Martin-Mcfarlane v. City of Phila.

299 F.Supp.3d 658

Stellita MARTIN–MCFARLANE, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17–0118

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed October 25, 2017

Signed October 26, 2017

L. Kenneth Chotiner, The Chotiner Firm Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Michael R. Miller, City Of Philadelphia Law Dept., Cy Goldberg, Lori C. Miller, Goldberg, Miller & Rubin, PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rufe, J.

Plaintiff Stellita Martin–McFarlane, a registered nurse, filed suit after she was assaulted by a hospitalized prisoner during his attempt to escape from custody. Defendants, the City of Philadelphia, Correctional Officer ("C.O.") Christopher Cox, C.O. Thomas Doman, Albert Einstein Medical Center ("AEMC"), Albert Einstein Healthcare Network ("AEHN"), Albert Einstein Medical Associates, Inc. ("AEMA"),¹ and the Department of Protective Services ("DPS"),² have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. For reasons that follow, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges the following facts, which are assumed to be true for purposes of the motions to dismiss. On January 11, 2015, prisoner Justin Mackie was transported to AEMC for a routine medical procedure.³ Mackie had previously been arrested on multiple charges, including, among others, murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and resisting arrest.⁴ At the time he was brought to AEMC, he was being held without bail "because he was such a danger to the community."⁵

Plaintiff alleges that Mackie should have been treated as a "special security inmate" pursuant to Philadelphia Prisons Policies and Procedures, Policy Number 3.A. 12 ("the policy").⁶ This policy requires that, when a prisoner is designated as a "special security inmate" and needs to be transported to an outside hospital, the escorting officers will be notified of the prisoner's high escape risk or high violence risk.⁷ In addition, the policy requires correctional officers to notify the hospital's chief of security of the prisoner's arrival.⁸ Notably, the policy states that "mechanical restraints should never be removed unless directed to do so for medical treatment."⁹

As a registered nurse working at AEMC, Plaintiff was assigned to tend to Mackie's medical care.¹⁰ Plaintiff alleges that sometime during Mackie's treatment on January 11, 2015, C.O. Cox left the hospital room, leaving C.O. Doman alone in the room with Mackie.¹¹ C.O. Doman then removed Mackie's restraints.¹² "Mackie seized upon the opportunity," overpowered C.O. Doman, and began to escape by running down the hallway.¹³ Plaintiff saw Mackie run past her, yelled for help, and ran towards the nurses' station to call security.¹⁴ As she ran, however, Mackie intercepted Plaintiff "and brutally assaulted" her.¹⁵ Plaintiff suffered "a concussion[,] back pain, neck pain, bruising, and post-traumatic stress disorder" from the assault.¹⁶

On January 10, 2017, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants. She alleges that Defendants the City of Philadelphia, C.O. Cox, and C.O. Doman violated her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, she asserts that she was deprived of her "right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, verbal abuse, to be secure in one's person and property, and to due process and equal protection of the law."¹⁷ She also raises state law claims of "assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, interference with state constitutional rights, negligence, gross negligence, and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision" against all Defendants.¹⁸

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a plausible entitlement to relief.¹⁹ In evaluating Defendants' motions, the Court "take[s] as true all the factual allegations of the [complaint] and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them," but "disregard[s] legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements."²⁰ Instead, to prevent dismissal, a complaint must "set out sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible."²¹ "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."²²

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises several claims against the City of Philadelphia, C.O. Cox, and C.O. Doman, including § 1983 claims and state law claims. She also alleges numerous state law claims against the hospital entities, AEMC, AEHN, AEMA, as well as DPS. The Court will first address the § 1983 claims against the City, Cox, and Doman, and then will analyze the state law claims against AEMC, AEHN, AEMA, and DPS.

A. Section 1983 Claims and the City of Philadelphia, C.O. Cox, and C.O. Doman

Plaintiff asserts two types of Fourteenth Amendment due process claims under § 1983 : a state-created danger claim against C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman, and a Monell claim²³ against the City of Philadelphia. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that her First Amendment rights were violated. She also alleges that her Fourth Amendment right to be "secure in ones' person and property" and to be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, and excessive force was violated.²⁴

1. State–Created Danger Claim Against C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.²⁵ Plaintiff alleges that her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman failed to protect her from Mackie's assault. In particular, she alleges Defendants' conduct afforded Mackie the opportunity to attempt an escape from custody and assault her.

"Generally, the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty upon the state to protect citizens from the acts of private individuals."²⁶ The state-created danger theory operates as an exception to this general rule and requires plaintiffs to meet a four-part test:

(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.²⁷

Defendants contend that the complaint fails to satisfy the second and fourth elements of this test—that the state actor's behavior "shocks the conscience," and that the defendants' affirmative conduct rendered Plaintiff more vulnerable to danger.

Although "[m]ere negligence is not enough to shock the conscience,"²⁸ acts motivated by harmful intent are likely to rise to the level of conscience-shocking behavior.²⁹ Conduct that falls between these two extremes requires courts to make "closer calls" based on the circumstances of each case.³⁰ Here, Plaintiff alleges that C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman left Mackie, a man charged with murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and resisting arrest, and who was denied bail, unrestrained in a public hospital. C.O. Cox's decision to exit the hospital room and leave Mackie attended with only one correctional officer, and C.O. Doman's decision to remove Mackie's restraints, may "shock the conscience" given the violent nature of the crimes for which Mackie was in custody. Taken as true and construed liberally at this early stage in the litigation, these facts about C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman's conduct in failing to secure a potentially violent prisoner may rise significantly above mere negligence to a level that shocks the conscience.

The fourth element requires state officials to engage in affirmative conduct that renders the plaintiff more vulnerable to danger.³¹ Plaintiff alleges that the C.O. Cox left the hospital room when he was supposed to be monitoring Mackie and that C.O. Doman removed the restraints securing Mackie to the hospital bed, allowing Mackie to attempt an escape. At this early stage in the litigation, these allegations sufficiently describe affirmative acts that endangered Plaintiff, who was directly engaged in caring for a potentially violent prisoner.

Defendants C.O. Cox and C.O. Doman assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's state-created danger claim. "Qualified immunity shields officials from liability when their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ constitutional rights of which a ‘reasonable person’ would have been aware at the time the incident occurred."³² "Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably."³³

Because qualified immunity results in "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," determining whether officials are entitled to qualified immunity should be determined as early as possible.³⁴ At the pleading stage, "qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint."³⁵ "The burden of establishing qualified immunity falls to the official claiming it as a defense."³⁶

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