Marshall v. Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office

Bradley R. Marshall, Plaintiff, v. Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-2993-RMG

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

August 24, 2021

ORDER AND OPINION

Richard Mark Gergel United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 32) recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office (“Solicitor's Office”), Scarlett A. Wilson Benjamin Chad Simpson, and Gregory Voigt (collectively “Moving Defendants”)'s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 17). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R&R as the order of the Court and grants in part and denies in part Moving Defendants' motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations of his constitutional rights as well as a state law claim. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint concerns an underlying state court action in which Plaintiff was charged with the unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) in violation of S.C. Code § 40-5-310. (Dkt. No. 12 at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants-including Ninth Circuit Solicitor Scarlett Wilson; Assistant Solicitor Benjamin Simpson; and Assistant Solicitor Gregory Voigt-were required to obtain a declaratory judgment from the South Carolina Supreme Court certifying that his conduct did in fact constitute UPL prior to charging him under the state statute. (Id. at 3, 6). In failing to do so, Plaintiff claims that Defendants abused their investigatory and prosecutorial powers, and violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under 42 U.S.C § 1981 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”).

More specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected him to unlawful search and seizure, arrest, imprisonment, and malicious prosecution; withheld exculpatory evidence from the state court; and improperly delayed the judicial proceedings. (Id. at 3-8). Moreover, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wilson “developed and maintained policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens, which were moving forces behind and proximately caused the violations of [his] constitutional and federal rights.” (Id. at 11). Plaintiff further alleges that the “deliberately indifferent training and supervision” provided by Defendant Wilson also contributed to his purported injuries. (Id. at 12). As a result of Defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct, Plaintiff claims that he “has suffered emotional injuries, and other damages and losses as described herein entitling him to compensatory and special damages ” (Id.).

Moving Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against them. (Dkt. No. 17). Plaintiff opposes. (Dkt. No. 28). Moving Defendants filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 31).

On July 20, 2021, the Magistrate Judge filed a R&R recommending that: (1) Plaintiff's claims proceed against Defendants Wilson and Voigt only to the extent the claims arise from the alleged investigation performed by Voigt and supervised by Wilson; (2) Plaintiff's claims against Simpson be dismissed in their entirety; and (3) Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Solicitor's Office be dismissed, and only those state law claims against the Solicitor's Office arising from the alleged investigation performed by Voigt and supervised by Wilson proceed. (Dkt. No. 32 at 10).

Moving Defendants filed objections to various parts of the R&R. (Dkt. No. 34).

II. Legal Standards

a. Pro Se Pleadings

This Court liberally construes complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a viable federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. See Weller v. Dep't of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

b. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action if the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A claim survives the motion if the complaint provides enough facts to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This is a test of the legal sufficiency of the complaint and, therefore, Rule 12(b)(6) “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of the claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Instead, the district court's “inquiry then is limited to whether the allegations constitute a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For that analysis, the district court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments”; however, it must “assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent with the complaint's allegations.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).

c. Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with this Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. Additionally, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where the plaintiff fails to file any specific objections, “a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Because the Moving Defendants filed objections to the R&R, the R&R is reviewed de novo.

III. Discussion

The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably addressed the issues and correctly concluded that Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part. Namely the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that: (1) Plaintiff's claims proceed against Defendants Wilson and Voigt only to the extent the claims arise from the alleged investigation performed by Voigt and supervised by Wilson; (2) Plaintiff's claims against Simpson be dismissed in their entirety; and (3) Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Solicitor's Office be dismissed, and only those state law claims against the Solicitor's Office arising from the alleged investigation performed by Voigt and supervised by Wilson proceed.

First, Moving Defendants object that all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendants Wilson and Voigt should have been dismissed because both individuals are entitled to prosecutorial immunity for their investigation of Plaintiff for UPL. (Dkt. No. 34 at 2-4).

A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability for damages under Section 1983 “when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997). However, “the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). Prosecutorial immunity depends on “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127. Prosecutors are entitled to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when they perform administrative functions or “investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126. The official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-487, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). To qualify as advocacy, an act must be “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Thus, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from liability from a suit alleging that he maliciously initiated a prosecution, used perjured testimony at trial, or suppressed material evidence at trial. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. A prosecutor is also absolutely immune for direct participation in a probable cause hearing, Burns, 500 U.S. at 491, and for preparing and filing charging documents. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons denied absolute immunity to prosecutors who fabricated evidence “during the early stage of the investigation” when “police officers and assistant prosecutors were performing essentially the same investigatory functions.” 509 U.S. at 273. Buckley also denied absolute immunity to prosecutors accused of holding a defamatory press conference, concluding that that activity “had no functional tie to the judicial process.” Id. at 277. The Supreme Court...