Martin v. Garland

1

DONALD LYNN MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. MERRICK GARLAND, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-1594 (TSC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Donald Lynn Martin brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see 5 U.S.C § 552.^[1] Defendants have moved for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24), and for the reasons discussed below, the court GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This Memorandum Opinion pertains only to Plaintiff's April 28 2022, FOIA Request No. EOUSA-2022-001858 to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”), a component of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). EOUSA is responsible for coordinating “responses of the United States Attorneys' Offices to requests under . . . FOIA,” Decl. for Tricia Francis (ECF No. 24-2, “Francis Decl.”) ¶ 1, and its staff “processes and reviews . . . FOIA requests,” id. ¶ 3.

Defendants demonstrate, see Def.'s Statement of Material Facts Not In Genuine Dispute (ECF No. 24-2, “Def. SMF”) SMF ¶¶ 1, 6, 8-14, and Plaintiff concedes, see Resp. to Def. Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 27, “Pl. Opp.”) at 1-2, that summary judgment for Defendants is warranted with respect to FOIA requests to the Office of the Attorney General, dated January 11, 2022, and February 11, 2022, see Compl. for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 1, “Compl.”), Ex. A (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3). Because Plaintiff's June 23, 2022, FOIA Request No. EOUSA-2022-002462 is a duplicate of the April 28, 2022, request, EOUSA closed it administratively. See Francis Decl. ¶¶ 29-31.

The records at issue in this case pertain to Jo E. Lawless, the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) assigned to prosecute the criminal case against Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. It appears Lawless underwent elective surgery, took medical leave, and was not expected to return to work until after January 2, 2018, the date on which Plaintiff's criminal trial was to begin. See Compl. ¶¶ 8-9; Pl. Opp., Ex. E (ECF No. 27-1 at 12). Plaintiff asserts that Lawless and her fellow prosecutors knew she would not be available to try the case as scheduled yet withheld this information from the trial court when the government filed a motion to continue the trial. See Compl. ¶ 9; Pl. Opp. at 10, 16. According to Plaintiff, there was “no justifiable reason to grant a continuance from January 2, 2018 until January 29, 2018,” Pl. Opp. at 16, “based on trial counsel's [s]o-called ‘unavailability,'” Pl. Opp., Ex. A (ECF No. 27-1 at 2), and the continuance violated the Speedy Trial Act by exceeding “the 70 day statutory maximum in which a trial must begin,” Pl. Opp. at 16.^[2] Plaintiff seeks “to establish the earliest date in which DOJ employees became aware” of Lawless' elective surgery and to determine the amount of time Lawless spent working on his criminal case. Compl. ¶ 8.

Plaintiff sent identical FOIA requests to the EOUSA and to the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Kentucky (“USAO-WDKY”) “for information that related to a third party located in the Louisville, Kentucky Office,” namely Jo E. Lawless. Francis Decl. ¶ 21; see id., Attach. A (ECF No. 23-3 at 18-19); Compl., Ex. B (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-7); Def. SMF ¶ 15. Specifically, he sought:

1. For the period July 1, 2017, through January 31, 2018.

2. All Emails and written correspondence, pertaining to request for paid or unpaid absence from work due to medical reasons, including Family Medical Leave Act request for the period above for Ms. Jo E. Lawless, Assistant United States Attorney, located in Louisville, Kentucky for the Western District.

3. All Emails and written correspondence, from Ms. Jo E. Lawless, Assistant United States Attorney, to her immediate supervisor, Mr. Russell Coleman, United States Attorney, Mr. Spencer McKiness, Assistant United States Attorney, and her Human Resources Department pertaining to any paid or unpaid leave from work due to medical reasons. For the above period in item # 1

4. All Emails and written correspondence, from Mr. Russell Coleman, United States Attorney, Mr. Spencer McKiness, Assistant United States Attorney, Ms. Lawless's Human Resources Department confirming or arranging or discussing any paid or unpaid time away from work for Ms. Lawless, for the above time period in item # 1 above.

5. The dates and hours spent by Ms. Jo E. Lawless, Assistant United States Attorney on case number 3:17-CR-00141-DJH, Donald Lynn Martin, for the period September 1, 20I7 through April 30, 2018, located in the Louisville, Kentucky office.

Def. SMF ¶ 17.

By letter dated June 13, 2022, see Francis Decl., Attach. B (ECF No. 24-3 at 21-22), EOUSA denied the request in full under Exemptions 6 and 7(C), explaining that Plaintiff sought information about a third party “without first showing . . . proof of consent, proof of death, or specifying the public interest that would be served by disclosing the desired information.” Def. SMF ¶ 20.^[3]Because the June 13, 2022, letter did not respond to paragraph 5 of the request, EOUSA staff prepared an amended denial letter on July 21, 2022, see Francis Decl. ¶ 33, but due to administrative error, see id. ¶ 34, did not send the letter to Plaintiff until September 14, 2022, Def. SMF ¶ 22. The letter repeated EOUSA's denial of paragraphs 1-4 and issued a “no records” response to paragraph 5. Id.

Meanwhile, on June 9, 2022, EOUSA sent Plaintiff's request to USAO-WDKY for processing, see id. ¶¶ 23, 28, and its FOIA Contact coordinated searches for responsive records, see Decl. of Robin K. Brown (ECF No. 24-4, “First Brown Decl.”) ¶¶ 4, 6. That search yielded eight pages of responsive records. See Def. SMF ¶ 24.

On review of the documents forwarded from USAO-WDKY, EOUSA staff determined that one of the eight pages was “a non-responsive cover page.” Id. ¶ 26. “[T]he remaining seven pages comprised four emails” which, although responsive to paragraphs 1-4 of Plaintiff's FOIA request, EOUSA withheld in full under Exemption 6. Id. EOUSA notified Plaintiff of its determination by letter dated March 22, 2023. Id. ¶ 27. No records responsive to paragraph 5 were found. Id. ¶¶ 41-43.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “A fact is ‘material' if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary' do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “An issue is ‘genuine' if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. Courts must view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant[ ] and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences accordingly,” and determine whether a “reasonable jury could reach a verdict” in the non-movant's favor. Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

FOIA cases are typically decided on motions for summary judgment. See Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Summary judgment for the agency is only appropriate when an agency demonstrates that it has fully discharged its FOIA obligations, see Moore v. Aspin, 916 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996), by complying with requests and making records available unless such “information is exempted under [one of nine] clearly delineated statutory [exemptions].” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 602 F.Supp.2d 121, 123 (D.D.C. 2009); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)-(b).

B. Adequacy of the Search for Responsive Records

An agency “fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep't of State, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The agency may submit affidavits or declarations to explain the method and scope of its search, see Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and such affidavits or declarations are “accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents,” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing the adequacy of an agency's search, the court need not determine “whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.” Steinberg v. Dep't of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “Mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1201.

1. Searches of USAO-WDKY Records

EOUSA forwarded Plaintiff's request to USAO-WDKY because it was the office Plaintiff “expressly identified” as the place where responsive records likely would be found and the office which prosecuted Plaintiff's criminal case. Francis Decl. ¶ 24; see Def. SMF ¶ 28.

Declarant Robin Brown, FOIA Contact at USAO-WDKY, coordinated the search. See First Brown Decl. ¶¶ 1-2, 6. She first contacted three individuals mentioned in...