Martin-Godinez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

1

REYNALDO MARTIN-GODINEZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:21-cv-582-TJC-MCR

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

August 6, 2024

ORDER

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN, United States District Judge.

I. Status

Petitioner an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner challenges a state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for three counts of sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age and one count of lewd and lascivious molestation. See id. at 1. Petitioner is serving a mandatory life term of incarceration. Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 10; Response) with exhibits (Docs. 10-1 to 10-20; Ex.). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 12). This case is ripe for review.^[1]

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must show that: (1) counsel's performance was outside the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption' that counsel's representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'” Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling on counsel's performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105); see also Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Jordan, J., concurring); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Procedural History

The State of Florida charged Petitioner by amended information with three counts of sexual battery on a person less than 12 years of age (Counts 13),^[2] one count of lewd and lascivious molestation (Count 4), and one count of promoting a sexual performance (Count 5). Ex. A at 45. Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial, see Ex. B, at the conclusion of which the jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1, 3, and 4, and not guilty verdicts on Counts 2 and 5, Ex. A at 76-80. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a mandatory term of natural life on both Counts 1 and 3, and 25 years on Count 4, with the sentences on Counts 3 and 4 to run concurrent with the sentence on Count 1. Id. at 90-92.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and he subsequently filed postconviction motions pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Petitioner then filed the instant case raising five grounds for relief.

IV. Analysis

A. Ground One

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to police when he did not have access to an appropriate interpreter. Doc. 1 at 7.

Prior to trial, Petitioner, through trial counsel, filed a motion to suppress the statements he made in his interview with police. Ex. A at 50-51. He argued that the Miranda^[3] warnings and interrogation were conducted in Spanish, but Petitioner's native language is Mayan Mam, and he “was not able to understand his rights or the conversation.” Id. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, during which it heard testimony from Petitioner and the detective who conducted the interview (Detective Nanette Lamb). See id. at 185-206. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied the motion, explaining as follows:

The Court actually reviewed the DVD [of the interview] multiple times carefully with the transcript, and after reviewing it - and of course hearing the Detective's testimony, it is clear to me that this defendant understood Spanish, understood what he was being told, understood what he was waiving. He had questions about the Miranda rights, but he asked them in Spanish and got a response in Spanish.

So based on the totality of the circumstances, I have to agree with Judge Borello. I think this defendant does not necessarily need this Mam interpreter, but we will certainly provide it. That he freely and voluntarily waiving [sic] his Miranda rights with the full understanding of what he was doing, and agreed to speak with the Detective. So I will deny the Motion to Suppress.

Id. at 200-01.

On direct appeal, Pet...