Martin v. Byrd

MARTIN v. THE STATE.

BYRD v. THE STATE.

S20A1134.

S20A1135.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 21, 2020

MELTON, Chief Justice.

In these related appeals, Dreshaun Martin and Tori Byrd appeal their convictions for the malice murder of Valentine Dwight Gant, Jr., and the aggravated assault of Gant's three-year-old son.¹For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in both cases.

1. In the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence produced at trial shows that, on June 6, 2015, Byrd, Martin, and Justin Cassell were socializing with several others in the backyard of Jasmine Brown, the mother of Byrd's child. The three men wanted some marijuana, but they had no money. At that point, they discussed the possibility of "finessing" people for marijuana, i.e., tricking or robbing them. Ebony Young, Cassell's friend, overheard some of this planning, though she left the backyard while the planning was ongoing. She testified that she did not want to stay there because she believed that the men were going to behave badly.

Martin, Byrd, and Cassell eventually decided that Byrd would call Gant, a marijuana dealer whom Byrd knew and thought would come to them, as Gant was in the Edgewater Apartment complex which was adjacent to Brown's backyard and accessible through a hole in her back fence. At Byrd's request, Gant agreed to come through the Edgewater Apartment complex and meet the men. When Gant answered Byrd's phone call, Gant's girlfriend, who waswith him at the time, saw the name "Tori" come up on Gant's phone. Before Gant left, his son asked to go with him, which Gant allowed.

While Byrd, Martin, and Cassell waited, they planned to steal both Gant's marijuana as well as any money Gant might be carrying. They discussed fighting Gant for the drugs and money, but decided to approach him with a gun that Byrd had brought and subsequently handed to Martin. It was agreed that Byrd would take all of Gant's marijuana, and Martin and Cassell would split any money they stole.

Justin Gibson, who was outside the apartments on the other side of the fence, could hear much of this conversation about robbing Gant. Martin, Byrd, and Cassell knew Gibson was there, but they were not particularly concerned about his presence and did not attempt to hide their conversation or actions from him, as they knew that Gibson suffered from intellectual disabilities.

A short time later, Gant arrived in his car and pulled into a parking lot where the three men could see him from Brown's house. Gibson testified that he saw Martin and Cassell approach Gant fromthe rear of the car. Byrd had gone into Brown's house. On the way to Gant's car, Martin handed the gun to Cassell, who approached the driver's door and pointed the gun at Gant's head. Gant tried to fight Cassell for the weapon. In the tussle, Cassell shot Gant in the chest. The bullet traveled down Gant's body and out his back, going into and then out of the leg of Gant's son, who was sitting next to Gant in the vehicle. Cassell and Martin then ran away.²

Fatally wounded, Gant briefly drove out of the Edgewood Apartment complex and into the parking lot of another complex across the street, where his sister lived. Gant subsequently died from the gunshot wound, but his son survived. Gibson followed Gant's vehicle on foot and made contact with police, telling them what he had seen that afternoon. A bullet was later recovered from Gant's vehicle and determined to be consistent with having been fired by a Smith and Wesson .9mm handgun.

Initially, only Cassell was identified and charged with Gant'smurder. Cassell proceeded to a jury trial, but, mid-trial on August 9, 2016, Cassell agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter. In return, Cassell provided the State with a full version of the events leading up to the shooting in a recorded interview (which was later introduced at the trial of Martin and Byrd). Martin and Byrd were arrested the next day, and later indicted and tried on the evidence set forth above.

Despite contentions otherwise, this evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to enable the jury to find both Martin and Byrd guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which they were convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime); Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 770 (2) (778 SE2d 205) (2015) (jury may infer common criminal intent from defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes); Cargill v. State, 256 Ga. 252, 253 (1) (347 SE2d 559) (1986) (as to the guilt of a party to a crime for co-perpetrator's acts, "[t]he act of one [perpetrator] wasthe act of the other in the commission of [the crimes]").

