Marshall v. Gus Petropoulous

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LADARIUS MARSHALL, Plaintiff, v. GUS PETROPOULOUS, et al, Defendants.

No. 22-cv-0525-bhl

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

January 24, 2023

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

BRETT H. LUDWIG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Ladarius Marshall spent twelve years incarcerated for the murder of Lavare Gould based largely on statements he made to law enforcement officers, statements that this Court later concluded, in granting Marshall's petition for habeas corpus, were made in violation of his Miranda rights. Marshall v. Eckstein, No. 15-CV-008, 2020 WL 1939182 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22, 2020). Following up on his habeas victory, Marshall now brings suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and seeks to recover damages from the Milwaukee police officers who interrogated him: Gus Petropoulous, Michael Braunreiter, Timothy Heier, and Matthew Goldberg. (See ECF No. 1.) Marshall also sues other, as yet unidentified, police officers and the City of Milwaukee. (See id.) His lead claim is that the officers and City violated his Fifth Amendment rights. (See id. ¶¶53-58.) He also asserts claims against the officers for violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights failing to intervene, and conspiring to deprive him of his constitutional rights. (Id. ¶¶59-75.) And his complaint includes state law claims against the officers for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, (see id. ¶¶76-81), and against the City based on respondeat superior and indemnification theories. (See id. ¶¶82-88.)

On June 23, 2022, just weeks after Marshall filed his complaint, the Supreme Court decided Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S.Ct. 2095 (2022), confirming that a mere Miranda violation is not redressable under Section 1983. Based on Vega Defendants have moved to dismiss Marshall's Fifth Amendment claim. (ECF No. 18.) They also offer an array of largely underdeveloped arguments for dismissal of Marshall's other claims. (Id.) Defendants' efforts are misplaced at this point in the case. They overstate the holding in Vega and understate the breadth of Marshall's detailed allegations. Accordingly, their motion will be denied. While discovery may show that Marshall's claims lack merit, his allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND^[1]

In August 2008, Ladarius Marshall was sixteen years old and about to start his freshman year of high school. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶1, 7.) Marshall struggled academically in several subjects, including reading, and received additional academic support through special education classes. (Id. ¶7.) The Milwaukee Police Department, after receiving information implicating Marshall in the murder of Lavare Gould, arrested Marshall at his grandmother's home. (Id. ¶¶1, 10, 12.) The officers placed Marshall in a windowless interrogation room at 7 a.m. and left him there for hours, without any adult advocate, until Defendants Petropoulous and Braunreiter arrived to question him. (Id. ¶¶14-16.)

Early in the interrogation, Marshall told Petropoulous and Braunreiter that he did not wish to make a statement. (Id. ¶17.) This did not stop them. Instead, the officers prodded Marshall by providing details of the murder investigation and falsely telling Marshall that they asked his grandmother-his legal guardian-about his whereabouts the night of the murder. (Id. ¶¶7, 19.) Marshall repeatedly asserted his right to end the questioning, but the officers continued to question him halting only after he asked them to stop several times. (Id. ¶20.)

Even this reprieve was only temporary. At 2 p.m., more than two hours after questioning paused, Marshall asked an officer for an update on his detention. (Id. ¶21.) Braunreiter asked Marshall if he felt like talking. (Id. ¶22.) Again, Marshall said he had nothing to say. (Id. ¶23.) But again this did not stop the officers. Instead, Braunreiter and Petropoulous continued interrogating Marshall until he finally started talking. (Id.) Then, in subsequent questioning by Braunreiter (solo) and Heier and Goldberg (together), Marshall placed himself at the crime scene and stated he shot a weapon provided to him by the informant. (Id. ¶25.) Even then Marshall did not say he shot Gould. (Id.) The officers declined Marshall's requests to call his grandmother until finally allowing him to do so at 6 p.m. (Id. ¶¶29-30.)

Based on Marshall's incriminating statements, authorities charged Marshall as party to first-degree intentional homicide and possession of a weapon by a minor. (Id. ¶¶32, 41.) He was charged as an adult, and while his attorney asked that he be tried in juvenile court, the trial court denied the motion. (Id. ¶¶33-35.) Marshall's attorney then filed a motion to suppress his incriminatory statements. (Id. ¶36.) The trial court denied that motion too. (Id. ¶38.) Marshall ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree reckless homicide and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. (Id. ¶¶39-40.)

After exhausting his state court options to challenge his conviction, Marshall filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. (Id. ¶¶42-43.) On April 22, 2020, the Court granted Marshall's petition, concluding his Miranda rights had been violated. (Id. ¶44.) After the writ was granted, the state did not appeal but instead dismissed the charges against him. (Id. ¶45.)

LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff['s] favor.” Roberts v. City of Chi., 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Roberts, 817 F.3d at 564 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Roberts, 817 F.3d at 564-65 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The complaint must do more than recite the elements of a cause of action in a conclusory fashion.” Roberts, 817 F.3d at 565 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

ANALYSIS

Defendants largely rely on Vega to argue that Marshall's complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because a Miranda violation cannot support a Section 1983 claim. Because Marshall has alleged that the officers coerced his confession, however, he has adequately pleaded violations of both his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Marshall has also alleged sufficient facts to survive dismissal on his remaining federal and state law claims.

I. Because Marshall Has Alleged Sufficient Facts to Suggest His Confession Was Coerced, His Federal Law Claims Survive Dismissal.

An individual defendant can be found personally liable under Section 1983 if he or she: (1) engaged in conduct while “acting under color of state law,” and (2) the conduct “deprived the plaintiff of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'” DiDonato v. Panatera, 24 F.4th 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. §1983). In support of dismissal, Defendants argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Vega precludes Marshall's suit because he has only pleaded that they violated his Miranda rights. (ECF No. 18 at 5.) They also argue Marshall has failed to plead facts sufficient to support a plausible finding that the officers' actions “shock the conscience” as required for a Fourteenth Amendment claim. (Id. at 8.) In the alternative, Defendants contend both counts should be dismissed because Marshall has not adequately alleged that they were the proximate cause of Marshall's damages and because the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 10-16.) Finally, Defendants argue that the remaining federal law claims should be dismissed because there is no actionable underlying violation. (Id. at 16.) Because Marshall has pleaded enough facts to allege his confession was coerced, Defendants' motion must be denied as to the federal law claims.

A. Marshall Has Adequately Alleged a Fifth Amendment Claim.

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. Am. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court embraced additional “prophylactic measures” to help secure the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id.; Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003). Under Miranda, prosecutors are precluded from using a suspect's statements made during police questioning unless the suspect was first informed of and waived his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination prior to the interrogation. 384 U.S. at 444-45. These warnings are intended “to prevent violations of the right protected by the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause-the admission into evidence in a criminal case of confessions obtained through coercive custodial questioning.” Johnson v. Winstead, 900 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772). Because these “prophylactic measures” go beyond the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that Miranda violations alone do not provide a basis for a Section 1983 claim. Id.; Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 (2003)). The Seventh Circuit's approach was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Vega, as the Court explained that a Miranda violation by itself is not “tantamount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Vega, 142 S.Ct. at 2101-02. Rather, Miranda only created rules to safeguard a suspect's Fifth Amendment right during his...