Martin v. Hamm

1

GEORGE MARTIN, Petitioner, v. JOHN HAMM, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, ^[1] Respondent.

Civ. Act. No. 1:21-cv-460-TFM-MU

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

May 20, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TERRY F. MOORER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On January 18, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation which recommends Petitioner's habeas claims be denied without an evidentiary hearing and that he be granted a certificate of appealability on two specific issues. (Doc. 27). Petitioner (Martin) and Respondent (the State) both timely filed objections (Docs. 32, 33) and responses to each other's objections (Docs. 34, 35). Martin also filed a reply in support of his objection. (Doc. 36). The Report and Recommendation and underlying habeas petition are ripe for review.

I. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Martin's case is troubling. The Brady violations that occurred during his first trial, and the probable impact those violations had on Martin's ability to investigate leads and present the most vigorous defense possible, are not lost on this Court. Nor does the Court question Martin's strong desire to expose those Brady violations to a jury. However, neither the Court's apprehension about how the Alabama courts handled those Brady violations nor its sincere appreciation of Martin's situation are enough to grant habeas relief. The standard for habeas relief set by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is “difficult to meet” and “it was meant to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Habeas relief is not justified simply because this Court might have decided Martin's constitutional claims differently-or even if the Court was convinced the Alabama courts were wrong. See Reaves v. Sec'y, Fla Dep't of Corr., 872 F.3d 1137, 1156 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The Court may only grant habeas relief if the strict requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are satisfied. Controlled by this standard, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Martin has not proven his right to habeas relief. The parties' objections to the Report and Recommendation are addressed below.

A. The Court agrees Martin's Sufficiency Claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Alternatively, it fails on the merits.

Martin's first objection relates to his Sufficiency Claim. He says the Magistrate Judge wrongly concluded the Sufficiency Claim was unexhausted and procedurally defaulted and argues instead that the Sufficiency Claim should be reviewed on the merits and granted. (Doc. 32 at 713). Alternatively, Martin requests a certificate of appealability on the issue. Martin's objections are overruled, but his request for a certificate of appealability is granted.

For starters, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Martin's Sufficiency Claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (See Doc. 27 at 9-14). Although Martin challenged the sufficiency of the State's pecuniary-gain evidence throughout the Alabama state courts he never raised the issue as a federal one until coming to this Court with his habeas petition. This means the claim is unexhausted. And because the Sufficiency Claim would be barred in Alabama state court now, it is also procedurally defaulted. Without proof of cause-and-prejudice or actual innocence, which Martin has not provided, the Sufficiency Claim must be dismissed.

Martin argues that his case is like Vazquez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 827 F.3d 964 (11^th Cir. 2016), where the Eleventh Circuit found error with the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a habeas claim as unexhausted despite the state having expressly waived any exhaustion argument. (Doc. 32 at 8). The Court finds Vazquez distinguishable. In Vazquez, the state very specifically admitted that “.. .the claims were fairly presented to the state court and are exhausted”. 827 F.3d at 966 n. 1. The State never made such a clear waiver in Martin's case though. Admittedly, the State acknowledged that Martin raised the sufficiency issue in the Alabama courts, and the State addressed the merits of that claim in its response to the habeas petition, but the Court does not see where the State ever expressly waived exhaustion like the state did in Vazquez. The Court declines to read the State's acknowledgment that an issue was raised in state court as a complete waiver of an exhaustion defense. Raising an issue in state court does not equate to exhausting it. Accordingly, Vazquez does not change the Court's opinion that Martin's Sufficiency Claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

Martin also relies on Mulnix v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 254 Fed.Appx. 763 (11th Cir. 2007), to suggest that a federal claim is necessarily exhausted where a petitioner has exhausted a state law claim with the same legal standard. (Doc. 32 at 9). However, Mulnix is an unpublished decision that was criticized later in Preston v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 460 (11th Cir. 2015), a published, precedential decision. Preston directs that “it is not at all clear that a petitioner can exhaust a federal claim by raising an analogous state claim” and “simply mentioning a phrase common to both state and federal law, like ‘sufficiency of the evidence,' cannot constitute fairly presenting a federal claim to the state courts.” Preston, 785 F.3d at 460; see also Cascante v. Florida, 816 Fed.Appx. 429, 431 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2020) (per curiam) (discussing Preston and ruling that federal claims were not exhausted where the petitioner had not raised any federal claims or cited to any federal cases in state court); Mingo v. Dixon, Case No. 21-cv-60263, 2022 WL 2208918 at *5 n. 6 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2022) (unpublished) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's criticism of Mulnix). Mulnix does not persuade the Court that Martin's Sufficiency Claim has been exhausted.

However, since Martin insists the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) adjudicated his federal insufficiency claim on the merits, and that it did so incorrectly, this Court writes to the merits of that claim too. In the Court's view, even if Martin's Sufficiency Claim was exhausted, it would still fail.

To elaborate, in order for Martin to be entitled to habeas relief on his Sufficiency Claim, this Court must decide that the Alabama courts' denial of that claim resulted in a decision that was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law,” or was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The “clearly established Federal law” relevant to Martin's Sufficiency Claim comes from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that, in an appeal challenging the sufficiency of evidence against a defendant, the “critical inquiry” is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 318-19. The Jackson court noted further that it is the trier of fact's duty “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts and ultimate facts,” and that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id.

The ACCA rejected Martin's argument that the State failed to prove he killed Hammoleketh for pecuniary gain. Specifically, the ACCA ruled:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence offered by the State was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of capital murder -- specifically murder for pecuniary gain. Evidence was presented that the scene was staged to look like an accident and that the fire was not a result of a collision but, instead, had originated in the back passenger floorboard. One of the reasons investigators believed that the fire was not the result of an accident was because of the smell of gasoline in the rear passenger floorboard, which was full of paper debris.

Martin insisted to investigators that the fire was a result of an accidental collision. The State presented evidence of an investigation report prepared by Martin approximately one year prior to the death of his wife. The report involved a traffic accident in which a vehicle left the road, hit a tree, and burst into flames. Martin's version of what occurred in this case was strikingly similar to the report of the incident one year prior. Given the evidence presented, including the position of the body in the vehicle, the jury could have reasonably concluded from the evidence that Hammoleketh died as a result of a homicide and not an accident.

Martin's brief on appeal attempts to cast his marriage to Hammoleketh as a loving relationship, yet the State's evidence indicates that Martin and Hammoleketh had marital problems. Martin himself admitted to physical altercations with Hammoleketh, and Joseph Petties, a friend of the Martins, testified that he had observed what appeared to be fist holes in some interior doors of the Martin residence. Further, Martin was involved in an extramarital affair. After Hammoleketh's death, Martin did not inform investigators of the affair when questioned and told Creer not to tell anyone about their affair.

Martin was the last known person to see his wife alive. When officers arrived around 2:00 a.m. at the Martin residence a few hours after the fire, Martin was not at home and, when questioned upon his return, he stated that he did not know his wife's whereabouts at the time. Martin admitted that the disposable lighter found on the ground at the scene was his and attempted to explain its presence by claiming that his wife used it as a flashlight even though the couple

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