Martin v. Martin

320 A.3d 113

Robert V. MARTIN, Jr.

v.Cherri A. MARTIN, Appellant

No. 1495 WDA 2022 Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 14, 2023

Filed July 22, 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 23, 2022, In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Civil Division, at No(s): 2153 of 2016-D, Jim Silvis, J.

William J. Carmella, Indiana, for appellant.

Elizabeth J. McCall, Greensburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.^*

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Cherri A. Martin ("Wife") appeals from the economic component of the divorce decree entered on November 23, 2022.¹ We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Wife and Robert V. Martin, Jr. ("Husband") married in 1998, and on December 6, 2016 Husband filed a complaint in divorce seeking, inter alia, equitable distribution and exclusive possession of the marital residence. Wife responded by raising counts of equitable distribution, alimony pendente lite ("APL"), and alimony. Pending the resolution of the competing economic claims, the parties entered into a consent decree that granted Husband exclusive possession of the marital residence as of February 1, 2017 and awarded Wife $2,400.00 monthly APL as of the same date. See Order 1/5/17, at 1. While Husband did not reside at the property, he had exclusive possession, maintained it, and paid the mortgage until the couple ultimately sold the residence, receiving net proceeds of $203,329.25. During the separation, the court divided the couple’s savings account and advanced Wife $17,500.00. Husband retained $9,000.00 in the account, which he continued to use post-separation.

Following evidentiary hearings before the divorce master on October 25, and November 2, 2021, and the parties’ briefing of their respective positions, the master issued a January 20, 2022 report and recommendation, which the trial court adopted as an order entered on January 24, 2022. Consistent with the master’s recommendation, the trial court divided the marital estate sixty percent/forty percent in favor of Wife. Specifically, the trial court awarded Wife, among other things, a sixty-percent share of each of the marital portions of Husband’s military pension that was in pay status and administered by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service ("DFAS"), two private-sector retirement savings plans that accrued during Husband’s post-military service employment as an engineer with Bechtel Marine Propulsion ("Bechtel") and its successor Fluor Marine Propulsion ("Fluor"), and the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, minus a $43,773.12 credit for Husband’s post-separation mortgage payments. In sum, the court awarded Wife $95,733.62 for her portion of the marital home, $47,157.77, representing her sixty-percent share of the balance in the couple’s Navy Federal Credit Union savings and checking account at date of separation, $88,738.82 from the Fluor/Bechtel retirement savings plans, and $1,156.20 per month, which is sixty percent of the military pension’s monthly marital component. However, it denied Wife’s claim for alimony, in part, "due to the length of time in which [Husband paid APL,]" approximately five years, and permitted Husband to remove Wife from the survivor benefit plan ("SBP"). Trial Court Opinion, 8/19/22, at unnumbered 3.

Husband and Wife both filed timely exceptions to the master’s recommendation. Husband challenged the 60%-40% equitable distribution scheme, generally, and specifically assailed the court’s: (1) calculation of the marital component of Husband’s Bechtel retirement plan; (2) failure to award a credit for the purported overpayment of APL; and (3) division of the military pension in contravention of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act concerning the "[p]ayment of retired [military] pay in compliance with court orders." 10 U.S.C. § 1408. As to the military pension, Husband argued that § 1408 prohibited the distribution of more than one-half of the retirement benefit to a former spouse.

Wife, meanwhile, contested the termination of the SBP component of the military pension, the $43,773.12 credit awarded to Husband for the post-separation mortgage payments, and the denial of alimony. On May 24, 2022, the trial court entered the above-captioned order that denied all of Wife’s exceptions and granted Husband’s exceptions relating to the calculation of the Bechtel retirement plan and § 1408’s restrictions on the distribution of military pensions.

This timely appeal followed. Wife complied with the trial court order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the court issued a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Wife presents five issues for our review, which we re-order for ease of disposition:

I. Whether the trial court erred by not granting [Wife] alimony.

II. Whether the trial court erred in its calculation of [Wife’s] share of [Husband’s] retirement plan.

III. Whether the trial court erred [in] granting [Husband] credit for payments made towards the principal amount of the mortgage on the marital residence.

IV. Whether the trial court erred by granting [Husband’s] exception to reduce the amount the Appellant is eligible to receive under 10 U.S.C. [§] 1408.

V. Whether the trial court erred by permitting [Husband] to eliminate or remove the [SBP] from his military retirement, including the elimination or removal of [Wife] as the beneficiary of such a designation.

Wife’s brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

[1–4] Wife’s first issue concerns the trial court’s denial of her alimony claim, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See Conner v. Conner, 217 A.3d 301, 315 (Pa.Super. 2019). As we have explained:

[T]he purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met. Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay. Moreover, alimony following a divorce is a secondary remedy and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award and development of an appropriate employable skill.

Id. at 315-16 (cleaned up). The Divorce Code provides that, "[i]n determining whether alimony is necessary and in determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony," the trial court must consider the following seventeen non-exclusive factors:

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the parties.

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

(5) The duration of the marriage.

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child.

(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.

(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

(13) The relative needs of the parties.

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties from the date of final separation shall not be considered by the court in its determinations relative to alimony, except that the court shall consider the abuse of one party by the other party.

As used in this paragraph, "abuse" shall have the meaning given to it under [§] 6102 (relating to definitions).

(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony award.

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the party’s reasonable needs.

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-support through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b).

Wife asserts that the trial court erred in adopting the master’s recommendation because it disregarded the enumerated factors and simply rejected alimony based upon the length of time in which APL has been paid. See Wife’s brief at 21-22. She contends that the focus on the prior APL award was misplaced because that temporary, need-based remedy served a different purpose than alimony, i.e., economic justice. Id. at 22-23. Wife also maintains that her earning capacity continues to be limited by the fact that the parties agreed that she would not work during the marriage, and highlights that, while she earns approximately $12.00 per hour, Husband earns more than $110,000 annually. Id. at 23. She also contests the trial court’s finding that she did not adduce evidence of her bills or expense, reasoning her "financial status and need was present throughout the entire hearing" and "[b]oth parties acknowledge Wife’s far inferior living situation[.]" Id. at 24. In this vein, she opines that "nearly all of the evidence and testimony presented during the two days of testimony demonstrates a need." Id

Ultimately, Wife posits that focusing on the duration of APL was error considering the disparity in the parties’ respective earning capacity and her demonstrable need for alimony pursuant to the relevant factors outlined in § 3701(b). Id. at 25. As explained infra, we reject both aspects of Wife’s assertion.

[5] While the master mentioned the duration of APL in...