Neither Martin's contention that Cassell's testimony was not sufficiently corroborated nor Byrd's contention that the child's shooting was unforeseeable has merit. With regard to Martin's corroboration claim, it is true that Cassell's testimony must be corroborated because he was an accomplice of Martin and Byrd. See OCGA § 24-14-8.³ There was, however, ample corroboration from multiple witnesses, including the testimony of Gibson and Young that recounted the planning and execution of the crimes. See Dozier v. State, 307 Ga. 583, 586 (837 SE2d 294) (2019) (noting that"[s]ufficient corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, it may be slight, and it need not of itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime charged," but it "must be independent of the accomplice testimony and must directly connect the defendant with the crime or lead to the inference that he is guilty") (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 901 (1) (757 SE2d 102) (2014) ("Once the State adduces [corroborating] evidence, it is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine whether the evidence sufficiently corroborates the accomplice's testimony and warrants a conviction." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)).

Byrd's argument that the presence and shooting of Gant's son was an unforeseeable collateral consequence is equally meritless.

It has long been the law of Georgia that "[a]ll of the participants in a conspiracy are criminally responsible for the acts of each, committed in the execution of the conspiracy, and which may be said to be a probable consequence of the conspiracy, even though the particular act may not actually have been part of the plan." Huffman v. State, 257 Ga. 390, 391 (2) (359 SE2d 910) (1987). This criminal responsibility also applies to collateral acts of a co-conspirator, so long as such collateral acts are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy. See Everritt v. State, 277Ga. 457, 459 (588 SE2d 691) (2003) (quoting Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 647-648 (66 SCt 1180, 90 LE 1489) (1946)) . . . "Even if [Byrd] did not have the specific intent that [Gant's son] be [shot], the crimes which [he] did intend were dangerous ones; by their attendant circumstances, they created a foreseeable risk of death." Parks v. State, 272 Ga. 353, 354 (529 SE2d 127) (2000).

McLeod v. State, 297 Ga. 99, 102 (1) (772 SE2d 641) (2015). The defendants planned an armed robbery as part of an illegal drug transaction. It was not an unforeseeable collateral consequence that someone might get shot during the commission of such an obviously dangerous and illegal enterprise. See id. See also Robinson v. State, 298 Ga. 455, 457-459 (1) (782 SE2d 657) (2016) (holding that the fatal shooting of the defendant's accomplice by the victim during an attempted armed robbery was foreseeable); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 654 (3) (697 SE2d 757) (2010) ("Proximate causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal . . . conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.").

2. Both Martin and Byrd contend that the trial court erred by denying a motion for mistrial after the State failed to properly redacta small portion of Cassell's recorded statement. We disagree.

In one part of his recorded interview, Cassell told the questioning investigator that Gibson had not visited Brown's backyard while Cassell was present. The investigator then inquired how Gibson could have known about the robbery if he had not been in or near Brown's backyard. In response, Cassell stated an assumption that, if Gibson had been present, Gibson must have visited the backyard prior to Cassell's arrival. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled that this portion of Cassell's interview should be redacted because it was based on speculation. At trial, however, it was accidentally played for the jury.

After the unexpected portion of Cassell's statement was played, Byrd moved for a mistrial, which Martin joined. In response, the State recognized its mistake and requested that the trial court issue a curative instruction. The trial court denied the motions for mistrial, but granted the State's request and instructed the jury: "I want you to disregard the last statement by the witness in the audio tape, which is speculative in nature. You are not to consider that atall. Is that clear?" The jurors responded affirmatively that they understood, and the State published the remainder of the interview.

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. "[A] new trial will not be granted unless it is clear that the trial court's curative instruction failed to eliminate the effect of the prejudicial comment [in contention]." Turner v. State, 299 Ga. 720, 723 (5) (791 SE2d 791) (2016). Here, the jurors indicated an understanding that they were not to consider the speculative statement in question, and there is no indication that it affected their consideration of the evidence before them. There was no abuse of the trial court's discretion, as neither Martin nor Byrd has shown that the grant of a mistrial was necessary to...