Marr v. State of Maine Department of Human Services, Civil No. 01-224-B-C (D. Me. 4/24/2002), Civil No. 01-224-B-C.

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LOGAN MARR, et al., Plaintiffs v. STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 01-224-B-C.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

April 24, 2002.

Charles Clifton Fuller, III, Esq., The Attorneys Office, P.A., Belfast, ME, for plaintiff Christy Marr, Individually and as Personal Representative of Logan Marr.

Andrew S. Hagler, Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for defendants Maine Department of Human Services, John Doe 1-10, Jane Doe 1-10, and XYZ Corporations 1-3 and for cross-defendant Sally Schofield and, for cross-claimant Karen Westburg and for cross-claimant Ray Doucette.

Andrew S. Hagler, Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, ME, Charles A. Harvey, Jr., Robert S. Frank, Esq., Harvey & Frank, Portland, ME, for defendant Allison Peters, cross-claimants Allison Peters, Ray Doucette, and cross-defendant Sally Schofield.

Edward R. Benjamin, Jr., Thompson & Bowie, Portland, ME, Andrew S. Hagler, Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for defendants Ray Doucette, Karen Westburg, Sallly Schofield, defendant and corss-claimant Margaret Marcotte.

Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., Norman, Hanson & Detroy, Portland, ME, Andrew S. Hagler, Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for defendant and cross-claimant Kevin Concannon.

E. James Burke, Lewiston, ME, for defendant Lawrence J. Irwin, Esq.

Thad B. Zmistowski, Esq., Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague, Bangor, ME, for defendants Sue Kiefer and Maine Childrens Home For Little Wanderers.

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

MARGARET J. KRAVCHUK, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs, the estate of Logan Marr and her mother, Christy Marr, brought this action for money damages against numerous defendants, including the Department of Human Services (the "Department"), an agency of the State of Maine. The Department has moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 12.) I recommend that the Court GRANT the motion.

12(b)(6) STANDARD

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, and determine whether the complaint, when taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant, sets forth sufficient facts to support the claim for relief. Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co., 228 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000); LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1998).

BACKGROUND

The complaint in this case, stretching over sixty-seven pages, contains 481 separate paragraphs and asserts twenty-seven separate causes of action against ten named defendants and various John and Jane Does and XYZ Corporations. It appears to me that the Department is the actual named defendant in at least three of the first ten counts that allege civil rights violations (the first, second and fifth causes of action) and in the twelfth cause of action that alleges a breach of contract by the Department vis-à-vis its contractual undertaking with the federal government under the terms of the Title IV-E State Plan, a contractual undertaking relating to federal funding for the State's foster care program. The Department is also named as a defendant in the thirteenth, fourteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth causes of action, all of which allege state law claims, including gross negligence, assault, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹ The operative facts giving rise to these various causes of action are found under the third section of the complaint entitled General Allegations (Compl. ¶¶ 1-160) and, as they relate to the Department, can be fairly easily summarized.

Logan Marr was placed in the custody of the Department on March 8, 2000, pursuant to orders entered in the Maine District Court in connection with child protection proceedings initiated by the Department. (Id. ¶ 2.) The Department placed her in the foster care of Sally Schofield and it is alleged that Logan died on January 31, 2001, of asphyxiation at the hands of Sally Schofield. (Id. ¶ 3.)

With respect to the allegations pertaining to the Department's employees, the complaint alleges, first, that the affidavit supporting the initial child protection petition was perjurious. (Id. ¶¶ 15-22.) The complaint further alleges that the placement of the child was improper in the Schofield home because that home was not licensed as a foster home by the State and because Schofield was an employee of the Department at the time of the placement. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 54-60.) Monitoring of the placement by Department employees is also alleged to have been deficient. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 35, 45.) According to the allegations the child complained that she had been the victim of an assault by Schofield but those complaints were not investigated. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 28.) The Department's supervisory staff allegedly failed to properly investigate, train, and supervise Department personnel. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35, 44, 45, 52, 64, 139, 449, 469.) Furthermore, Commissioner Concannon's statements after the death of Logan Marr were allegedly defamatory of the child's mother Christy Marr. (Id. ¶¶ 147-48.) Finally, the Department breached its Title IV-E State Plan, a contractual undertaking with the federal government to support federal funding of its foster care program, by placing the child in an unlicensed foster care home. (Id. ¶¶ 320, 322.)

DISCUSSION

A. Federal Civil Rights Claims: Counts One through Ten

Plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allege violations of various substantive and procedural due process rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. "To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 1) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and 2) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Barreto-Rivera v. Flores-Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir. 1995)). With regards to this second element the plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the defendants' conduct was the cause of the right's deprivation. Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1062 (1st Cir. 1997).

The first element is clearly met here; the Department's actions were all taken under color of state law. As for the second element plaintiffs assert that the rights that have been violated arise directly under the Constitution. For purposes of this decision only, I will assume that the plaintiffs' allegations of the death of the child at the hands of state actors while the child was in state custody is a deprivation of a right secured under the Constitution, compare DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989); Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 990-92 (1st Cir. 1992) with DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n. 9; Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1989), without pausing to parse the substantive and procedural due process claims alleged in each count, a task that can be nettlesome, see, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 70-73 (1st Cir. 1999); Soto, 103 F.3d at 1062-64, and is unnecessary to undertake for purposes of this motion to dismiss.

The Constitutional analysis is unnecessary because there is one other threshold requirement that must be met to maintain an action for money damages pursuant to § 1983. The defendant must be a "person" within the statute's reach. The Department has moved to dismiss the civil rights causes of action brought against it relying upon the well-known doctrine that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-68, 71 (1989). The Will holding applies to states, state officials acting in their "official capacity," or governmental entities that are considered "arms of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 491 U.S. at 70-71. See also Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is settled beyond peradventure . . . that neither a state agency nor a state official acting in his official capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action."); Rawlings v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D.Iowa 1993) ("[B]ecause a state agency was a party to the case [the Will decision] must be construed as implicitly holding that state agencies are also not persons under § 1983.").

The Maine Department of Human Services is a governmental entity that is an "arm of the State". For this reason the § 1983 causes of action against the Maine Department of Human Services must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

B. Federal Statutory/Third Party Beneficiary Claim

Plaintiffs' cause of action in Count Twelve presents some initial analytical problems. The count appears to be brought in connection with the "Maine Title IV-E State Plan" and alleges a common law cause of action for breach of contract brought by the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries. The State explains in its memorandum that the "Maine Title IV-E State Plan" arises under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), inter alia 42 U.S.C. § 670-679b (West Supp. 2001). The AACWA provides federal assistance to the states in connection with, among other things, foster care expenses. In order to receive such federal funding, states are required to submit for the approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services a "State plan" containing features described in 42 U.S.C. § 671.

Though the Plaintiffs have not attempted to clarify the point, in this case the portion of the State plan that might be the relevant "contract" language giving rise to Count Twelve would be found in § 671(a)(10). That paragraph states as follows:

In order for a State to be eligible for payments under...