Marriage Bauman v. Bauman (In re Re)

2014 IL App (4th) 130891-U

In re: MARRIAGE OF RONALD R. BAUMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, and DIANE M. BAUMAN, Respondent-Appellee.

NO. 4-13-0891

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

Modified upon denial of rehearing February 19, 2015

December 1, 2014

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from Circuit Court of Woodford County

No. 09D53

Honorable Charles M. Feeney, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Despite petitioner's numerous contentions of the error, the trial court did not commit any reversible error where many of the issues came down to making a credibility determination, resolving a conflict in the evidence, or working with the scant evidence provided by the parties.

¶ 2 In May 2009, petitioner, Ronald R. Bauman, filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage to respondent, Diane M. Bauman. In February 2012, the Woodford County circuit court entered an order dissolving the parties' marriage and distributing the parties' property. Petitioner filed numerous postjudgment motions. In September 2013, the court entered an order allowing petitioner to withdraw all pending motions as a final disposition.

¶ 3 Petitioner appeals, asserting (1) the trial court erred by requiring petitioner to reimburse the marital estate for all principal and interest paid during the marriage on his farmland mortgage; (2) the court erred by classifying the marital residence and outbuildings asmarital personal property; (3) if the residence and outbuildings were marital property, then the court erred in valuing them; (4) if the residence and outbuildings were petitioner's nonmarital property, then the marital estate should not be reimbursed for the 2000 and 2003 improvements; (5) the court erred by finding dissipation of various items by petitioner without any notice of a claim of such dissipation before trial and no opportunity to provide documentary proof in response; (6) the court's maintenance award was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; and (7) the court erred by rejecting the parties' postnuptial agreement. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The parties married in July 1983 and had two children, who were adults at the time the dissolution petition was filed. Petitioner was a farmer and owner of Midwest Asphalt Repair, Inc. (road-repair business), and respondent did not have outside employment during most of the marriage. During the marriage the parties resided at 1257 County Road 700 North in Eureka, Illinois (marital residence property). Petitioner's mother, Virginia Bauman, died in 1995. In her will, Virginia placed the marital residence property in a trust with her husband, Donald Bauman, as trustee. Under the terms of the trust, Donald had the use and control of the trust property during his life. Virginia left the residue of the trust property and the remainder interest to petitioner. Until the dissolution proceedings, respondent believed petitioner had inherited the marital residence property upon his mother's death. In July 2003, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement. Petitioner moved out of the marital home in February 2009 and filed his petition for dissolution in May 2009.

¶ 6 The parties brought numerous pretrial motions and petitions in this case. We only set forth those that are relevant to the issues on appeal. In her August 2009 petition for temporary relief and for attorney fees, respondent contended Donald had served her with a 30-day notice to vacate the marital residence property by September 5, 2009. Donald brought an eviction action against respondent. Bauman v. Bauman, No. 09-LM-68 (Cir. Ct. Woodford Co.). In December 2009, the trial court entered an agreed order, providing, inter alia, petitioner was to make available up to $300,000 to respondent for the purchase of a new residence for herself having a value of no more than $300,000, including closing costs. The new residence would be considered marital property and be awarded to respondent as part of her share of the marital estate. In the eviction case, the court entered a January 2010 agreed order, awarding Donald possession of the marital residence property but giving respondent until June 30, 2010, to vacate the property.

¶ 7 In November 2009, respondent filed a supplemental petition for a restraining order, alleging petitioner had told her he planned on quitting his profession as a farmer and terminating the family business to prevent her from receiving any maintenance or long-term support. In his response, petitioner admitted contacting respondent but denied he said those things. In February 2010, petitioner filed a petition to sell certain marital assets to finance the road-repair business's 2010 operations and pay other financial obligations. The petition noted petitioner had been unable to secure operating loans for the year 2010 for both the business and his farming operation. Petitioner also noted the reasons why he was unable to continue his farming operation in 2010, including the loss of several farming agreements. In April 2010, the trial court entered an agreed order on temporary matters, under which the parties agreed to sell their one-half interest in the farm equipment to Donald and petitioner was to continue to operate the road-repair business in good faith and in a reasonable, businesslike manner during the dissolution proceedings. The order also provided each party was entitled to $5,000 a month from the road-repair business's account.

¶ 8 In May 2010, respondent filed a petition for a finding of dissipation by petitioner on seven occasions in 2009 and 2010. In February 2011, respondent filed a second petition for a finding of dissipation, asserting the funds invested in the marital residence property were dissipation because the property belonged to petitioner's father. It also contended petitioner dissipated marital funds by (1) draining the equity of the road-repair business, (2) spending money on his girlfriend, and (3) refusing to work as a farmer.

¶ 9 In May 2010, petitioner sought to modify the December 2009 agreed order. Petitioner noted Donald had demanded to be paid rent for use of the outbuildings on the marital residence property and for his work on behalf of the road-repair business, and thus the business's costs had increased significantly. The business was very low on cash, and petitioner requested, inter alia, he not have to make any further payments to respondent from the marital estate until it was known the business had sufficient income. In December 2010, petitioner sought to modify the April 2010 agreed order, noting the business was in substantial debt and could no longer provide the monthly $5,000 payments to each of them. Both motions detailed the decline of the road-repair business. Petitioner's response to respondent's June 2011 petition for temporary and permanent maintenance also detailed the demise of the road-repair business and why he was no longer farming. Petitioner explained he was working as an hourly farmhand for Donald's farming operations.

¶ 10 In December 2011, the trial court held a three-day trial on the contested matters. While represented by counsel during the pretrial and posttrial phases of this case, petitioner was pro se during the actual trial. Both parties testified at the trial as well as their son, Brock Bauman, and Neil Gerber, a certified public accountant. The testimony presented at the trial was not recorded. Thus, all this court has is a bystander's report of the trial and the trial court'srecitation of the facts in its order. The evidence presented at trial relevant to the issues on appeal follow.

¶ 11 Respondent testified she worked part-time at a bank prior to the parties' marriage but was a stay-at-home mother during the marriage. She had only a high school education, and her only training was working at a bank. At the time of trial, she was 49 years old and working 35 hours per week at a bank until another employee returned to work, at which point her weekly hours would be reduced to 25. According to respondent, the marriage broke down in June 2008, when she discovered petitioner had a relationship with Mimi Maney, who lived in Wisconsin. Respondent further alleged the affair had been going on for an extended period of time, and petitioner had spent substantial sums of money on Maney, as documented in several exhibits regarding dissipation.

¶ 12 Petitioner admitted taking Maney on trips before the dissolution proceedings. However, as to some of the other allegations of dissipation, petitioner explained he did not recall the particular disposition and documents were available to support how the money was spent. Petitioner did not have the documents with him because he did not know he needed them available. Petitioner also noted he lacked documentation showing his disposition of the $70,000 he removed from the parties' joint account in early 2010. Petitioner also denied knowing he needed to present documentation on those dispositions. The bystander's report noted that, despite the trial lasting 4 1/2 days, petitioner did not bring in any documents regarding the $70,000.

¶ 13 Petitioner testified that, during the marriage, he worked as a farmer and ran the road-repair business. His father Donald was also a farmer, and they jointly owned most of their farming equipment. Petitioner had been farming about 2,000 acres, and Donald farmed about1,000. Distributions from the road-repair business to petitioner were placed in the "farm account" that the parties used to pay their bills and expenses. The business had 10 to 12 employees, and he frequently took the employees and his business associates to Wisconsin and Florida. The trips were paid for with the business credit card. In 2010, he cut back on those "perks"...