Martin v. PTM Mgmt. Corp.

214 A.D.3d 782

185 N.Y.S.3d 247

John H. MARTIN, plaintiff,

v.PTM MANAGEMENT CORP., et al., appellants, et al., defendant.

2020–07563

Index No. 501108/19

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—December 16, 2022

March 15, 2023

Zaklukiewicz, Puzo & Morrissey, LLP, Islip Terrace, NY (Judith S. Pluviose of counsel), for appellants.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants PTM Management Corp. and Clifton E. Murrel appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Karen B. Rothenberg, J.), dated September 25, 2020. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of those defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the motion of the defendants PTM Management Corp. and Clifton E. Murrel which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted.

The parties were involved in a three-vehicle, chain-collision accident. The plaintiff, who operated the middle vehicle, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the defendant Nicole Acevedo, the operator of the lead vehicle, the defendant PTM Management Corp. (hereinafter PTM), the owner of the rearmost vehicle, and the defendant Clifton E. Murrel, the operator of the rearmost vehicle. PTM and Murrel (hereinafter together the PTM defendants) moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiff did not oppose the motion. The Supreme Court denied that branch of the PTM defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and the PTM defendants appeal.

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence (see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 ; Matzen v. Armstrong, 190 A.D.3d 848, 849, 136 N.Y.S.3d 788 ). " ‘A nonnegligent explanation may include that a vehicle made a sudden lane change in front of a defendant's vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly’ " ( Flood v. Fillas, 190 A.D.3d 828, 829, 136 N.Y.S.3d 767, quoting Cruz v. Valentine Packaging Corp., 167 A.D.3d 707, 708, 89 N.Y.S.3d 316 ; see Hernandez v. Brayer, 208 A.D.3d 642, 643, 174 N.Y.S.3d 77 ). Additionally, "the emergency doctrine holds that those faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, not of their own making, that leaves them with little or no time for reflection or reasonably causes them to be so disturbed that they are compelled to make a quick decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, may not be negligent if their actions are reasonable and prudent in the context of the emergency" ( Bello v. Transit Auth. of N.Y. City, 12 A.D.3d 58, 60, 783 N.Y.S.2d 648 ; see Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 77...