Marquez v. Winn Mgmt. Grp.

1

Jose A. Marquez, III, Plaintiff, v. Winn Management Group, LLC, Defendant.

C. A. No. 9:23-cv-05045-RMG-MHC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Beaufort Division

March 5, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MOLLY H. CHERRY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Jose A Marquez, III (“Plaintiff”), brings this employment discrimination action against Winn Management Group, LLC (“Defendant”). ECF No. 1.

Presently before the Court for disposition is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, which Defendant filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 13, and Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. 16. The Motion is ripe for review.

This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C). As Defendant's Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

THE ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Accepting the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, see E.I. du Pont de Nemours &amp Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011), the facts, for purposes of ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, are as follows.

On or about February 10, 2020, Plaintiff, a Hispanic/African American, began working for Defendant as a general maintenance tech. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11.

Beginning in or about June 2021, Plaintiff noticed that Caucasian applicants with less education, training, and time on the job were approved for management positions while anyone of color was immediately denied. Plaintiff reported the matter several times, but nothing was done. Id. at ¶ 12.

On or about June 19, 2021, Plaintiff applied for an open position of Field Supervisor, as he was already completing the duties of the field supervisor without the title or pay. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff was notified that Rebecca Young, a Caucasian employee who had substantially less education, experience, and time on the job than Plaintiff, got the promotion to field supervisor. Id. at ¶ 14. Young resigned her position days later. Plaintiff again inquired into the position but was again denied as Defendant rehired Young. Id. at ¶ 15.

Defendant tests its employees in certification tests or aptitude tests on a regular basis, in order to determine pay raises and promotions. Id. at ¶ 16. Defendant declined to offer or provide the certification tests or aptitude tests to Plaintiff, but Defendant regularly tested Plaintiff's Caucasian coworkers or simply provided pay raises or promotions to Caucasian workers without requiring tests. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff was told he was not eligible for a pay raise without pursing the certification or aptitude tests even though they provided pay raises or promotions to Caucasian employees that did not take the tests or failed them. Id. at ¶ 18. When Plaintiff asked why he was overlooked, he was told that he was accused of being “aggressive” even though he had never been written up or received any other disciplinary actions. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff was told that he could and would get tested for certifications, but he never did even though other Caucasian employees continued to be tested for certifications. Id. Plaintiff believes he was denied a promotion due to his race and that any stated reasons for promoting less-qualified Caucasian employees over Plaintiff are merely pretextual in nature. Id. at ¶ 20.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court is required to evaluate the complaint in its entirety, accept the factual allegations in the pleading as true, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d at 440, 448. Moreover, the court must evaluate “the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.” Id. at 448. The court may consider a document not attached to the complaint, so long as the document “was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint,” and there is no authenticity challenge. Id. (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999)). “A complaint should not be dismissed as long as it provides sufficient detail about the claim to show that the plaintiff has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 511 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts one cause of action in his Complaint: a claim for “Racial Discrimination/ Failure to Promote” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). ECF No. 1. Defendant seeks dismissal of the Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to timely file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the conduct he challenges.^[1] ECF No. 11.

A. Exhaustion of Remedies Under Title VII

Title VII prohibits an “employer [from] discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Before filing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC or, in a “deferral” jurisdiction such as South Carolina, with an appropriate state or local agency, within a specified time “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), 2000e-5(f)(1); see Sloop v. Memorial Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 148 (4th Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiff's Title VII claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies). Title VII establishes two possible limitation periods for filing a discrimination charge: “the basic limitations period is 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice but can be extended to 300 days in a deferral state if state law proscribes the alleged employment practice and the charge is first filed with a state deferral agency.” Gerald v. Olsten, No. 4:20-CV-2555-CMC-KDW, 2021 WL 1394669, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:20-CV-2555-CMC, 2021 WL 960509 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2021).

Courts have interpreted this exhaustion requirement to mean that each discrete incident of discriminatory treatment must be administratively exhausted. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the 180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.”); King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that subsequent civil suit “may encompass only the discrimination stated in the charge itself or developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bishop v. Behr Heat Transfer Sys., No. 2:11-CV-3535-SB-BHH, 2012 WL 1752701, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2012) (“A plaintiff's failure to file a charge within the applicable limitations period bars a later lawsuit in federal court.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 2:11-3535-SB, 2012 WL 1752047 (D.S.C. May 16, 2012).

The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that only those discrimination claims stated in an administrative charge those reasonably related to the original charge, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original charge, may be maintained in a subsequent lawsuit. See Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996). Courts have routinely enforced the exhaustion requirement on the rationale that “[a]llowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge as surely as would a failure to file a timely EEOC charge.” O'Rourke v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 983 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 19...