injunctive and/or other equitable relief for unfair competition and/or the use and/or the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, as to which [the employee] understand[s] and agree[s] that the Company may seek and obtain relief from a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Id. at 1.) With respect to arbitration procedures, the Arbitration Agreement states that (1) except as otherwise provided, any arbitration must be in accordance with Arbitration Services of Portland's (“ASP”) “then-current rules,” (2) the arbitrator must “apply the substantive law . . . of the state in which the claim arose, or federal law, or both, as applicable to the claim(s) asserted,” (3) Oregon Rules of Evidence apply, (4) the arbitrator, not a “federal, state or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement, including but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable,” and (5) the arbitration “shall be final and binding upon the parties.” (Id.)

With respect to arbitration costs and attorney's fees, the Arbitration Agreement provides that (1) the parties “shall equally share the fees and costs of the Arbitrator,” (2) “[e]ach party shall pay for its own costs and attorney's fees, if any,” (3) “[e]ach party will deposit funds or post other appropriate security for its share of the Arbitrator's fee, in an amount and manner determined by the Arbitrator, 10 days before the first day of the hearing,” and (4) “if any party prevails on a statutory claim which affords the prevailing party attorney's fees, or if there is a written agreement providing for fees, the Arbitrator may award reasonable fees to the prevailing party.” (Id. at 2.)

In October 2020, four months after signing the Arbitration Agreement, Marquez suffered a work-related injury and submitted a request for medical leave to Tellez. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Tellez denied Marquez's request, and Marquez later discovered that Tellez told a co-worker she did so because Marquez “had been reporting and making complaints abouts sexual harassment.” (Id.) In November and December 2020, respectively, a co-worker asked Marquez to “watch pornographic movies and to engage in sexual intercourse,” and Marquez informed Crunt about “the sexual harassment, denial of medical leave, and retaliation by [Tellez, Kio,] and others[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)

Tellez and some of Teufel's other employees continued to harass Marquez between December 2020 and May 2021, and Marquez continued to complain to Teufel's HR department about unabated and “on-going harassment.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-28.) Teufel's HR representatives informed Marquez that Tellez was “too important to [the] company to be held accountable for sexually harassing [him], even though [they] had uncovered some evidence of harassment.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Instead, in or around May 2021, Teufel sent Marquez to work in an area away from Tellez and other co-workers who had harassed him. (Id. ¶ 27.) Around the same time and in the months that followed, Teufel largely assigned Marquez, who was “under work restrictions for his work-related injury,” to work alone and instructed him “not to converse with other workers,” and “unnecessarily assigned [him] to work which reduced [his] earnings.” (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.)

In September 2021, Marquez filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. (Id. ¶ 31.) Teufel assigned Marquez to Tellez's work area the next month, and Marquez experienced further sexual harassment. (Id. ¶ 32.) In November 2021, after a co-worker informed Marquez about Tellez's plan to “fire [him] or make sure that [he] would be fired when his injury had improved because he had reported and complained about sexual harassment at work,” Teufel terminated Marquez and rejected Marquez's application to return to work. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35.)

As a result, Marquez filed this action in January 2022. Teufel's motion to compel arbitration followed in September 2022.

DISCUSSION

Teufel moves to compel arbitration under the FAA. (See Def.'s Mot. Compel Arbitration (“Def.'s Mot.”) at 5-6, ECF No. 13, citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 which sets forth the FAA procedure for addressing a motion to compel arbitration.) In seeking dismissal or, alternatively, a stay, Teufel also invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1), “the means by which a defendant raises a defense that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” (Def.'s Mot. at 1, quoting Bazile v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted)).

I. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Section 2 of the FAA

“Under the FAA, private agreements to arbitrate are ‘valid irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'” Knapke v....