Martin v. Houy

1

ADAM EUGENE MARTIN, Petitioner, v. WARDEN HOUY, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-00854

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

December 28, 2022

RAMBO J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Adam Eugene Martin (“Martin”), an inmate currently incarcerated at the United States penitentiary in Coleman, Florida (“USP-Coleman II”), filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against Respondent Warden Houy (“Respondent”). (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Martin's petition be denied for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background and Procedural History

On August 18, 2004, Martin was convicted, following a jury trial, of eight counts of bank robbery, and subsequently sentenced to eight concurrent life sentences. United States v.Martin, 431 F.3d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 2005). Martin was sentenced subject to a mandatory enhancement under the “Three Strikes” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559, which states that a person convicted of a serious violent felony “shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if . . . the person has been convicted . . . on separate prior occasions . . . of . . . 2 or more serious violent felonies.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). At the time of sentencing, Martin had four prior felony convictions: two federal bank robbery convictions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a); a Texas state robbery conviction, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 29.02; and an Arizona state Aggravated Assault conviction in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204(A)(1), 13701, 13-801. Martin, 431 F.3d at 850. Martin filed a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which was affirmed by a decision dated December 2, 2005. Martin, 431 F.3d 846. The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Martin v. United States, 547 U.S. 1059 (2006).

Martin's first collateral attack of his conviction and sentence was made on January 31, 2006, when he filed a § 2255 motion in the sentencing court, which was denied. See United States v. Martin, No. 1:03-CR-250 (W.D. Tx.), ECF No. 215. The Fifth Circuit denied Martin's motion for a certificate of appealability and also dismissed his appeal of the trial court's order denying relief on his section 2255 motion. See United States v. Martin, 1:06-CV-57 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006), certificate of appealability denied, No. 06-50962 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2007). Later in 2006, Martin filed a § 2255 motion, which was denied. (Doc. 3, at 2). Martin then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 in the Eastern District of Texas in which he asserted that he was unlawfully confined because the federal government did not have a waiver of jurisdiction from the state and he was, therefore, innocent. Martin v. Outlaw, No. CIV.A. 1:06CV804, 2007 WL 1138830, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2007). By memorandum order dated April 17, 2007, that petition was dismissed as having been inappropriately brought pursuant to § 2241. Martin, 2007 WL 1138830, at *1. In August 2008, Martin was sanctioned $350 and barred from filing any motion or action in the Western District of Texas until he receives permission from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive § 2255 motion. (Doc. 6, at 3). In December 2009, Martin was again barred from filing any motion or action in the Western District of Texas challenging his conviction until he receives permission from the Fifth Circuit to file a successive § 2255 motion. (Doc. 6, at 3).

Martin proceeded to file a second § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia on January 26, 2009, in which he claimed: (1) the government withheld exculpatory DNA evidence, violating his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights and that he was innocent of all charges; (2) the FBI requested his arrest until completion of the federal investigation, violating his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights and his right to due process; and (3) the government violated Title 18 U.S.C. § 3000 by withholding DNA tests done by a state lab in violation of his right to due process. Martin v. Cross, No. 2:09CV12, 2009 WL 1034497, at *1 (N.D. W.Va. Apr. 16, 2009). By order dated April 16, 2009, the second petition was also dismissed as inappropriately being brought pursuant to § 2241. Martin, 2009 WL 1034497.

On an unspecified date, Martin sought DNA testing in the district court which was denied. The petitioner moved to proceed in forma pauperis in the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit denied the petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the appeal as frivolous noting that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt was overwhelming and included testimony from the petitioner's co-defendants regarding his participation in the robberies, as well as letters written by the petitioner that amounted to a confession. United States v. Martin, 377 Fed.Appx. 395, 396 (2010). The court further found that the petitioner had made no attempt to explain how DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the bank robbery offense so as to satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3600. Martin, 377 Fed.Appx. at 396. Martin filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was denied by the United States Supreme Court on October 4, 2010. Martin v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 357 (2010).

On May 3, 2011, Martin filed a habeas petition in the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he argues that he can establish that he is actually innocent pursuant to the provisions of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Martin v. Martinez, No. 3:11-837, 2012 WL 140420, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2012). On January 18, 2012, the Court denied the petition for failure to meet the stringent requirements of § 2241. Martin, 2012 WL 140420, at *5. In January 2022 Martin filed a motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act, which was denied. (Doc. 6, at 3).

Martin initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, setting forth two grounds for relief: (1) actual and factual innocence of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c); and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 1, at 4-6). On July 26, 2022, Respondent filed a response to the petition, arguing that “[t]he petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it is actually a § 2255 motion but Martin's claim does not trigger that section's savings clause.” (Doc. 6, at 3). On August 12, 2022, Martin filed a traverse, citing Borden v, United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817 (2021), for the first time. (Doc. 8). On August 22, 2022, Martin filed a motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order (“TRO”).^[1] (Doc. 10). On August 26, 2022, Respondent filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental response, a brief in support, and a proposed supplemental response. (Doc. 11; Doc. 12; Doc. 13). On August 31, 2022, the Court granted Respondent's motion for leave to file. (Doc. 14). Martin filed objections to Respondent's supplemental response on September 8, 2022. (Doc. 15).

The petition has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

Martin may not challenge his sentence by way of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A federal prisoner generally must use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence on constitutional grounds. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). He “can seek relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Manna v. Schultz, 454 Fed.Appx. 31, 33 (3d Cir. 2010).

28 U.S.C. § 2255 establishes a one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Also, before a second or successive § 2255 motion may be considered by the district court, it must be certified by a three judge panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain:

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

A motion under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if “‘some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a Section 2255 proceeding from affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim of wrongful detention.'” Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (quoting United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954)). “Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.” Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002). “It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to utilize it, that is determinative.” Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538. The petitioner has the burden of proving that the remedy afforded by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Brown v. Mendez, 167 F.Supp.2d 723, 726 (M.D. Pa. 2001). And when a petitioner improperly challenges a conviction or sentence under § 2241, the petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming the District Court's order denying Gardner's § 2241 habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction).

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