Martin v. Olson

318 A.3d 1067

226 Conn.App. 392

Daniel A. MARTIN

v.Christopher R. OLSON, Executor (Estate of Robert K. Olson)

(AC 46483)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 13, 2024

Officially Released June 25, 2024

Thomas A. Amato, Manchester, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Steven L. Katz, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

Alvord, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

ALVORD, J.

[1–8] ₃₉₄The plaintiff, Daniel A. Martin, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Christopher R. Olson, executor of the estate of Robert K. Olson (decedent). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) instructed the jury regarding the defendant’s statute of limitations defense, (2) admitted into evidence certain testimony, and (3) permitted the defendant to present the testimony of undisclosed witnesses during his casein-chief.¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

₃₉₅The following facts, as reasonably could have been found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In October, 2007, the plaintiff moved into the home of the decedent, his grandfather, at 65 Andreis Trail, South Windsor (property). The plaintiff continued to reside at the property with the decedent until the decedent’s death in March, 2020. During this thirteen year period, the plaintiff provided certain caregiving services to the decedent in the form of (1) assisting the decedent with completing errands, (2) completing general household chores and cooking, (3) providing the decedent with his medications, (4) driving the decedent to doctor’s appointments, (5) providing care to the decedent when he was ill, and (6) serving as a daily presence at the property in the event of an emergency. The decedent’s children, including the defendant, also frequently provided care for their father.

After the decedent’s death, the defendant was appointed executor of the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s last will and testament did not include the plaintiff as a beneficiary. On May 29, 2020, the plaintiff sent a claim to the defendant requesting $741,048 for the caregiving services the plaintiff provided to the decedent. On June 5, 2020, the plaintiff sent a supplemental claim to the defendant requesting an increased amount of $1,106,175 for the services he provided to the decedent. On July 10, 2020, the defendant filed with the Probate Court a form titled "Return of Claims and List of Notified Creditors" (return of claims), wherein the defendant rejected the plaintiff’s claim by identifying the "date of ₃₉₆Written disallowance" as July 10, 2020, and stating that the "amount allowed" to the plaintiff was zero dollars. The defendant sent via certified mail the return of claims to the plaintiff. On July 13, 2020, the postal return receipt card was signed. The defendant subsequently received the signed return receipt card.²

On October 19, 2020, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant by certified mail stating in relevant part: "I understand that you are the executor of [the decedent’s estate]. On May 29, 2020 I presented a claim, and on June 6, 2020 an amended claim, to you in your capacity as such executor. You thus far have failed to give notice under [General Statutes §] 45a-360 (a)³ of your action on said claim. Since at least ninety days have elapsed since May 29, 2020 please consider this correspondence my request under [§] 45a-360 (c)⁴ that you take action on said claims." (Footnotes added.)

The defendant received the plaintiff’s letter on October 24, 2020. On November 23, 2020, the defendant’s counsel sent an email to the plaintiff’s counsel stating in relevant part: "I have received a letter from your client to the [defendant] requesting action on his claim for caretake[r] services. The claim was denied by virtue ₃₉₇of the [return of claims] filed on July 9, 2020.⁵ On that form, the claim was denied in its entirety. At this time, we consider the claim to be dismissed as no legal action was commenced within 120 days per Connecticut law." (Footnote added.)

In December, 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant. In the plaintiff’s operative amended complaint, he alleged five causes of action, captioned breach of express oral contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and "breach of promise to nominate as beneficiary." The defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff’s amended complaint and raised several special defenses. Relevant to this appeal, the defendant asserted, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 45a-363⁶ because the plaintiff did not commence this action within 120 days of receiving the return of claims.

A jury trial was held over several days in September, 2022. In addition to his own testimony, the plaintiff presented the testimony of Gabrielle Duah, an expert in the rates for caregiving services; Jami Somero, his friend; and Jeffrey J. Martin, his father. The plaintiff testified, inter alia, that he had several conversations with the decedent wherein the decedent offered to pay the plaintiff for his caregiving services, offered him the ₃₉₈property as compensation for his services, and stated that he would name the plaintiff as a beneficiary in his will.

In addition to his own testimony, the defendant presented the testimony of his siblings. The defendant also presented the testimony of Audrey Carson, a caregiver hired by the defendant and his siblings to provide assistance to the decedent. Finally, the defendant presented, during his casein-chief, the testimony of Debra Olson, the defendant’s wife, and Mark Longo, the plaintiff’s stepfather. The plaintiff objected to the defendant presenting this testimonial evidence during his case-in-chief, arguing that it was impermissible "surrebuttal" evidence. The court overruled the plaintiff’s objection and permitted the defendant’s wife to testify so as not to delay the trial and found that the plaintiff was not unfairly surprised by the testimony of his stepfather.

After the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury as to each of the plaintiff’s causes of action.⁷ The ₃₉₉court then instructed the jury on the defendant’s special defenses. Finally, the court instructed the jury on how to complete the jury interrogatories. Specifically, the court instructed the jury to make a finding as to each count of the plaintiff’s operative complaint and then, if necessary, to make findings on the defendant’s special defenses.

On September 19, 2022, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on each count of the plaintiff’s operative complaint. The jury also determined that the defendant’s statute of limitations defense applied. The plaintiff filed a timely motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35. The defendant filed an objection, and, on April 24, 2023, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. This appeal followed. Additional procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly instructed the jury regarding the effect of the return of claims. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that the court’s instruction as to the defendant’s statute of limitations defense caused the jury to find against the plaintiff on his five causes of action. The defendant responds that, because the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on all five causes of action, the jury was not required to make any findings as to the defendant’s special defenses and any purported error in the court’s instruction was harmless. We agree with the defendant.

The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this claim. After the close of evidence, the ₄₀₀court held a charging conference. The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the court’s draft instruction on the defendant’s statute of limitations defense and argued, inter alia, that his "position is that the return of claims that seems to be the significant document by which the defendant is claiming that it notified] the plaintiff of the rejection, our position is that that document in and of itself is invalid because it violates § 45a-360 (b)."⁸ The court overruled the objection, stating that it understood the plaintiff’s objection to be that the return of claims did not provide a reason for denying the plaintiff’s claim. The court relied on International Tool & Gauge Co. v. Borg, 145 Conn. 644, 646, 145 A.2d 750 (1958), for the proposition that notice must be sufficiently unequivocal to place a claimant on notice that their claim has been denied.

The court, after instructing the jury on the plaintiff’s causes of action, charged the jury on the defendant’s statute of limitations defense as follows: "[The defendant] has raised defenses to [the plaintiff’s] claims asserting that [the plaintiff] cannot prevail on his various claims because he did not bring suit on those claims within the time that is allowed by law. There are state statutes that specify how much time a person—how much time a person has to bring certain kinds of claims. These are called statutes of limitation. A person cannot recover on a claim that is brought after the time period that applies to a particular claim even if it is one day late. The defendant claims that the [statute] of limitations provided for under … § 45a-363 bars recovery under all of [the plaintiff’s] claims since the action was not commenced within 120 days from the date of the rejection of [the plaintiff’s] claim against [the decedent’s] estate. [The defendant] contends that [the plaintiff’s] ₄₀₁claim for alleged caregiver services was denied on July 9, 2020,⁹ and that [the plaintiff] received a copy of that denial on July 13, 2020. [The plaintiff] denies that he ever received a copy of the denial of his claim. It is undisputed that this action was filed with the court o...