Martin v. State

TAMEKIA MARTIN v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 658

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

September 10, 2020

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 117075001

UNREPORTED

Arthur, Friedman, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.

Opinion by Raker, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

In 2008, D.M., child of Tamekia Martin, appellant, suffered serious injuries while in appellant's care. Appellant was thereafter charged, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, with various crimes related to D.M.'s injuries. Appellant entered a negotiated Alford plea¹ to one count of first-degree child abuse. In 2014, D.M. died as a result of his injuries, and the State re-charged appellant with manslaughter and first-degree child abuse resulting in death. Prior to her March 2019 trial, appellant filed a "Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and Bar Further Prosecution," which the circuit court denied. Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to a term of incarceration of six years for involuntary manslaughter and six years for first-degree child abuse resulting in death, to be served concurrently. In this appeal, appellant presents the following questions for our review:

"1. Did the circuit court err in denying the motion to enforce the 2018 plea agreement and bar further prosecution?

2. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the convictions?"

We shall hold that the circuit court erred in denying appellant's motion and shall reverse.

I.

On January 19, 2008, three-year-old D.M. was at his home when he suffered a traumatic brain injury consistent with "an inflicted injury" and "child abuse." At the time, appellant was the only adult in the home. As a result of these injuries, D.M. suffered from cerebral palsy and "visual, physical and mental disabilities, requiring the use of a feeding tube, ventilator and wheelchair."

On April 30, 2008, the Grand Jury for Baltimore City indicted appellant with the offenses of first-degree child abuse, first-degree assault, and lesser included offenses. The charges arose out of the 2008 incident. Baltimore City authorities responded to a call for an injured, unconscious child at appellant's home on Hugo Avenue. Appellant told the investigating detective that D.M. fell down the stairs and passed out on the way to the bathroom. D.M. was admitted to The Johns Hopkins Hospital where Dr. Allen Walker determined that he suffered a traumatic brain injury consistent with "Abusive Head Trauma" or "Shaken Baby [S]yndrome," not an accidental fall. Dr. Walker stated that D.M. had little chance of surviving. Shortly after sustaining the injuries, D.M., in a vegetative state, was transferred to Lifeline, Inc., a long-term care facility.

On May 4, 2009, appellant agreed to enter an Alford plea to one count of first-degree child abuse.² At the plea hearing that followed, the State outlined the terms of the plea agreement as follows:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor . . . Ms. Martin is going to be pleading guilty to the first count, which is first degree child abuse. Upon acceptance of the plea and a finding of guilt, the State will enter a nolle prosse as to the remaining counts.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, that's Count 1 or Count 2?

[THE STATE]: That's Count 1, Your Honor . . . first-degree child abuse.

***

THE COURT: And that sentence grade is—well, it's going to be held sub curia anyway.

[THE STATE]: That's correct, but it is 25 years, Your Honor."

Subsequently, the court and appellant discussed as follows:

"THE COURT: Okay. The agreement will be that it's 15 years, suspend all but time served, three years supervised probation. And the State is going to research treatment facilities and programs for you in the meantime.

[APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.

***

THE COURT: . . . There are no promises regarding any other cases than the ones I stated. Do you understand that, [Ms. Martin]?

***

[APPELLANT]: Yes."

The court asked appellant if there was anything she wanted "to get off [her] chest, without limitation, about this case" or if there was anything "in the back of [her] mind that's bothering [her]." After appellant conferred with defense counsel, defense counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." The State read the facts to support the plea into the record, and the court found appellant guilty of first-degree child abuse. The court imposed sentence in accord with the plea agreement.

On July 2, 2014, an Anne Arundel County paramedic responded to a call to an apartment, a Lifeline health care facility, along Bushy Ridge Road. She found ten-year old D.M. lying in cardiac arrest but still breathing with the assistance of a ventilator. He was cold to the touch, and no one was performing CPR. After performing CPR for twenty to thirty minutes, the paramedic called the hospital and received permission to terminate efforts to resuscitate D.M.³ and waited for police to arrive. D.M. was in the care and custody of Lifeline, and appellant had had no contact with D.M. from January 19, 2008 to July 2, 2014.

The medical examiner performed an autopsy on D.M. and concluded that the manner of death was homicide and that the causes of death were complications stemming from "cerebral palsy due to remote head trauma," with the originating cause of death being the head trauma that he suffered in 2008.

On March 17, 2017, the State charged appellant with one count of manslaughter and one count of child abuse resulting in death, based on the events of January 19, 2008. On September 13, 2017, Appellant filed in the circuit court a "Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and Bar Further Prosecution." In that motion, appellant argued that when she pled guilty to first-degree child abuse following D.M.'s injuries, she did so "on the clear understanding that this plea would end forever the legal ordeal that began with her child's injury." Appellant further argued that the circuit court's acceptance of the binding plea agreement created "a reasonable assumption in [her mind] that this plea was the conclusion of any and all legal consequences for the alleged abuse of [D.M.]" Appellant asked that the terms of the plea bargain be enforced and that, in accord with those terms, the State be barred from further prosecution and the court dismiss all charges.

Prior to the start of appellant's trial, the parties litigated appellant's motion before the circuit court. The court denied the motion, reasoning as follows:

"[A]fter looking at the transcript, I think [the hearing court] points out that there were no future promises to any other cases, and that [appellant's] belief was unreasonable. Her attorney could have explained to her that if this child died that she could be charged with the death of her child.

Her belief that she could not be charged with any further cases if [D.M.'s] situation changed, I think was completely unreasonable and it is not supported by the transcript or any other evidence."

The trial commenced, the jury convicted appellant, and the court imposed sentence. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Before this Court, appellant argues first that the circuit court erred in denying her "Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and Bar Further Prosecution." She maintains that when she agreed to the Alford plea following the alleged child abuse involving D.M. in 2008, she believed, and a reasonable person in her position would have believed, based on the terms of the plea agreement, that she could not be prosecuted again if D.M. died from his injuries. Appellant asserts that the only notice she had that such a consequence was possible came when the hearing court asked her if she understood that there were "no promises regarding any other cases." She contends, however, that the court's question "was simply too thin of a reed upon which to conclude that it would be unreasonable for [her] to believe she could not be prosecuted again if [D.M.] died." Appellant maintains that the terms of her 2008 plea agreement, as she understood them, should be enforced and that, as a result, her 2019 convictions of manslaughter and child abuse resulting in death should be vacated.

Second, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions for involuntary manslaughter and first-degree child abuse. For both charges, appellant asserts that the State failed to prove that her actions were the legal cause of D.M.'s death. Appellant concedes, however, that she did not move for judgment of acquittal on the charge of involuntary manslaughter at trial. If the causation issue in first-degree child abuse is preserved and vacated, the interest of justice demands vacating the involuntary manslaughter conviction. In the alternative, this court should exercise plain-error review to vacate the involuntary manslaughter conviction because post-conviction relief is "inevitable." Additionally, appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

In response, the State contends that the court properly denied appellant's "Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement and Ban Further Prosecution" because "there is nothing in the record to show that [her] plea was conditioned on the State's promise not to prosecute her if [D.M.] died." In the State's view, the plea agreement was clear: "[appellant] was to enter an Alford plea to first-degree child abuse, and in exchange, the State was to nol pros the remaining counts in the charging document" and nothing else. The State argues that because there was no express condition nor ambiguous term for the circuit court to interpret in appellant's favor, it properly denied her motion.

As to the sufficiency of the evidence claim, the State argues that this claim for the manslaughter conviction is not preserved for our review. On the merits, the State maintains that the evidence, viewed in the light most...